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Summary 
Changes in land use, such as deforestation, expansion of sedentary agriculture and 
intensification of agricultural systems, significantly altered economic and ecological 
conditions in many regions of the world. In recent decades, one of the most rapid changes 
in land use was the expansion of plantation crops and the associated loss of tropical 
rainforests. In particular, oil palm expanded rapidly due to the increasing global demand 
for vegetable oil and the high land productivity of oil palm compared to other oil crops. 
One of the countries where the expansion of oil palm has been particularly strong during 
the last 25 years is Indonesia. The oil palm acreage in Indonesia increased from about 1 
million hectares in 1990 to 12 million hectares in 2016. A number of studies have shown 
that the oil palm expansion led to increasing welfare of smallholder farmers. However, oil 
palm expansion was also found to aggravate ecological hazards such as greenhouse gas 
emission and biodiversity loss, not only by replacing the natural ecosystem functions of 
forests but also by replacing less-intensive agricultural production systems (e.g., rubber 
agro-forestry). The positive economic effects in the smallholder sector and the negative 
ecological effects depict a strong trade-off for policy-makers. In order to mitigate such 
trade-offs and ensure economic and ecological sustainability of agrarian systems, detailed 
studies of the impacts and determinants of land-use change are indispensable. The 
dissertation contains three essays on the impacts and determinants of land-use changes in 
Indonesia. The first essay explores the pathways through which secure property rights curb 
deforestation via land-sparing intensification. The second essay discusses the effect of oil 
palm cultivation on smallholder farmers‟ welfare. The last essay investigates the impact of 
oil palm expansion on human population growth assessed in terms of women‟s fertility 
rates (number of live birth per woman) channeled through income gains, rising returns to 
education, and other mechanisms.  
The expansion of agricultural land remains one of the main drivers of deforestation in 
tropical regions, with severe negative environmental consequences. The first essay 
hypothesizes that stronger land property rights could enable farmers to increase input-use 
intensity and productivity on the already cultivated land, thus reducing incentives to 
expand their farms by deforesting additional land. The current literature on the land 
property rights and deforestation analyzed primarily the effects of secure forest property 
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rights on protecting forest from encroachment. For agricultural land, studies have focused 
on the effects of secure property rights on input intensity and crop productivity. Examining 
the potential effects of secure property rights for agricultural land on deforestation via 
agricultural intensification was rarely explored in the literature. To test our hypothesis, we 
compiled a data set using various kinds of data, including a panel survey of farm 
households in Jambi, Sumatra, satellite imageries from LANDSAT to account for spatial 
patterns, such as historical forest locations and data on topsoil characteristics of farmers‟ 
plots. Results show that plots for which farmers hold formal land titles are cultivated more 
intensively and are more productive than untitled plots, even after controlling for other 
relevant factors such as soil characteristics. However, our results also show that, due to 
land policy restrictions, farmers located at the historic forest margins are less likely to hold 
formal titles for the land they cultivate. We assume that without land titles, these farmers 
are less able to intensify and more likely to expand into the surrounding forest land to 
increase agricultural output. Indeed, historic forest closeness and past deforestation 
activities by households are found to be positively associated with current farm size. The 
findings suggest that unregulated deforestation activities of farmers in combination with 
insecure property rights for the appropriated land are not conducive for forest conservation. 
Farmers with insecure property rights face incentives for extensive rather than intensive 
production systems, which could lead to even further deforestation if land and forest 
governance is weak.  
While the negative ecological effects of the rapid expansion of oil palm in Southeast 
Asia are far-reaching and relatively widely studied, the socioeconomic consequences have 
received much less attention in the literature. The second essay examines the welfare 
effects of oil palm cultivation for smallholder farm households. Unlike other related 
studies that have used cross-section data, our analysis builds on panel data. Farm 
household data were collected from 683 farm households in Jambi, Sumatra, in two survey 
rounds, 2012 and 2015. The results show that oil palm cultivation has significant positive 
effects on farmers‟ consumption expenditure, our proxy of household living standards. 
Lower labor requirements allow oil palm farmers to further expand their farmland or 
reallocate the saved labor to non-farm economic activities, thus contributing to additional 
secondary income gains. We further test if oil palm cultivation leads to spillover effects on 
neighboring farm households. We find no such spillover effects, suggesting that the overall 
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effect for the farming community is positive. The results further show that the positive 
welfare effect depends on the relative price of palm oil compared to rubber, the main 
competing crop in the region. Our results suggest that policies aimed at regulating further 
oil palm expansion will have to account for the economic benefits that this crop offers to 
the local population. 
While we provided evidence of positive income (consumption expenditure) effects of 
oil palm for cultivating farmers, we expect that the ramifications of the rapid expansion of 
oil palm may be more far-reaching, potentially also affecting some of the underlying 
determinants of economic development, such as population growth. The proliferation of 
new production technologies is often regarded as one of the key drivers of the historical 
fertility transition in the US and Western Europe. In contrast, empirical evidence on the 
relationship between technologies, including crop choice, and fertility in developing 
countries such as Indonesia is largely inexistent. The third essay of this dissertation 
addresses this research gap, exploring the effect of oil palm expansion on fertility in 
Indonesia using a range of different data sources at the regency level. Oil palm is less 
labor-intensive than some of the alternative crops such as rubber or rice. Hence, in a land-
scarce setting, the substitution of oil palm for other crops induces labor savings similar to 
mechanization. We use Becker‟s quantity-quality model to identify different causal 
mechanism through which the expansion of oil palm could affect the number of children 
born to a woman (fertility). Our identification strategy relies on an instrumental variable 
approach with regency-fixed effects, in which the expansion of area under oil palm at 
regency level is instrumented by regency-level attainable yield of oil palm interacted with 
the national oil palm expansion. While a labor-saving technology could theoretically 
increase fertility rates by decreasing maternal opportunity costs of time, we find 
consistently negative effects of the oil palm expansion on fertility. The results suggest that 
income gains among agricultural households coupled with broader local economic 
development explain this effect. Specifically, local economic development seems to have 
raised returns to education and triggered investments into women‟s and children‟s 
education, which together with direct income effects explain the bulk of the negative effect 
of the oil palm expansion on fertility. 
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Overall, our findings are in line with previous studies, suggesting that smallholder-
driven oil palm expansion has on average positive socioeconomic effects. However, the 
negative ecological effects are also widely documented. Our research underlines that 
having secure and clear property rights for agricultural land and forest as well as access to 
the non-agricultural sector might be important steps towards more sustainable land-use 
systems in Indonesia. 
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1 General introduction 
1.1 Global land-use change 
For millennia, human activities have changed land use throughout the world driven 
primarily by an ever increasing demand for agricultural products (Foley et al. 2005; 
Lambin & Meyfroidt 2011; van Vliet et al. 2015). Population growth, rising incomes and 
globally changing preferences are the main drivers of agricultural demand, and projections 
of future trends do not yet indicate any turning point (Alexandratos & Bruinsma 2012; 
Schmitz et al. 2014). Global population is expected to grow to over nine billion by 2050 
(UNDP 2015). The expansion of urban settlements may appropriate an additional 30 
million hectares of fertile cropland by 2030. This lost cropland will have to be replaced by 
converting natural habitat into agricultural land unless sufficient intensification and 
productivity growth occurs to make up for declining areas (Bren d'Amour et al. 2016). 
Forecasts on economic growth suggest that per-capita income will rise throughout the 
world, particularly in low-income countries (OECD-FAO 2016). Such income growth will 
help to decrease food insecurity, but will also increase the demand for agricultural products 
per capita. Income growth and urbanization are also expected to change dietary habits. In 
particular the shift from plant-based staple foods to meat and dairy products will require 
more land per calorie (Pingali 2007; Qaim 2017). 
More sustainable consumption patterns – with less waste and lower consumption of 
animal-source foods – can influence future demand to some extent, but will not suffice to 
completely reverse the trend. Rising demand for food and other agricultural products is 
hence likely to require cropland expansion, or strong productivity growth
1
 on the already 
cultivated land, or a combination of both. In the past, cropland expansion mainly occurred 
through the conversion of natural habitats such as forests. While deforestation rates 
stabilized or even reversed in temperate and subtropical regions, this is not the case in 
tropical zones. More than 83% of new agricultural land was appropriated from forests 
between 1980 and 2000 in these zones (Gibbs et al. 2010). In total between 1990 and 2015, 
six to ten million hectares of forest were lost annually (FAO 2016). However, although 
                                                 
1
 In principle, growth in land productivity can occur either through agricultural intensification (more 
inputs per unit of land) or through technological change (growth in total factor productivity). 
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agricultural production rose by more than 200% between 1955 and 2005, total global 
cropland increased by only 15% (Schmitz et al. 2014). These numbers show that 
productivity growth on the already cultivated land played a significant role in terms of 
reducing the pressure on land, using the toolbox of modern agricultural technologies. 
While catering for the needs of a growing population, both productivity growth and 
agricultural expansion involve certain trade-offs concerning the ecosystem functions of 
land. Ecosystem functions are here understood as „the capacity of natural processes and 
components to provide goods and services that satisfy human needs, directly or indirectly‟ 
(Groot 1992). Converting forest to agricultural land adversely affects regulation functions 
such as carbon storage but also soil fertility and water regulation and supply. Moreover, 
habitat functions such as species diversity and density and information functions such as 
recreational and cultural components can be affected (Fearnside 2005; Foley et al. 2005; 
Butler & Laurance 2009; Wilcove et al. 2013; Barnes et al. 2014; Dislich et al. 2017). 
Increasing productivity and intensity within agricultural systems can also affect ecosystem 
functions such as on-farm biodiversity, soil fertility and water regulation (Tscharntke et al. 
2012). On the other hand, maintaining and increasing production functions such as the 
supply of agricultural goods are indispensable. Due to the existence of numerous such 
trade-offs, analyzing the impacts of different land uses on ecosystem functions has become 
a major focus of many research projects (Tilman et al. 2002; Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007; 
Clough et al. 2016).  
This dissertation is written as part of such a research project which addresses these 
issue in the context of Indonesia - the Collaborative Research Center (CRC) 990 
“Ecological and Socioeconomic Functions of Tropical Lowland Rainforest Transformation 
Systems” financed by the “Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft” (DFG). The CRC 990 aims 
to provide evidence on how to protect ecosystem functions of forest and agricultural land-
use systems, while enhancing economic welfare. This includes reconciling agricultural 
production with ecosystem functions such as biodiversity, developing new ways of 
sustainable agricultural land use. The CRC research aims to enable policy-makers to select 
the most efficient allocation and types of land uses based on the preferred set of ecosystem 
functions within their society. Besides identifying the impact of different land uses on 
ecosystem functions, another strand of research examines the institutional and 
socioeconomic factors that determine land-use change (Euler et al. 2016b; Krishna et al. 
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2017b), giving policy-makers a toolset how to effectively influence land use. This 
dissertation contributes in these directions, including three essays that examine land-use 
change in Indonesia. The first essay focuses on the institutional determinants of land-use 
change, while the second and third essays focus on the socioeconomic impact of land-use 
change.  
 
1.2 Land-use change in Indonesia 
Indonesia depicts a hotspot of global land-use change. In particular, forest loss and the 
expansion of oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) occurred at rates rarely observed in the recent 
history of agriculture. The global production of palm oil rose by around 600% between 
1990 and 2016 (Byerlee et al. 2017; US Department of Agriculture 2017), and this 
production growth was highly concentrated in only two countries - Indonesia and 
Malaysia. In Indonesia, the main producer since about 2009, oil palm covered 12 million 
hectares of land in 2016, rising from 1 million hectares in 1990 (Ministry of Agriculture 
2017). Several factors led to this rapid increase: First, consumption of vegetable oils 
increased by approximately 5% annually between 1993 and 2012, and also non-food 
consumption of palm oil derivatives for cosmetics and soaps increased rapidly (Byerlee et 
al. 2017). Second, since the early 2000s, new policies in different parts of the world 
incentivized the use and production of biodiesel, increasing output from only less than 1 
million tons in 2003 to 31 million tons in 2015 (OECD-FAO 2015). Oil palm growth was 
in particular strong compared to other oil-yielding crops such as soybean, rapeseed, and 
sunflower due to the high land productivity of oil palm. Well-managed oil palm plantations 
can produce three times more oil than rapeseed fields and even six times more than 
soybeans. The high market demand contributed to the high financial profitability of palm 
oil production (Clough et al. 2016; Drescher et al. 2016; Byerlee et al. 2017). Palm oil 
production thus became an essential part of Indonesia‟s past and current economic 
development strategy. In the past, oil palm expansion joint with resettlement programs (the 
so-called transmigrant program) was used to balance the divergent population density of 
Java and the outer islands and to foster economic development in remote regions. With 
financial support from the World Bank and other international institutions 3.5 million 
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people were resettled by 1990 to the outer islands (Adhiati & Bobsien 2001). 
Transmigrants became hence an essential part of Indonesia‟s palm oil sector. 
The increase in palm oil production was mainly driven by expansion in planation area 
and not by any technological innovation. There is some evidence from Indonesia which 
showed that oil palm expansion led to the conversion of other agricultural land uses such 
as agroforestry or rubber plantations (Gatto et al. 2015). However, the increase in 
production volume also caused the loss of tropical rainforest and conversion of peat 
swamps, contributing significantly to heavy deforestation and greenhouse gas emission in 
Indonesia (Wilcove et al. 2013; Vijay et al. 2016). With 0.84 million hectares of forest lost 
in 2012, Indonesia‟s deforestation rate was the highest worldwide surpassing even Brazil 
(Margono et al. 2014). The adverse effects of deforestation on various ecosystem functions 
are well known. Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Malaysian peninsula inhabit the highest 
number of endemic plants worldwide compared to other biodiversity hotspots (Myers et al. 
2000). Moreover, since Indonesia‟s tropical forests are major stocks for carbon dioxide, the 
deforestation is threatening global climate stability (Carlson et al. 2012). Detailed studies 
further document the detrimental effects on other ecosystem functions if forest is converted 
into monocultures (Fitzherbert et al. 2008; Barnes et al. 2014; Clough et al. 2016; Dislich 
et al. 2017). 
The academic literature emphasizes oil palms‟ negative environmental effects, 
however, oil palm cultivation in Indonesia sustains millions of livelihoods. Smallholder 
farm households cultivate more than 40 percent of the oil palm area in Indonesia (Gatto et 
al. 2015; Euler et al. 2016b), and non-farm household in rural areas also derive substantial 
income from working in oil palm farms and plantations (Bou Dib et al. 2018). While the 
literature is rather critical on the potential welfare effects of large-scale plantations (Li 
2015; Cramb & McCarthy 2016b), recent research shows that the welfare effects of oil 
palm cultivation are substantial for smallholder farmers (Euler et al. 2017; Krishna et al. 
2017a). Smallholder farmers are often among the poorest segments of society. Hence, 
measures to secure and improve smallholder livelihoods are important components of 
poverty reduction (Sibhatu et al. 2015). However, farmers‟ livelihoods are also vulnerable 
to changes in their environment such as global warming, soil erosion, and water depletion. 
Trade-offs and interactions between ecosystem functions and economic gains such as 
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poverty reduction are therefore in particular strong in the context of smallholder farming. 
This motivates the focus of this dissertation on smallholder farming in Indonesia. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
In the following, we will outline the research objectives of the three essays related to 
institutional and socioeconomic aspects of oil palm expansion and deforestation with a 
particular focus on smallholder farming.  
As mentioned, smallholder farming is an important part of Indonesia‟s palm oil sector. 
To access the necessary land for plantation agriculture, smallholder farmers are often 
found to deforest land; thus contributing to the high deforestation rates (Krishna et al. 
2017b). The policies at hand to regulate deforestation of smallholders often include costly 
control mechanism such as fines and embargos. Yet, in Indonesia, as well as in many other 
tropical countries, fines and embargoes are associated with several complications, 
including high costs of monitoring, low acceptance rates among smallholders, and thus low 
effective reduction rates in deforestation (Meyfroidt et al. 2013; Godar et al. 2014). 
Incentive-based approaches could potentially be more promising and also more in line with 
poverty reduction objectives. We propose that land property rights are fundamental to 
improve both local livelihoods and forest protection. The current literature on land 
property rights and deforestation analyzed primarily the effects of secure forest property 
rights on protecting forest from encroachment (Damnyag et al. 2012; Liscow 2013; 
Robinson et al. 2014). For agricultural land, studies have focused on the effects of secure 
property rights on input intensity and agricultural productivity (Goldstein & Udry 2008; 
Holden et al. 2009; Deininger et al. 2011). Yet, most of these studies did not link the 
potential effect of more secure property rights for agricultural land to deforestation 
outcomes. In the first essay, we hypothesize that more secure property rights at the forest 
margin could increase farmers‟ incentive to intensify production, thus reducing the 
incentive to increase agricultural output through deforesting additional land. We test this 
hypothesis by using panel data collected from smallholder farmers at household level and 
plot level. Moreover, we combine these survey data with data from satellite imageries and 
soil samples.  
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The second essay analyzes the welfare effect of oil palm cultivation for smallholder 
farmers. Environmental studies found that biodiversity, carbon stocks and other ecosystem 
functions are decreasing when moving from forest or less intensive agricultural systems to 
oil palm monocultures (Clough et al. 2016; Dislich et al. 2017). However, economic 
studies provide broad evidence of a positive welfare effect of oil palm adoption and 
cultivation among smallholders (Rist et al. 2010; Obidzinski et al. 2012; Krishna et al. 
2017a; Euler et al. 2017). Several studies underline in particular the high labor productivity 
of oil palm compared to other competing crops such as rubber. These studies further 
suggest that the associated welfare gains are mostly generated through reallocation of labor 
to additional land or off-farm work (Euler et al. 2017; Krishna et al. 2017a). These findings 
deliver important evidence to understand the rapid oil palm adoption patterns among 
smallholder farmers. Furthermore, the findings hold important lessons for policy-making, 
because the economic gains for farmers should not be ignored. Yet, the positive welfare 
effect found in the literature depends on several factors such as the relative price of oil 
palm compared to competing crops and the assumption of zero spillover effect to other 
farmers. Previous studies relied on cross-sectional data, so that the role of possible price 
changes and other dynamic effects could not be analyzed. We address these shortcomings 
in the previous literature by using panel data from farm household collected in 2012 and 
2015, a time period where relevant output prices fluctuated considerably. We also use 
spatial econometric models to control for spatial dependence and test explicitly for 
spillover effects. 
We assume that oil palm expansion is not only affecting income growth but also some 
of the underlying determinants of development, such as population growth. We focus on 
fertility (i. e., the number of child births per women), which is one of the main drivers of 
population growth and a central issue for policy planning. While the proliferation of new 
production technologies is often regarded as one of the key drivers of the historical fertility 
transition in the US and Western Europe, empirical evidence on the relationship between 
technology and fertility in developing countries such as Indonesia is largely inexistent. In 
the last essay, we address this gap in a detailed analysis of the effects of oil palm expansion 
on fertility. We show that oil palm can be characterized as a labor saving technology, 
releasing large amounts of labor from agriculture in the case of land scarcity. Building 
upon this, we develop a theoretical model for the effect of oil palm expansion on fertility 
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based on Becker‟s Quantity-Quality model. We highlight five main mechanisms. The first 
mechanism is an income effect, assuming that with rising income fertility decreases. The 
second and third mechanisms show that reduction in the value of child labor and increasing 
maternal opportunity costs of time can reduce fertility. The fourth and fifth mechanisms 
relate to returns to education and infrastructure development which could reduce the costs 
of investing in child quality such as education, leading to substitution away from child 
quantity to quality. We also discuss three alternative mechanisms: female empowerment, 
migration patterns and child mortality. To test our predictions we use a wide set of 
nationally representative data. Land-use change is commonly associated with significant 
shifts in farm income levels, consumption patterns and ecosystem functions (Lambin & 
Meyfroidt 2011; Clough et al. 2016; Edwards 2017), but rarely with demographic 
variables.  
 
1.4 Study area and data 
This dissertation builds on a set of different data sources from Indonesia. Primary data 
were collected in Jambi Province, Sumatra. The research is focused on the lowlands of 
Jambi Province, which present an archetype of land-use change in Indonesia with rapid 
expansion of oil palm and shrinking forest areas.  
To obtain data on smallholder farms we conducted an extensive survey of local farm 
household. The household survey data were collected in two waves, 2012 and 2015. Data 
in 2012 were collected by another research team (Euler et al. 2016b), while data collection 
in 2015 was led by the author of this dissertation himself. Sampling was based on a multi-
stage framework. All five regencies in Jambi Province located in the tropical lowland areas 
- Sarolangun, Batanghari, Muaro Jambi, Tebo, and Bungo - were selected purposively. 
From these regencies, 40 villages in 20 districts were randomly selected. Five additional 
villages were selected purposively to allow for interdisciplinary overlaps with other 
subprojects of the CRC 990 (Drescher et al. 2016). After village selection, a complete list 
of all farm households was compiled in each village together with the village leaders. From 
these lists, 6 to 24 farm households were randomly selected. The sample size was adjusted 
to village population size to mitigate possible sampling bias. All households that owned 
any agricultural land in the last 5 years were included. In total 700 farm households were 
 8 
 
interviewed
2
. Data were collected in 2012 and 2015 for the same farm households. 
Between these two rounds, the attrition rate was at 6%. In total 41 households from 2012 
could not be re-interviewed in 2015. Outmigration was the major reason for attrition (56% 
of attrition). Other reasons included refusal to be interviewed again (24%), death or old age 
(10%).  
Data were collected in the dry season in 2012 and 2015 using personal interviews with 
structured questionnaires (the 2015 questionnaire is included in the General Appendix of 
this dissertation). The survey instrument included questions at the household level such as 
current farm income, off-farm activities, socioeconomic characteristics of the household, 
household composition and food and non-food consumption expenditures. Additionally, 
data at the plot level were collected such as land use, material and labor input, yield, 
acquisition pathways and tenure status. In addition, a village survey was conducted in 
2012. The survey elicited land-use changes and related institutional aspects at the village 
level (Gatto et al. 2015). In 2015, a smaller village survey was conducted including in 
particular questions on village demographics, land tenure and conflicts within the village. 
The village questionnaires were administered to knowledgeable persons (e.g., village head, 
secretary etc.) in the village.  
The farm household survey data and the village survey datasets were used in all the 
three dissertation papers. In the first essay (Chapter 2), we combine the household survey 
data with remote sensing data (Melati et al. 2014) as well as measurements of topsoil 
characteristics (Guillaume et al. 2015). The further description of the data can be found in 
the respective essays themselves. The third essay (Chapter 4) builds on a large set of 
national data. The data sources are described in the data section and the Appendix of 
Chapter 4. 
 
1.5 Outline of the dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the first 
essay, exploring the potential effect of more secure property rights on agricultural 
productivity, intensity and deforestation. The second essay is presented in Chapter 3, 
                                                 
2
 Out of these 700 farmers, 17 farmers were purposively selected due to interdisciplinary overlaps. These 
farmers were not included in the statistical analysis. 
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analyzing the welfare effect of oil palm cultivation for smallholder farmers. The third and 
final essay, examining the effect of the oil palm expansion on fertility rates using 
nationally representative data is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarizes the broader 
findings and policy implications. It further discusses limitations of the research and 
proposes some directions for future research. The questionnaire for the farm household 
survey in 2015 is attached in the General Appendix. 
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2 Land property rights, agricultural intensification, and 
deforestation in Indonesia
3
 
2.1 Introduction 
Deforestation remains a widespread problem, especially in tropical regions. Between 
2010 and 2015, about 6 million hectares of tropical forest were lost annually (FAO 2016), 
entailing severe negative consequences for biodiversity, ecological systems, and climate 
stability (Fearnside 2005; Butler & Laurance 2009; Wilcove et al. 2013; Barnes et al. 
2014). Agricultural area expansion is one of the main drivers of deforestation (Gibbs et al. 
2010), and demand for agricultural output will further increase due to population and 
income growth. In addition to food, global demand for feed, fuel, and other biomass-
derived renewable resources will grow substantially over the coming decades 
(Alexandratos & Bruinsma 2012; Valin et al. 2014). These developments threaten the 
conservation of the remaining tropical forest (Laurance et al. 2014). Increasing agricultural 
yields on the land already cultivated, through higher input intensity and use of better 
technology, could be one important way to meet the rising demand and reduce further 
deforestation (Green et al. 2005; Ewers et al. 2009; Phalan et al. 2011a; Stevenson et al. 
2013). To be sure, agricultural intensification is not a magic bullet to conserve tropical 
forest and related ecosystem functions (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007; Perfecto & 
Vandermeer 2010; Tscharntke et al. 2012). Effects will vary with the type of 
intensification and also with the institutional and policy context in a particular setting. 
Better knowledge is required about how land-sparing agricultural intensification can be 
implemented locally, and why past efforts have often failed. Empirical research in this 
direction is scant. 
Here, we propose that land property rights are fundamental for agricultural production 
and deforestation outcomes. Land is the main source of farmers‟ livelihoods and also a 
                                                 
3
 This essay was published as: Kubitza, C.; Krishna, V. V.; Urban, K.; Alamsyah, Z. & Qaim, M. (2018). 
Land Property Rights, Agricultural Intensification, and Deforestation in Indonesia. Ecological Economics 
146, 312-321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.01.021 CK developed the research idea, compiled the 
data, conducted the regression analyses, and wrote the first draft of the paper. KU compiled the remote 
sensing data. KU, VVK, and MQ contributed to designing the study and preparing the data sets. All authors 
commented on data analysis, result interpretation, and revising the paper. 
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major mean for accumulating and inheriting wealth. The institutions shaping access, use, 
and transfer of land are hence central for farmers‟ decision-making (Deininger & Feder 
2001). Ownership regulations for forest land and for agricultural land often differ. The 
available literature on the links between land property rights and deforestation focuses 
primarily on the effects of secure tenure for forest land (Araujo et al. 2009; Damnyag et al. 
2012; Liscow 2013; Robinson et al. 2014). For agricultural land, studies have analyzed 
effects of tenure security on input intensity and crop productivity (Deininger et al. 2011; 
Fenske 2011; Bellemare 2013), yet without linking this to potential deforestation 
outcomes. To address this gap, we use comprehensive data from Sumatra, Indonesia, one 
of the hotspots of recent rainforest loss due to agricultural area expansion (Margono et al. 
2014; Gatto et al. 2015; Clough et al. 2016). Data from a farm household survey, a village 
survey, soil samples and satellite imageries are combined to examine relationships between 
land ownership rights, agricultural production intensity, and farm size expansion into forest 
areas. 
In Indonesia, small farms as well as large logging and agribusiness companies 
contribute to deforestation (Rudel et al. 2009b; Cacho et al. 2014). Overall, the share of 
land deforested by companies is larger than the share of land deforested by smallholder 
farmers. While precise data are not available, smallholders may have contributed less than 
20% to overall deforestation in Indonesia in recent decades (Lee et al. 2014). However, 
there are at least two reasons why a focus on small farms – as taken in this study – is 
relevant nevertheless from a policy perspective. First, in Indonesia the role of smallholders 
in cultivating plantation crops, such as oil palm and rubber, continues to grow (Euler et al. 
2017). Second, deforestation by smallholder farms is more difficult to monitor and control 
(Krishna et al. 2017b). Whereas large companies usually operate based on government 
concessions, smallholder decisions to clear forest land are individual responses to various 
incentives and constraints. Such behavioral responses need to be better understood, in 
order to design and implement effective policies. 
For private farms, land titles can increase agricultural intensity and productivity 
through three effects (Feder & Feeny 1991; Besley 1995; Deininger et al. 2011). First, the 
assurance effect, incentivizing higher investment because farmers are more secure to also 
reap the benefits from long-term measures to improve land quality and yield potential. 
Second, the collateralization effect, allowing better access to investment capital because 
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land titles can be used as collateral in formal credit markets. Third, the realizability effect, 
resulting from more efficient land allocation given that titled land facilitates land market 
transactions. The empirical literature largely confirms these effects (Banerjee et al. 2002; 
Goldstein & Udry 2008; Holden et al. 2009; Deininger et al. 2011; Fenske 2011; Grimm & 
Klasen 2015; Lawry et al. 2016), although in some cases the influence of land titling was 
found to be insignificant (Quisumbing & Otsuka; Brasselle et al. 2002; Jacoby & Minten 
2007; Bellemare 2013). 
An increase in farm productivity induced through land titles could reduce deforestation 
(Angelsen & Kaimowitz 2001). Higher output from the already cultivated land reduces the 
pressure to convert additional forest land. Also, a more productive agricultural sector could 
spur broader economic development, reducing population growth, enhancing non-
agricultural income opportunities for rural households, and improving land-governance 
capacities and institutions. Empirical evidence for these types of effects is scarce, although 
a few studies show indeed that higher farm productivity can help spare natural habitat from 
agricultural conversion (Barbier & Burgess 1997; Ewers et al. 2009; Phalan et al. 2011b). 
On the other hand, agricultural productivity growth could also be associated with higher 
rates of deforestation, for instance, by increasing the cost of forest conservation programs 
or by stimulating in-migration and road infrastructure investments in rural areas (Maertens 
et al. 2006; Phelps et al. 2013). Better understanding the complexities in concrete situations 
can help design appropriate policies aimed at promoting more sustainable development. 
In Indonesia, much of the land that farmers use is not formally titled (Krishna et al. 
2017b). Privately owned land can be titled, but the costs for farmers are relatively high. 
Additionally, farmers located close to the forest suffer from ambiguous ownership 
structures. Most of the forest land is formally owned by the state and not eligible for 
private titling (Agrawal et al. 2008). But the boundaries are not always clear-cut. Some of 
the land that farmers have cultivated for long officially counts as forest land. Moreover, 
local communities have customary claims and deforest land even when the newly obtained 
plots cannot be titled (Resosudarmo et al. 2014). The motivation to deforest will likely 
increase when farmers have no titles for their already cultivated land and therefore limited 
ability and incentives to intensify production. 
To answer the question whether providing secure titles for agricultural land could help 
to reduce deforestation, two sub-questions will have to be addressed. First, do land titles 
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increase agricultural intensity and productivity? Second, does higher productivity on the 
already cultivated land reduce farmers‟ incentives to clear additional forest land? The first 
sub-question will be addressed by comparing input use and crop productivity on farms 
with and without land titles and controlling for other relevant factors. The second sub-
question is less straightforward to answer, because this would require farm-level data on 
crop productivity in the past, which we do not have. However, we address this sub-
question indirectly by analyzing the relationship between the possession of land titles, 
historical forest coverage, deforestation activities of farm households, and farm size in a 
spatially explicit way. In addition, we look at the association between current crop 
productivity and farm size, which – together with the other results – may allow some 
cautious conclusions on the role of land titles for deforestation and the underlying 
mechanisms. 
 
2.2 Data  
2.2.1 Socioeconomic data 
This research builds on data collected in Jambi Province on the island of Sumatra, 
Indonesia. Jambi has been one of the regions with rapid loss of tropical rainforest over the 
last few decades. Forest cover in Jambi declined from 48% in 1990 to 30% in 2013 
(Drescher et al. 2016). Nevertheless, 43% of Jambi‟s total area was officially categorized 
as state forest in 2000 (Komarudin et al. 2008). Agricultural production in Jambi is 
dominated by plantation crops, especially rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) and oil palm (Elaeis 
guineensis). Rubber is primarily grown by local farmers with only some involvement of 
large-scale companies. Companies are more involved in oil palm, but even in oil palm 
more than 40% of the area is cultivated by smallholder farmers (Euler et al. 2017). That 
smallholders contribute to deforestation in Jambi in a significant way was underlined in a 
recent study (Krishna et al. 2017b), which showed that 18% of the rubber and oil palm 
plots cultivated by smallholders were acquired through direct forest appropriation. 
A survey of farm households was conducted in Jambi in two rounds, 2012 and 2015, as 
part of a larger interdisciplinary research project (Drescher et al. 2016). A multi-stage 
sampling framework was used to obtain a representative sample of local farm households. 
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At the first stage, five regencies of Jambi located in tropical lowland rainforest areas were 
selected. At the second stage, a total of 40 villages were randomly selected in these five 
regencies. In addition, five villages, where more intensive measurements by other teams of 
the same research project were ongoing (Drescher et al. 2016), were purposively selected, 
resulting in a total of 45 villages. In these villages, 700 households were randomly selected 
proportional to village size. There are two types of villages in Jambi, autochthonous and 
transmigrant villages. Transmigrant villages were established as part of the government‟s 
transmigration program (Gatto et al. 2017). Most households in transmigrant villages were 
allocated titled land by the state and started producing plantation crops under contract with 
one of the large public or private companies. Hence, the institutional and agricultural 
production conditions are quite different. In this research, we only consider the 34 
autochthonous villages in the sample, with 473 farm household observations in 2015 (and 
471 household observations in 2012). Out of these, around 25% are migrants (Table A1 in 
the Online Appendix), but these migrants in autochthonous villages did not come as part of 
the government‟s transmigration program (Gatto et al. 2015). Most of the households in 
the two survey rounds are identical. The attrition rate between 2012 and 2015 was 6%. 
Households that could not be surveyed again in 2015 (mostly due to out-migration) were 
replaced with other randomly selected households in the same villages. 
In both survey rounds, household heads were interviewed with a structured 
questionnaire, capturing a wide range of variables related to the households‟ 
socioeconomic situation and the institutional context (Euler et al. 2017; Krishna et al. 
2017a). Details about the different plots owned and cultivated by the farm households were 
also collected. In 2015, the 473 households cultivated a total of 902 plots with plantation 
crops; out of these 690 were cultivated with rubber, the rest with oil palm. For all these 
plots, data on general plot characteristics, such as size, location, and status of land titling, 
were elicited. In addition, detailed input-output data were captured for all plots in 2012 and 
for a random sub-sample of plots in 2015. For the analysis of agricultural productivity and 
intensity, we concentrate on productive rubber plots (those where the trees are old enough 
such that rubber is already being harvested). Input-output relationships in rubber and oil 
palm are quite different, so combining both crops in the same models would not be useful. 
Besides the interviews with household heads, village representatives were interviewed in 
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all sample villages to capture data on village size, ethnic composition, and other village-
level characteristics.  
 
2.2.2 Soil and remote sensing data 
In the farm household survey, respondents were asked to classify the soil fertility on 
each of their plots as low, medium, or high. In addition to these data on perceived soil 
quality, soil samples were taken in 2012 for a randomly selected sub-sample of 92 rubber 
plots. These soil samples were taken and analyzed by a different team of researchers 
(Guillaume et al. 2016). We use topsoil properties, such as bulk density, carbon content, 
and carbon/nitrogen ratio as additional explanatory variables in the rubber production 
models. 
Land cover maps of Jambi Province from the years 1990 and 2013 were obtained using 
multi-temporal Landsat TM and OLI satellite imageries with a spatial resolution of 30x30 
m. Land cover classification is based on automatic classification and additional qualitative, 
visual interpretation to reduce miss-classifications (Melati et al. 2014). In this research, we 
are particularly interested in the share of forest in the vicinity of the sample households, 
which we determined by evaluating land cover classifications in circles with specific radius 
around the households‟ residence. We use different alternatives with 2 km, 5 km, and 10 
km radius. Households with a high share of forest in their vicinity are considered as being 
located at the forest margins. 
 
2.3 Econometric methods 
The analysis is done in three steps. First, we present models that analyze the effect of 
land titles on agricultural productivity. Second, we use similar models to analyze effects of 
land titles on agricultural intensity (input use). Third, we examine spatial patterns by 
developing and estimating models to analyze the relationships between historic forest 
margin, possession of land titles, deforestation activities, and farm size. 
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2.3.1 Models to analyze agricultural productivity  
To analyze the effect of land titles on productivity in rubber, we estimate household-
level panel regression models of the following type: 
 
Eq. (1):                                                           (household level) 
 
where      is total annual rubber yield per hectare of household i at time t.       is the 
share of household i‟s land cultivated with plantation crops that had a systematic land title 
at time t. The share can vary between 0 and 1.     is a vector of other farm and household 
characteristics that may also influence rubber yields, such as farm size, age, gender, and 
education of the household head, and a wealth index. The wealth index was constructed 
based on ownership of the following assets: television, different types of vehicles, 
refrigerator, and washing machine. A principal component analysis was used to determine 
the weight of each asset in the wealth index (Filmer & Pritchett 2001).    is the unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity of the model, while     is the iid error term. 
We also estimate similar models at the plot level: 
 
Eq. (2):                                                              (plot level) 
 
where       is the annual rubber yield per hectare on plot p of household i at time t. 
      is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the plot was systematically titled at time t. 
     includes additional plot characteristics such as age of the rubber trees and variables 
related to plot location. 
Due to the sampling framework used, households and plots are clustered at the village 
level. We use hence cluster-corrected standard errors (Pepper 2002; Cameron et al. 2011). 
For interpretation of the estimation coefficients, functional form has to be considered. 
      in Eq. (1) is a continuous variable, so that    is interpreted as the percentage effect 
on rubber yield.       in Eq. (2) is a dummy variable, so that the percentage effects is 
calculated as {   ̂     ̂  ̂    } (van Garderen & Shah 2002). 
The models in Eqs. (1) and (2) are estimated with random effects (RE) panel 
estimators. Studies with micro-level data to assess the effects of land titling often struggle 
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with endogeneity issues (Brasselle et al. 2002). Endogeneity bias occurs when unobserved 
characteristics are jointly correlated with land titling and crop productivity. In particular 
reverse causality might be a concern, since high productivity might influence farmers‟ 
decision to title their plots. For instance, if investments in plot productivity can be made 
which also increase tenure security, tenure security would be endogenous. However, we 
use land titles as a proxy for tenure security, so investments are not likely to be 
confounded. Clearly, having a land title may be affected by other factors related to, for 
example, the characteristics of the land, which may in turn affect our estimates. Valid 
instruments for land titles, which are exogenous and fulfill the exclusion restrictions, are 
usually hard to find (Fenske 2011; Bellemare 2013; Grimm & Klasen 2015). We use 
different strategies to address endogeneity and reduce related bias to the extent possible. 
First, we include a wide range of plot- and household-level control variables to reduce the 
likelihood of unobserved heterogeneity. In robustness checks, we also include various 
measures of soil quality, which has rarely been done in previous research (Bellemare 
2013). Second, in addition to using random effects, we also estimate the productivity 
models with fixed effects (FE) estimators and balanced plot- and household-level panel 
data. The variation in land titling within plots and households between 2012 and 2015 is 
small, but sufficient to obtain FE estimates. We use the Hausman test (Wooldridge 2002) 
to compare between the RE and FE models (Table A2). Test results fail to reject the 
hypothesis that the RE models produce consistent estimates. Third, in addition to model 
estimates with all observations, we split the sample into migrants and non-migrants and 
estimate separate models for these two groups. We expect heterogeneous impacts of land 
titling, because customary land claims that apply to autochthonous people do not apply to 
migrants from outside the region.  
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2.3.2 Models to analyze agricultural intensity 
To analyze the effect of land titles on intensity of rubber production, we estimate plot-
level panel regression models of the following type:  
 
Eq. (3):                                                               (plot level) 
 
Eq. (4):                                                              (plot level) 
 
where        is total annual expenditures on material inputs applied per hectare (ha) on 
plot p by household i at time t. Material inputs include chemical fertilizers and pesticides 
(incl. herbicides).       is annual labor input (incl. family and hired labor) measured in 
hours per ha. The other variables are defined as above. Since more than 50% of the sample 
farmers did not use any material inputs during the survey years, we do not take logs of 
      . Given censoring of the dependent variable at 0, we use a Tobit specification for the 
model in Eq. (3). To test the effect of        and       on crop productivity, we also 
estimate additional specifications of Eq. (2) with these inputs included as explanatory 
variables. 
 
2.3.3 Spatial regression models 
To estimate the effect of historical forest closeness on the probability of holding a land 
title, we estimate the following plot-level probit model: 
 
Eq. (5):                                                           (plot level) 
 
where       is a dummy indicating whether or not plot p of household i in village v was 
systematically titled in 2015, and     is the share of forest land in 1990 in a circle with 
specific radius around the household residence.     can take values between 0 (no forest in 
1990) to 1 (completely forested in 1990). The reference year 1990 was chosen because 
most of the formal land classifications in Indonesia took place in the 1980s (Indrarto et al. 
2012). We estimate separate models, using radii of 2 km, 5 km, and 10 km to construct    . 
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In each of these models, plots that are located outside the specific radius are excluded from 
estimation. A further robustness check is performed, replacing     with a binary variable 
indicating if the plot was acquired by the household through deforestation.     ,    , and 
   are further plot-, household-, and village-level controls. Eq. (5) includes both rubber 
and oil palm plots. 
It is likely that land titling is also affected by spatial factors such as local policies, 
distances to roads and markets, or environmental conditions. This can possibly lead to 
spatial dependence in the models in Eq. (5). All models were tested for spatial 
autocorrelation using Moran‟s I, Anselin‟s, and Florax‟s Lagrange Multiplier tests (Baltagi 
2003). These tests failed to reject the hypothesis of zero spatial autocorrelation. For 
completeness, spatial lag and spatial error models are reported in Table A3. 
We hypothesize that households close to the forest are less likely to hold land titles and 
therefore have stronger incentives to expand their farms into the forest. After controlling 
for other factors, this should lead to larger farm sizes at the forest margins. To test this 
hypothesis, we regress farm size in 2015 on forest closeness in 1990 and a set of control 
variables. Again, we used Moran‟s I, Anselin‟s, and Florax‟s Lagrange Multiplier tests 
(Baltagi 2003) to test for spatial autocorrelation. These tests reject the hypothesis of zero 
spatial autocorrelation. Based on the test results, we estimate spatial lag models of the 
following type: 
 
Eq.(6):       
  
                                             (household level) 
 
where      is total farm size of household i in village v measured in hectares,     is the 
share of forest land in 1990 (as defined above).      and     are household- and village-
level controls.   is an N×N spatial weights matrix (N=Number of households) based on 
the inverse Euclidian distance between the households‟ residence. The parameter   
measures the degree of spatial correlation.   is row standardized, such that for each i, 
∑        (Baltagi 2003). The spatial lag            can be interpreted as a weighted 
average of the farm sizes of neighboring households. For comparison, spatial error and 
ordinary least squares models are reported in Table A4. 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The average size of farms in our sample in 2015 was around 4 ha. This refers to the 
land cultivated, regardless of whether or not the farmer formally owns the different plots. 
Locations of the farm households are depicted in Figure 1 (Maps 1 and 2). Responses 
during the survey interviews suggest that households are actively engaged in deforestation. 
This is also confirmed by land cover maps. In 1990, about 17% of the area within a 5 km 
radius around farmers‟ residence was covered with forest; by 2013, this forest share was 
reduced to 3%. Much of the previous forest land is now grown with rubber and oil palm. 
Even though the area cultivated with oil palm grew faster during the last two decades 
(Gatto et al. 2015), rubber remains the dominant crop in the study region. About 30% of 
the sample farms grow oil palm, whereas 86% grow rubber (Table A1). This is also the 
reason why we focus on rubber for the analysis of crop productivity and production 
intensity.  
Concerning supply chains in the local rubber sector, famers mostly sell their harvest to 
traders in the village, who then transport the rubber to the processing factories (Kopp & 
Brümmer 2017). Fertilizer, pesticides, and other material inputs can often be bought from 
the village traders. Alternatively, inputs can be purchased in the next market, which is 5-6 
km away from the households‟ residence on average (Table A1). Given relatively bad 
infrastructure conditions in large parts of Jambi, transportation and transaction costs can be 
substantial, meaning that farm-gate input and output prices are influenced significantly by 
distance to roads and markets. 
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Figure 1: Maps of land uses in Jambi Province (Sumatra) in 1990 and 2013  
 
 
 
Notes: Maps 1 and 2 depict Jambi Province in 1990 and 2013. Map 3 is one example from a sub-region (Harapan 
Rainforest) with eight sample villages in 1990. The red circles indicate a 2 km radius around the sample households‟ 
residence. Circles with different radius (2, 5, 10 km) were used to calculate the share of forest land around households. 
 
Most of the plots that sample farmers cultivate are not formally titled, but held under 
customary tenure. In 2015, only 10% of the rubber plots had a systematic land title, which 
is a document that all formal authorities recognize. Figure 2 shows that systematic land 
titling is a rather recent phenomenon in the study area, largely due to changes in formal 
land policies. Since the late-1990s, the Indonesian government has intensified its efforts to 
facilitate the systematic titling of land in agricultural use (Krishna et al. 2017b). Note that 
the titling of land in a particular year is not an indication of new land acquisition in that 
same year. In most cases, plots were systematically titled many years after their 
acquisition. In addition to systematic land titles, so-called sporadic land titles exist, which 
are cheaper for farmers to obtain but only recognized by local authorities and thus of 
limited value as collateral in formal credit markets (Kunz et al. 2016; Krishna et al. 2017b). 
About 22% of the rubber plots have a sporadic land title (Table A1).  
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Figure 2: Land titling and deforestation activities by farmers (1965-2015) 
 
Notes: Based on farmer recall data from 902 plots. The graph shows the number of plots that were 
obtained through deforestation and the number of plots for which farmers obtained a systematic 
land title in a particular year. The curves were constructed using locally-weighted time series 
smoothing. 
 
Figure 2 also shows deforestation activities by sample farmers in terms of the number 
of plots acquired through forest clearing in a particular year. The frequency of 
deforestation has declined since the late-1990s, which may be due to forest land becoming 
scarcer in Jambi. The rising provision of systematic titles for the land already cultivated 
may also have played a role. This is analyzed more formally below. The peak in 
deforestation around the year 2000 is possibly also related to the political turbulences 
during the so-called Reformasi era and the subsequent decentralization process. 
 
2.4.2 Land titles and agricultural productivity  
To analyze whether land property rights have an effect on agricultural productivity, we 
estimated regression models with rubber yield as dependent variable and land titles as 
explanatory variables, as explained in Eqs. (1) and (2). The main results are shown in 
Table 1 (full model results with all explanatory variables are shown in Table A2 in the 
Online Appendix). In all model specifications, systematic land titles have positive and 
significant coefficients, while sporadic land titles have insignificant effects. In the 
household-level models, the different rubber plots of a household are combined. Compared 
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to a situation with no land titles, systematic titling of all plots (share of land with 
systematic title equal to 1) leads to an increase in crop productivity by 35% (column 1). In 
column (2), we only include households that migrated to the villages from outside the 
region. For these households, the productivity effect of systematic land titles is even larger. 
It is not unexpected that migrants benefit more from land titles. First, migrants often 
belong to a different ethnicity than autochthonous households. Given smaller family 
networks in the local context, migrants depend more on formal credit markets to access 
financial capital (collateralization effect). Second, for migrants, customary land claims do 
not hold, so that formal property rights play a more important role for tenure security 
(assurance effect). 
In the plot-level models in Table 1, each of the rubber plots is considered separately. 
Plots with a systematic land title have 15% higher yields than plots without title (column 
3). The effect is smaller than in the household-level models. This is plausible, because the 
same household can have titled and untitled plots, so that spillovers may occur. For 
instance, a title for one plot will usually suffice as collateral to obtain a credit to pay for 
farm inputs that can be used to increase productivity on all of the household‟ plots. Also in 
the plot-level specifications, the effect for migrants (column 4) is larger than the effect for 
the total sample of farmers. 
While we control for plot- and household-level characteristics, including road distance 
that influences farmers‟ access to input and output markets (see Table A2), it is still 
possible that there are unobserved factors that influence land titling and productivity 
simultaneously. Such unobserved heterogeneity could lead to bias in the coefficient 
estimates. For instance, land with better soil quality will result in higher yields and may 
also have a higher likelihood to be titled. The measures of perceived soil quality
4
 are 
included in the model in column (5) of Table 1. In addition, column (6) shows precise soil 
quality measurements as explanatory variables for the random sub-sample for which these 
measurements are available. In both these models, the coefficient for systematic land titles 
remains positive and significant. As soil quality may also be correlated with other relevant 
unobserved factors, this suggests that the finding of a positive effect of land titles on crop 
productivity is rather robust to unobserved heterogeneity. 
                                                 
4
 Number of observations are lower than in the full model (Table 1 col. (3)) due to missing data. 
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2.4.3 Land titles and agricultural intensity  
Estimation results with indicators of input intensity as dependent variables, as 
explained in Eqs. (3) and (4), are summarized in Table 2 (full results are shown in Table 
A5). Possession of systematic land titles significantly increases the use of material inputs 
(chemical fertilizers and pesticides). The marginal effect is 114 thousand IDR/ha in 
column (1). Among migrant farmers, the effect is even larger (column 2). For labor input 
(column 3), we also find a positive effect of systematic land titles, which is somewhat 
smaller (13%) than that for material inputs. For migrant farmers, the effect of systematic 
land titles on labor is insignificant (column 4). On the other hand, sporadic land titles seem 
to increase labor input among migrants. As mentioned, sporadic titles are of limited value 
in formal credit markets, but – unlike material inputs – farmers rarely take a credit to pay 
for hired labor. 
We expect that the effect of land titles on agricultural productivity is partly channeled 
through higher input intensity. Indeed, when including input use in the productivity model 
(columns 5 and 6 in Table 2), material and labor inputs both have significantly positive 
effects, whereas the effect of systematic land titles on productivity declines (compare with 
column 3 in Table 1)
5
. However, the land title effect remains positive and significant, 
suggesting that other transmission channels also play an important role. 
 
2.4.4 Spatial patterns of land titling 
Now we take a spatial perspective and analyze the likelihood of plots being titled as a 
function of forest closeness (see Eq. 5). As mentioned, plots located in areas designated as 
state forest are not eligible for titling, even though the boundaries are not clear-cut. Table 3 
shows plot-level probit regression estimates with a dummy for systematic land titles in 
2015 as dependent variable and the share of forest in 1990 as explanatory variable (column 
1-3). Controlling for other factors (see full results in Table A6), location at forest margins 
(areas that were more forested in the past) decreases the likelihood of systematic land 
titling by 13-18 percentage points. Column (4) in Table 3 shows a model with a somewhat 
                                                 
5
 Note that the number of observations is declining slightly due to missing data. 
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different specification, confirming that plots that were deforested by households 
themselves are less likely to be titled
6
. 
Concerning the effects of control variables, we find that plots located further away 
from roads are significantly less likely to be titled. On the other hand, plots that were 
already used by the farmer for a longer period of time are more likely to be titled. In some 
of the models, we also find a significantly positive effect of household wealth on land 
titling (Table A6). 
Without land titles, farmers at the forest margins are less able and willing to increase 
productivity, so they may have stronger incentives to increase their farm size by further 
expanding into forest land. To test this hypothesis, we regress farm size in 2015 on the 
share of forest in 1990 (see Eq. 6). The estimation results are shown in columns (5) to (7) 
of Table 3. As expected, farms at the forest margins are significantly larger than farms 
further away from the forest. The model in column (8) of Table 3 also confirms that 
households‟ deforestation activities have directly contributed to larger farm sizes.7 
We emphasize that lack of land titles is not the only factor that could explain larger 
farms at forest margins. Closeness to the forest is likely correlated with the private costs of 
deforestation: for farmers close to the forest it may be cheaper to deforest due to lower 
transportation costs. This means that the provision of land titles may not completely 
eliminate deforestation, but it would still influence incentive structures towards more 
intensive forms of production. For farms close to the forest, additional incentives for more 
intensive forms of production seem to be particularly important to reduce deforestation 
activities. Spatial dependencies are accounted for in our analysis through the use of spatial 
error models and spatial lag models, as explained above. 
While we have no plot- or farm-level data on cropping patterns before 2012, which 
could help to elucidate historical relationships between intensity, productivity, and farm 
size expansion, in Table A7 we regress current farm size (in 2015) on current rubber 
yields. Farm size is negatively associated with yield, even after controlling for other 
factors, providing further evidence that higher productivity may indeed reduce the 
incentive to expand the area cultivated. 
                                                 
6
 The binary variable indicates if a plot was directly encroached from forest versus being purchased for a 
sub-sample of plots with available information. 
7
 Since we are not interested here in direct or indirect effects of explanatory variables but rather to assess 
if a significant association between farm size and being located at former forest margins exists, we report 
parameter estimates of β. 
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Table 1: Land titles and agricultural productivity 
 Household-level models  Plot-level models  
Plot-level models with soil quality 
controls 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Full sample Migrants  Full sample Migrants  Full sample 
Sub-sample 
with soil quality 
measures 
Share of land with systematic title  0.351
***
 0.586
***
  0.152
**
 0.370
***
  0.183
**
 0.697
***
 
(0.085) (0.107)  (0.063) (0.098)  (0.071) (0.265) 
Share of land with sporadic title  0.019 0.111  -0.017 0.039  -0.036 -0.131 
(0.071) (0.090)  (0.071) (0.073)  (0.079) (0.254) 
Size of rubber area (ha) -0.030
*
 -0.006  -0.086
***
 -0.132
***
  -0.088
***
 -0.097
*
 
 (0.016) (0.028)  (0.017) (0.029)  (0.021) (0.049) 
Wealth index (quintiles) 0.011 -0.023  0.031
**
 0.021  0.035
*
 0.134
***
 
 (0.017) (0.031)  (0.015) (0.021)  (0.019) (0.049) 
         
Perceived soil quality included No No  No No  Yes No 
Soil quality measurements included No No  No No  No Yes 
Chi2 / F- statistic 297.453
***
 232.371
***
  312.312
***
 2332.550
***
  485.131
***
 3.63
***
 
Number of observations 665 174  851 231  741 92 
Notes: All models have the logarithm of rubber yield (kg/ha) as dependent variable. All models were estimated with random effects panel estimators using data 
from 2012 and 2015, except for the model in column (6), which only includes 2012 data and was estimated with ordinary least squares. Coefficient estimates 
are shown with robust standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. The share of land titled in the plot-level models is 1 if the plot was titled and 0 
otherwise. Additional covariates that were included in estimation are shown in Table A2.
 *
 p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table 2: Land titles and agricultural intensity 
 Plot-level models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Material input         
(000 IDR/ha) 
Full sample 
Material input         
(000 IDR/ha) 
Migrants 
Log of labor 
input (hours/ha) 
Full sample 
Log of labor 
input (hours/ha) 
Migrants 
Log of yield 
(kg/ha) 
Full sample 
Log of yield 
(kg/ha) 
Full sample 
Systematic land title (=1) 114.148
**
 204.127
**
 0.125
*
 0.122 0.141
**
 0.145
**
 
(48.649) (97.340) (0.070) (0.104) (0.062) (0.062) 
Sporadic land title (=1) -9.365 26.157 0.055 0.198
*
 -0.015 -0.026 
(36.395) (61.016) (0.056) (0.105) (0.073) (0.062) 
Plot size (ha) -7.491 -14.137 -0.104
***
 -0.063 -0.084
***
 -0.053
***
 
(9.024) (21.056) (0.021) (0.038) (0.017) (0.014) 
Wealth index (quintiles) 
 
38.959
***
 9.467 -0.007 -0.011 0.029
*
 0.027
*
 
(11.018) (22.878) (0.023) (0.042) (0.015) (0.014) 
Material input (million IDR/ha)     0.076
***
  
    (0.027)  
Labor input (Log of hours/ha)      0.334
***
 
     (0.034) 
Chi2 139.889
***
 82.550
***
 4202.748
***
 482.462
***
 357.550
***
 1033.791
***
 
Number of observations 1101 286 1015 269 850 846 
Notes: All models were estimated with random effects panel estimators using data from 2012 and 2015. Coefficient estimates are shown with robust standard 
errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Due to left-censoring of the dependent variable, a Tobit specification was used in columns (1) and (2). The 
coefficients themselves measure how the latent variable changes with respect to changes in the regressors. IDR, Indonesian rupiah. Additional covariates that 
were included in estimation are shown in Table A5. 
*
 p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table 3: Historical forest coverage, land titles, and farm size  
 
Plot-level models (systematic land title =1)  Household-level models (log of farm size in ha) 
(1) 
2 km  
radius 
(2) 
5 km 
radius 
(3) 
10 km  
radius 
(4) 
All plots 
 (5) 
2 km  
radius 
(6) 
5 km  
radius 
(7) 
10 km  
radius 
(8) 
All plots 
Share of forested area in 1990  -0.180
***
 -0.128
**
 -0.180
***
   0.268
*
 0.337
**
 0.453
**
  
(0.057) (0.050) (0.065)   (0.146) (0.155) (0.198)  
Deforestation (=1)    -0.060
**
     0.258
***
 
   (0.028)     (0.086) 
Wealth index (initial, quintiles) 0.003 0.009 0.018
*
 0.029
**
  0.142
***
 0.144
***
 0.146
***
 0.140
***
 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Migrant (=1) -0.042 -0.020 0.009 -0.014  0.137 0.135 0.132 0.148 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029)  (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Wald chi2 / squared correlation 74.830
***
 95.021
***
 77.205
***
 75.126
***
  0.208 0.210 0.211 0.217 
Number of observations 433 660 750 594  462 462 462 462 
Notes: Models in columns (1) to (4) were estimated as probit models. Rubber and oil palm plots are included. Average marginal effects are shown with robust 
standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Models in columns (5) to (8) were estimated as spatial lag models. The spatial lag coefficient   ranges 
from 0.231 to 0.24 significant at p ≤ 0.01; the goodness of fit measure is the squared correlation. Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in 
parentheses. Additional covariates that were included in estimation are shown in Table A6. 
*
 p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
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2.5 Discussion 
Using data from farm households in Jambi Province, Sumatra, we have shown that 
secure land property rights contribute to higher agricultural intensity and productivity. 
Higher productivity on the land already cultivated can lower the need to convert additional 
forest land and thus reduce deforestation. Yet, the effectiveness of this mechanism depends 
on the spatial patterns of land titling and intensification. While it is particularly important 
that farmers at the forest margins have secure land property rights, our data have revealed 
that farmers close to historically forested areas are unlikely to hold formal land titles. Like 
many other developing countries (Agrawal et al. 2008), Indonesia considers forest land as 
state property. However, forest governance is constrained by unclear boundaries, limited 
capacity to monitor, and overlaps of state and customary land claims (Indrarto et al. 2012). 
While land that was deforested in violation of state law is not eligible for titling, farmers 
are rarely prosecuted and punished for deforestation activities. Without land titles, farmers 
at the forest margins have little incentive to intensify and rather expand their farms by 
deforesting additional land. Indeed, farms at the historic forest margins were found to be 
larger in size.  
The results suggest that the provision of land titles can contribute to agricultural 
intensification and reduced deforestation, even though this potential is not fully realized in 
this particular setting. Addressing the existing inconsistencies between state and customary 
land institutions at the forest margins would be important to encourage land-sparing 
agricultural intensification. This does not mean that farmers encroaching forest land should 
easily be granted land titles for the newly deforested plots. But a regime that does not 
effectively impede deforestation and at the same time excludes farmers at the forest 
margins from the legal property system is probably the worst recipe for forest protection 
and agricultural development. Besides improving farmer‟s access to land titles for non-
forest land, better recognition of customary land rights and more effective protection of 
forest land without recognized claims could be useful policy responses. 
Our research coincides with major efforts of the Indonesian government to reform its 
land governance system. After a court ruling in 2013, the government is now negotiating 
major releases of land to local communities through social forestry schemes. Moreover, the 
government aims to legalize and reallocate land ownership to local families through the so-
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called TORA initiative (Land Object of Agrarian Reform) (LANDac 2016). Our research 
delivers timely support for the TORA initiative in particular, because the land covered in 
our survey is mostly cultivated by individual farming families. However, privately-owned 
agricultural land with secure land titles and community-owned forest land is not a 
contradiction. Our results suggest that this combination can contribute to efficient 
agricultural production on the already cultivated land, while effectively preserving the 
remaining forest resources. 
We acknowledge that the relationships are complex and that we were not able to 
establish all relevant effects unambiguously. Further research is required to confirm some 
of the mechanisms. First, our study concentrated on deforestation activities by smallholder 
farmers. Large logging and agribusiness companies also contribute to deforestation in a 
significant way, and the incentive structures in the company sector are likely different. 
Second, we did not show that farm location at the forest margins affects agricultural 
productivity and intensity directly. The reason is that forest closeness is correlated with 
many unobserved factors that could also influence yield. Beyond soil characteristics, 
microclimate and the abundance of various types of organisms may play important roles 
(Guillaume et al. 2016). 
A third aspect that we did not analyze explicitly is that higher agricultural productivity 
may lead to higher land rents, which could make further forest conversion more attractive 
for outside agents and thus induce in-migration. However, another recent study with data 
from Jambi showed that autochthonous farm households are much more involved in 
deforestation than migrant households (Krishna et al. 2017b). In any case, to avoid that the 
increasing agricultural productivity threatens forest resources, it will be useful to invest 
some of the accruing economic benefits into effective forest protection. Fourth, higher use 
of material inputs and technologies may possibly lead to a substitution of capital for 
manual labor, with the freed labor becoming available to deforest and cultivate additional 
land. However, higher fertilizer use tends to increases labor demand. Indeed, our data show 
that land titles have an increasing effect on labor input on the already cultivated plots. 
Another material input that is used more widely by farmers with land titles is herbicides, 
which could be labor-saving in general. Yet, the labor input for manual weeding in this 
setting is small, so that increasing herbicide use leads to better weed control and higher 
yields rather than significant reduction in the use of manual labor. We acknowledge that if 
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farm households had substantial labor surplus, it would still be economically rational for 
them to use the surplus labor for deforestation. However, farming households in Jambi are 
typically rather labor-constrained, which is also why many of them are currently switching 
from rubber to oil palm, a crop with significantly lower labor requirements (Euler et al. 
2017; Krishna et al. 2017a). 
Two seemingly contrasting agricultural options for environmental conservation are 
widely discussed: extensive farming with higher levels of ecological functions but also 
higher land demand, and intensive farming with lower levels of ecological functions and 
lower land demand (Green et al. 2005; Rudel et al. 2009a; Tscharntke et al. 2012). Which 
of these options is preferable is highly context-specific. Different settings and different 
valuations of ecosystem functions can produce a wide range of optimal land allocations 
and degrees of intensity (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007). In tropical rainforest areas, as 
analyzed here, highly-productive farming with lower land demand and effective forest 
protection could possibly be the best option to promote sustainable development. The 
reason is that no agricultural system is able to sustain the same level of biodiversity and 
other ecosystem functions as provided by tropical rainforest (Burney et al. 2010; Clough et 
al. 2016). 
Sumatra had experienced significant deforestation even before land titling started. 
Hence, from today‟s perspective the question whether land titles could have reduced 
deforestation is partly hypothetical. Our findings could help to improve the conservation of 
the remaining forest land in Sumatra. More importantly, however, our results can provide 
important insights for other regions as well. Many countries with tropical rainforests face 
similar complications with smallholder farmers encroaching forest land to expand the 
agricultural area (Meyfroidt et al. 2013; Godar et al. 2014). In such situations, partly 
switching from costly control and sanction mechanisms to more incentive-based policies 
seems to be promising. This study has made an attempt to contribute in this direction. 
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Data Availability: The data used in this study are archived with openly accessible, 
keyword-searchable metadata and data holder contact details for data requests (EFForTs-
Information System: University of Goettingen 2017). Datasets used in this study have the 
following identification numbers: 12620, 13500, 13501, 13520, 13660, 13642, 13643, 
13644, 13647, 13648, 13649, 13650, 13651 (household-level data); 13521, 13600, 13601, 
13620 (plot-level data); 11422, 11423, 13680 (village-level data); 11987 (soil data); 12026, 
12027, 12030 (land cover maps). 
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2.6 Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistics  
 
 2012    2015  
Number 
of obs.  
Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
 Number 
of obs.  
Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
        
Plot-level variables (rubber plots)        
Yield per year (kg/ha) 643 1144.683 1083.612  466 1489.196 1086.691 
Material input per year (000 IDR/ha) 643 322.521 672.179  466 141.655 419.497 
Labor input per year (hours/ha) 643 692.655 630.828  466 1057.674 1122.030 
Systematic land title (=1) 645 0.074   690 0.100  
Sporadic land title (=1) 645 0.180   690 0.222  
Plot size (ha) 645 2.242 1.948  690 2.084 1.809 
Age of rubber trees (years) 645 14.763 10.647  689 17.026 10.479 
Employing sharecropping tenants (=1) 645 0.143   690 0.223  
Distance from household residence (km) 645 4.802 8.226  689 4.902 12.791 
Distance from road (km) 645 1.170 1.757  689 0.885 1.410 
        
Household-level variables        
Age of household head (years) 471 44.996 12.213  473 47.072 11.408 
Female-headed household (=1) 471 0.059   473 0.080  
Education of household head (years in school) 471 7.476 3.620  473 7.150 3.742 
Migrated to village (=1) 471 0.255   473 0.256  
Number of adults in household 471 2.975 1.243  473 2.987 1.190 
Total farm size (ha) 471 4.200 4.642  473 4.134 4.615 
Size of productive rubber area (ha) 406 2.684 3.037  406 2.968 3.167 
Oil palm farmer (=1) 471 0.285   473 0.309  
Rubber farmer (=1) 471 0.866   473 0.860  
Rubber farmer using fertilizer/pesticide (=1) 408 0.519   406 0.345  
Oil palm farmer using fertilizer/pesticide (=1) 134 0.819   146 0.818  
Formal credit taken (=1) 471 0.166   473 0.288  
Informal credit taken (=1) 471 0.193   473 0.173  
Own business (=1) 471 0.200   473 0.277  
Share of land with systematic land title  471 0.060   473 0.089  
Share of land with sporadic land title  471 0.167   473 0.189  
Distance to market (km) 471 6.940 7.899  472 5.616 5.880 
        
Village-level variables         
Number of households per village 34 674.485 617.922  34 735.118 973.537 
Share of households of Melayu ethnicity 34 0.651 0.312  34 0.696 0.308 
Notes: In 2015, plot level input and output data were not collected for all, but only for a random sub-sample of plots. 
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Table A2: Land titles and agricultural productivity 
 
Household-level models  Plot-level models  Plot-level models with soil quality 
controls 
(1) (1a) (2) (2a)  (3) (3a) (4) (4a)  (5) (6) 
Full sample 
(RE) 
Balanced 
panel (FE) 
Migrants 
(RE) 
Non-
migrants 
(RE) 
 Full sample 
(RE) 
Balanced 
panel (FE) 
Migrants 
(RE) 
Non-
migrants 
(RE) 
 Full sample 
(RE) 
Sub-sample 
with soil quality 
measures (OLS) 
Share of land with 
systematic. title  
0.351*** 0.352 0.586*** 0.328***  0.152** 0.025 0.370*** 0.095  0.182*** 0.697** 
(0.085) (0.298) (0.107) (0.098)  (0.063) (0.269) (0.098) (0.070)  (0.071) (0.265) 
Share of land with 
sporadic title  
0.019 -0.098 0.111 -0.038  -0.017 0.070 0.039 -0.070  -0.036 -0.131 
(0.071) (0.199) (0.090) (0.123)  (0.071) (0.203) (0.073) (0.106)  (0.079) (0.254) 
Total farm size (ha) -0.025 0.049 -0.007 -0.020  -0.020* 0.014 0.021 -0.023*  -0.018 -0.123** 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.038) (0.026)  (0.012) (0.029) (0.021) (0.013)  (0.016) (0.054) 
Size of rubber area (ha) -0.030* -0.064*** -0.006 -0.040**  -0.086*** -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.080***  -0.088*** -0.097* 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.028) (0.018)  (0.017) (0.049) (0.029) (0.018)  (0.022) (0.049) 
Wealth index (quintiles) 0.011 -0.006 -0.023 0.021  0.031** 0.015 0.021 0.042*  0.034* 0.134*** 
 (0.017) (0.040) (0.031) (0.022)  (0.015) (0.038) (0.021) (0.022)  (0.019) (0.049) 
Number of adults  -0.007 0.036 0.128 -0.062  0.019 -0.003 -0.014 0.021  0.005 0.011 
 (0.065) (0.044) (0.095) (0.081)  (0.021) (0.046) (0.029) (0.024)  (0.022) (0.059) 
Own business (=1) 0.019 0.033 0.001 0.024  -0.045 0.026 0.126 -0.118*  -0.026 -0.351* 
 (0.024) (0.099) (0.041) (0.029)  (0.056) (0.096) (0.085) (0.070)  (0.065) (0.195) 
2012 (=1) -0.075 -0.107** -0.126 -0.062  -0.114** -0.138*** -0.080 -0.132***  -0.117**  
(0.049) (0.051) (0.136) (0.050)  (0.046) (0.050) (0.100) (0.049)  (0.048)  
Age of household head 
(years) 
-0.001  0.002 -0.002  -2.E-4  0.004 -0.003  -0.001 -0.024*** 
(0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.009) 
Female-headed household 
(=1) 
-0.227**  -0.480*** -0.141  -0.196*  -0.472*** -0.056  -0.192 0.055 
(0.113)  (0.140) (0.130)  (0.105)  (0.178) (0.098)  (0.126) (0.362) 
Education (years of 
schooling) 
0.010  0.004 0.012  0.017*  0.008 0.021**  0.016* 0.015 
(0.010)  (0.012) (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.020) 
Farm size squared (ha) 
 
0.001***  4.E-4 0.001**  0.001***  7.E-5 0.001***  0.001** 0.008*** 
(0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (4.E-4)  (0.001) (5.E-4)  (0.001) (0.003) 
Non-random village (=1) -0.165**  -0.215*** -0.126  -0.191***  -0.227** -0.137**  -0.167**  
 (0.068)  (0.072) (0.078)  (0.067)  (0.099) (0.056)  (0.066)  
Migrant (=1) 0.056     0.040     0.019 -0.115 
 (0.065)     (0.066)     (0.067) (0.200) 
Age of rubber trees 
(years) 
     0.017*  0.028 0.013  0.023** -0.004 
     (0.009)  (0.017) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.038) 
Age of trees (years 
squared) 
     -4.E-4*  -0.001 -3.E-4*  -0.001*** 1.E-06 
     (2.E-4)  (4.E-4) (2.E-4)  (2.E-4) (0.001) 
Employing sharecroppers 
(=1) 
     0.118*  0.171 0.098  0.077 0.360** 
     (0.064)  (0.110) (0.069)  (0.062) (0.178) 
Distance from residence 
(km) 
     -0.002  -0.025*** 0.003  -0.003 -0.012 
     (0.003)  (0.008) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.013) 
Distance from road (km)      0.005  0.055** -0.007  0.009 0.013 
      (0.016)  (0.026) (0.019)  (0.017) (0.066) 
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Household-level models  Plot-level models  Plot-level models with soil quality 
controls 
(1) (1a) (2) (2a)  (3) (3a) (4) (4a)  (5) (6) 
Full sample 
(RE) 
Balanced 
panel (FE) 
Migrants 
(RE) 
Non-
migrants 
(RE) 
 Full sample 
(RE) 
Balanced 
panel (FE) 
Migrants 
(RE) 
Non-
migrants 
(RE) 
 Full sample 
(RE)  
Sub-sample with 
soil quality 
measures (OLS) 
Altitude of residence (m)           -2.E-4  
           (0.001)  
Medium soil fertility (=1) 
(Ref.=low fertility) 
          0.012  
          (0.122)  
High soil fertility (=1) 
(Ref.=low fertility) 
          -0.042  
          (0.112)  
Soil bulk density            -0.600 
            (0.456) 
Soil carbon content            -0.088 
            (0.099) 
Carbon content (squared)            0.003 
            (0.003) 
Carbon/nitrogen ratio            0.032 
            (0.037) 
Constant 7.233*** 7.105*** 7.188*** 7.279***  7.126*** 7.494*** 6.967*** 7.220***  7.163*** 8.760*** 
 (0.150) (0.211) (0.244) (0.171)  (0.199) (0.234) (0.347) (0.237)  (0.256) (0.852) 
Chi2 / F-statistic 297.453*** 1.986*** 232.371*** 123.891***  312.312*** 1.89** 2332.550*** 550.142***  482.379*** 3.634*** 
Hausman test (chi2)  2.24     4.67      
Number of observations 665 564 174 491  851 516 231 620  741 92 
Notes: All models have the logarithm of rubber yield (kg/ha) as dependent variable. Coefficient estimates are shown with robust standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses.  
The share of land titled in the plot-level models is 1 if the plot was titled and 0 otherwise. RE, random effects; FE, fixed effects; OLS, ordinary least squares. * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 
0.01. 
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Table A3: Historical forest coverage and land titles (spatial error and spatial lag models) 
 
Spatial error models  Spatial lag models 
(1) 
2 km 
radius 
(2) 
5 km 
radius 
(3) 
10 km 
radius 
(4) 
All plots 
 (5) 
2 km 
radius 
(6) 
5 km 
radius 
(7) 
10 km 
radius 
(8) 
All plots 
          
Share of forested 
area in 1990 
-0.160*** -0.113** -0.150***   -0.164*** -0.107** -0.146***  
(0.050) (0.048) (0.057)   (0.053) (0.046) (0.056)  
Deforestation 
(=1) 
   -0.068**     -0.068** 
   (0.027)     (0.027) 
Rubber plot (=1) -0.056 -0.096*** -0.078** -0.105***  -0.057 -0.095*** -0.077** -0.105*** 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032)  (0.042) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) 
Duration of plot 
ownership (years) 
0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006***  0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance from 
road (km) 
-0.086*** -0.041*** -0.025** -0.020**  -0.085*** -0.042*** -0.025** -0.021** 
(0.030) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.030) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) 
Age of household 
head (years) 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -3.E-4  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -3.E-4 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (years 
of schooling) 
0.005 4.E-4 0.001 4.E-4  0.004 4.E-4 0.001 0.001 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Migrant (=1) -0.028 -0.013 0.012 -0.014  -0.030 -0.013 0.012 -0.013 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030)  (0.042) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030) 
Wealth index 
(initial, quintiles) 
0.008 0.012 0.017 0.028***  0.007 0.012 0.018* 0.029*** 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Total farm size 
(ha) 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004*  -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004* 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-random 
village (=1) 
-0.066 -0.056 -0.007 -0.013  -0.066 -0.055 -0.007 -0.015 
(0.052) (0.043) (0.040) (0.042)  (0.055) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) 
Share of migrants 
in village  
0.195** 0.190*** 0.126** 0.128**  0.202** 0.183*** 0.123** 0.117* 
(0.078) (0.070) (0.060) (0.065)  (0.083) (0.068) (0.059) (0.061) 
Village wealth 
index (initial, 
quintiles) 
-0.025* -0.011 -0.005 -0.003  -0.026* -0.011 -0.005 -0.004 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant 0.276** 0.297*** 0.198* 0.141  0.287** 0.287*** 0.191* 0.135 
 (0.132) (0.110) (0.102) (0.110)  (0.134) (0.109) (0.101) (0.107) 
Regency 
dummies 
included 
         
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lambda and rho            
Constant -0.079 0.062 0.039 0.122  -0.050 0.068 0.032 0.148 
 (0.104) (0.095) (0.091) (0.103)  (0.099) (0.092) (0.087) (0.096) 
Squared 
correlation 
0.088 0.074 0.057 0.099 
 
0.089 0.075 0.058 0.104 
Number of obs. 405 620 734 573  405 620 734 573 
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is a dummy that take a value of 1 if the plot was systematically titled in 
2015, and 0 otherwise. The reported coefficients are the parameter estimates of β with standard errors reported in 
parentheses. In column (1) to (4) β equals the average marginal effect. Lambda the coefficient of spatially autocorrelated 
errors. In column (5) to (8): Rho is the spatial lag coefficient.    * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table A4: Historical forest coverage and farm size (spatial error and OLS models) 
 
Spatial error model  Ordinary least squares 
(1) 
2 km 
radius 
(2) 
5 km 
radius 
(3) 
10 km 
radius 
(4) 
All plots 
 (5) 
2 km 
radius 
(6) 
5 km 
radius 
(7) 
10 km 
radius 
(8) 
All plots 
          
Share of forested 
area in 1990  
0.325* 0.406** 0.535**   0.321* 0.412** 0.551**  
(0.178) (0.187) (0.240)   (0.164) (0.177) (0.233)  
          
Deforestation (=1)    0.236***     0.283*** 
    (0.089)     (0.086) 
          
Age of household 
head (years) 
0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.009*  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.008** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
          
Education (years of 
schooling) 
0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038***  0.038** 0.037** 0.037** 0.039*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
          
Migrant (=1) 0.112 0.112 0.110 0.128  0.155 0.152 0.149 0.169 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105)  (0.133) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) 
          
Age of household 
(years) 
0.009* 0.009* 0.008* 0.008*  0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
          
Wealth index (initial, 
quintiles) 
0.142*** 0.144*** 0.146*** 0.141***  0.144*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.142*** 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)  (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) 
          
Share of migrants in 
village  
0.757*** 0.763*** 0.751*** 0.733***  0.701** 0.710** 0.702** 0.691** 
(0.227) (0.225) (0.224) (0.221)  (0.299) (0.295) (0.294) (0.278) 
          
Village wealth index 
(initial, quintiles) 
-0.122*** -0.124*** -0.129*** -0.121***  -0.127*** -0.129*** -0.134*** -0.126*** 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
         
Non-random village 
(=1) 
0.214 0.183 0.137 0.212  0.218* 0.186 0.140 0.224* 
(0.163) (0.161) (0.162) (0.158)  (0.128) (0.130) (0.139) (0.119) 
          
Constant -0.307 -0.325 -0.354 -0.246  -0.237 -0.262 -0.298 -0.204 
 (0.312) (0.310) (0.311) (0.304)  (0.317) (0.319) (0.326) (0.291) 
          
Regency dummies 
included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lambda          
Constant 0.253*** 0.243*** 0.240*** 0.226***      
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086)      
F-stat./squared corr. 0.186 0.190 0.191 0.196  8.354 8.589 8.621 8.152 
Number of obs. 462 462 462 462  462 462 462 462 
Notes:  The dependent variable in all models is log of farm size in 2015 measured in hectares. Coefficient estimates are 
shown with standard errors in parentheses (clustered at village level in columns 5-8). Goodness of fit measure for the 
spatial error models is the squared correlation. Lambda is the coefficient of spatially autocorrelated errors.   * p ≤ 0.10, ** p 
≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table A5: Land titles and agricultural intensity 
 Plot-level models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Material input         
(000 IDR/ha) 
Full sample 
Material input         
(000 IDR/ha) 
Migrants 
Log of labor 
input 
(hours/ha) 
Full sample 
Log of labor 
input 
(hours/ha) 
Migrants 
Log of yield 
(kg/ha) 
Full sample 
Log of yield 
(kg/ha) 
Full sample 
Systematic land title 
(=1) 
114.148** 204.127** 0.125* 0.122 0.141** 0.145** 
(48.649) (97.340) (0.070) (0.104) (0.062) (0.062) 
Sporadic land title (=1) -9.365 26.157 0.055 0.198* -0.015 -0.026 
(36.395) (61.016) (0.056) (0.105) (0.073) (0.062) 
Total farm size (ha) 14.887** 23.495 -0.035* 0.006 -0.022** -0.002 
 (7.195) (17.456) (0.018) (0.035) (0.011) (0.010) 
Farm size squared (ha)  -0.241 -0.285 0.001* -0.001 0.001*** 0.001** 
(0.231) (0.659) (0.001) (0.001) (4.E-4) (3.E-4) 
Wealth index 
(quintiles) 
38.959*** 9.467 -0.007 -0.011 0.029* 0.027* 
(11.018) (22.878) (0.023) (0.042) (0.015) (0.014) 
Own business (=1) 
 
-11.332 102.631 0.023 0.073 -0.047 -0.068 
(33.826) (65.527) (0.056) (0.117) (0.054) (0.057) 
Number of adults  -4.377 -0.566 0.031 0.045 0.019 0.007 
(12.091) (27.882) (0.028) (0.053) (0.020) (0.018) 
Age of household head 
(years) 
-0.414 1.233 0.003 0.004 -2.E-4 -0.002 
(1.451) (3.207) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
Female-headed 
household (=1) 
-181.132** -324.205 -0.246 -0.707* -0.186* -0.068 
(76.972) (225.738) (0.197) (0.406) (0.103) (0.092) 
Education (years of 
schooling) 
2.652 26.751*** -0.011 -0.022 0.017* 0.020** 
(4.375) (9.153) (0.010) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009) 
Migrant (=1) 113.687***  -0.061  0.027 0.060 
(32.706)  (0.056)  (0.067) (0.064) 
Plot size (ha) 
 
-7.491 -14.137 -0.104*** -0.063 -0.084*** -0.053*** 
(9.024) (21.056) (0.021) (0.038) (0.017) (0.014) 
Age of rubber trees 
(years) 
-32.052*** -33.473*** -0.014 -0.028 0.020** 0.011 
(5.586) (10.745) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age of trees (years 
squared) 
0.542*** 0.560** 3.E-4 6.E-4 -4.E-4 -2.E-4 
(0.123) (0.235) (2.E-4) (4.E-4) (2.E-4) (2.E-4) 
Plot productive (=1) 191.446*** 392.696*** 3.393*** 3.417***   
(45.729) (91.030) (0.127) (0.211)   
Employing 
sharecroppers (=1) 
-62.861 -45.360 -0.077 -0.202 0.121** 0.136** 
(42.254) (82.972) (0.087) (0.209) (0.062) (0.062) 
Distance from 
residence (km) 
-0.083 -0.308 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(1.071) (42.252) (0.001) (0.086) (0.061) (0.061) 
Distance from road 
(km) 
-20.854** -2.569 0.029 0.074 0.005 0.002 
(9.577) (21.924) (0.024) (0.054) (0.016) (0.014) 
2012 (=1) 121.727*** 178.450*** -0.170*** -0.222** -0.124*** -0.071 
 (27.185) (51.524) (0.060) (0.102) (0.046) (0.047) 
Non-random village 
(=1) 
-67.208* -261.588*** 0.067 0.236** -0.185*** -0.198*** 
(36.386) (67.676) (0.080) (0.114) (0.065) (0.058) 
Material input (000 
IDR/ha) 
    8.E-5***  
    (3.E-5)  
Log of labor input 
(hours/ha) 
     0.334*** 
     (0.034) 
Constant   3.784*** 3.487*** 7.096*** 4.873*** 
   (0.291) (0.539) (0.199) (0.287) 
Chi2 139.889*** 82.550*** 4202.748*** 482.462*** 357.550*** 1033.791*** 
Number of obs. 1101 286 1015 269 850 846 
Notes: All models were estimated with random effects panel estimators using data from 2012 and 2015. Coefficient 
estimates are shown with robust standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. Due to left-censoring of the 
dependent variable, a Tobit specification was used in columns (1) and (2). The coefficients themselves measure how the 
latent variable changes with respect to changes in the regressors. IDR, Indonesian rupiah. * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 
0.01. 
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Table A6: Historical forest coverage, land titles, and farm size 
 
Plot-level models (systematic land title =1)  Household-level models (log of farm size in ha) 
(1) 
2 km radius 
(2) 
5 km radius 
(3) 
10 km radius 
(4) 
All plots 
 (5) 
2 km radius 
(6) 
5 km radius 
(7) 
10 km radius 
(8) 
All plots 
Share of forested area in 1990  -0.180*** -0.128** -0.180***   0.268* 0.337** 0.453**  
(0.057) (0.050) (0.065)   (0.146) (0.155) (0.198)  
Deforestation (=1)    -0.060**     0.258*** 
   (0.028)     (0.086) 
Age of household head (years) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.009* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Education (years of schooling) 0.004 1.E-4 -0.001 -0.003  0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Migrant (=1) -0.042 -0.020 0.009 -0.014  0.137 0.135 0.132 0.148 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029)  (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Wealth index (initial, quintiles) 0.003 0.009 0.018* 0.029**  0.142*** 0.144*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Non-random village (=1) -0.030 -0.041 0.005 -0.008  0.169 0.144 0.105 0.177 
 (0.054) (0.048) (0.044) (0.051)  (0.137) (0.136) (0.137) (0.136) 
Share of migrants in village  0.212*** 0.197*** 0.149** 0.184**  0.585*** 0.596*** 0.590*** 0.578*** 
(0.074) (0.069) (0.061) (0.075)  (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) (0.191) 
Village wealth index (initial, quintiles) -0.017 -0.004 -3.E-5 0.001  -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.111*** -0.104*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Rubber plot (=1)  -0.059 -0.101*** -0.081*** -0.097***      
 (0.038) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033)      
Duration of plot ownership (years) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006***      
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)      
Distance from road (km) -0.095** -0.042** -0.025** -0.023**      
 (0.041) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011)      
Age of household (years)      0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.008* 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant      -0.544* -0.554* -0.585* -0.514* 
      (0.301) (0.300) (0.301) (0.298) 
          
Regency dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2 / squared correlation 74.830*** 95.021*** 77.205*** 75.126***  0.208 0.210 0.211 0.217 
Number of observations 433 660 750 594  462 462 462 462 
Notes: Models in columns (1) to (4) were estimated as probit models. Rubber and oil palm plots are included. Average marginal effects are shown with robust standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses. 
Models in columns (5) to (8) were estimated as spatial lag models. The spatial lag coefficient   ranges from 0.231 to 0.24 significant at p ≤ 0.01. The reported coefficients are the parameter estimates of β with 
standard errors reported in parentheses. The goodness of fit measure is the squared correlation. Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses. * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table A7: Agricultural productivity and farm size  
 (1) (2) 
Rubber yield (log/ha) -0.192*** -0.189*** 
 (0.059) (0.060) 
   
Age of household head (years)  0.014*** 
  (0.004) 
   
Education (years of schooling)  0.043*** 
  (0.015) 
   
Spontaneous migrant (=1)  0.039 
  (0.115) 
   
Wealth index (initial, quintiles)  0.086** 
  (0.038) 
   
Share of migrants in village  0.193 
  (0.246) 
   
Village wealth index (initial, 
quintiles) 
 -0.056 
 (0.036) 
   
Non-random village (=1) 0.088 0.143 
 (0.129) (0.117) 
   
Constant 2.894*** 1.644*** 
 (0.423) (0.528) 
   
Regency dummies included Yes Yes 
R2 0.088 0.155 
Observations 349 349 
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the log of farm size in 2015 
measured in hectares. Only farms with productive rubber are included. Coefficient 
estimates from ordinary least squares models are shown with robust standard 
errors clustered at village level. * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
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3 The economics behind an ecological crisis: Livelihood 
effects of oil palm expansion in Sumatra, Indonesia
8
 
3.1 Introduction 
The negative environmental effects associated with oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) 
monocultures in Southeast Asia have received much attention over the last two decades. 
Studies have shown that oil palm expansion contributed to deforestation and conversion of 
peat swamps (Koh et al. 2011; Carlson et al. 2012; Wilcove et al. 2013; Stibig et al. 2014; 
Abood et al. 2015), causing biodiversity loss and disruptions in other ecosystem services 
(Fitzherbert et al. 2008; Nantha & Tisdell 2009; Gibbs et al. 2010; Azhar et al. 2011; 
Lucey & Hill 2012; Barnes et al. 2014; Guillaume et al. 2015; Konopik et al. 2015; Ganser 
et al. 2017). In spite of mounting evidence about the negative environmental effects, oil 
palm expansion has continued in the tropics during the last two decades at a rate 
unparalleled for any crop in the more recent history of agriculture (Wicke et al. 2011; 
FAOSTAT 2014; Cramb & McCarthy 2016a; Vijay et al. 2016). The main reason for this 
unprecedented expansion is the increase in global demand for vegetable oil due to 
population and income growth. Increasing demand results in high economic profitability in 
the palm oil sector (Wilcove & Koh 2010; Clough et al. 2016; Drescher et al. 2016).  
Much of oil palm cultivation is carried out by large companies (Euler et al. 2016a). 
However, smallholder farmers are also increasingly involved (Rist et al. 2010). Recent 
studies have estimated that smallholder farmers account for about 40% of total global palm 
oil supply with a further rising trend (Bourke & Harwood 2009; Byerlee et al. 2017; Euler 
et al. 2017). Unlike large company plantations, smallholder-driven land-use changes are 
more difficult to monitor and regulate. Hence, policies aimed at more sustainable land-use 
systems have to build on a thorough understanding of the economic incentives for 
smallholder farmers. 
                                                 
8
 This essay was published as: Kubitza, C.; Krishna, V. V.; Alamsyah, Z. & Qaim, M. (2018). The 
Economics Behind an Ecological Crisis: Livelihood Effects of Oil Palm Expansion in Sumatra, Indonesia. 
Human Ecology, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-017-9965-7. CK and VVK developed the research idea, 
collected the survey data, conducted the regression analyses, and wrote the paper. MQ and ZA commented 
on data analysis, result interpretation, and revising the paper. 
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Our study was conducted in Indonesia, the world‟s leading palm oil producer. Similar 
to the global pattern, around 40% of the oil palm area is cultivated by smallholder farmers 
(Susanti & Budidarsono 2014; Gatto et al. 2015; Euler et al. 2016b). Several studies have 
shown that oil palm has a higher labor productivity than alternative cash crops, such as 
rubber (Bourke & Harwood 2009; Budidarsono et al. 2012; Clough et al. 2016). However, 
very few have explicitly analyzed the economic and social effects of oil palm cultivation 
among smallholder farmers. Extrapolating productivity data from large company 
plantations is of limited value because the average yields achieved by smallholders are 
significantly lower than those on large oil palm plantations (Cramb & McCarthy 2016a; 
Euler et al. 2016a; Hoffmann et al. 2017; Woittiez et al. 2017). We are aware of only two 
recent studies that analyzed the livelihood effects of oil palm cultivation in the small-farm 
sector (Euler et al. 2017; Krishna et al. 2017a). Using cross-sectional data, both studies 
suggested that cultivating oil palm has a positive effect on household living standards on 
average. Both also showed that the magnitude of the effect varies depending on the farms‟ 
endowment of land, labor, and capital.  
While these recent studies are an important step towards better understanding the 
economics of smallholder oil palm cultivation, we identify two major limitations that are 
addressed in this article. First, existing studies used cross-sectional data so that the results 
only provide a snapshot of effects under static conditions. The benefits of cash crop 
cultivation for farmers critically depend on fluctuating market prices and can hence change 
over time. Here, we use data from 2012 and 2015 to analyze possible dynamics. In 2012, 
the international price of palm oil was relatively low compared to the main competing crop 
– natural rubber (Hevea brasiliensis Muell-Arg.). In subsequent years, the international 
rubber price declined (Agris 2017), thus adding to the relative profitability of oil palm as 
an alternative cash crop, such that we expect to observe an increase in the benefits of oil 
palm cultivation between 2012 and 2015. 
The second limitation of existing studies is that they did not look at possible spillover 
effects that the cultivation of oil palm by some farmers may have on others in the local 
context. Spillovers could occur through various mechanisms. For instance, oil palm is less 
labor-intensive than rubber (Gatto et al. 2015; Euler et al. 2017), which could reduce the 
local demand for labor and increase the market price of cultivable land and thus may affect 
employment and other economic opportunities for households in the community. On the 
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other hand, the expansion of oil palm is often associated with new public or private sector 
infrastructure investments that may also be beneficial for local households not directly 
involved in the palm oil sector. The analysis of spillover effects is possible through the use 
of spatially explicit regression models, a relatively recent trend in the empirical economics 
literature (Lewis et al. 2011; Wollni & Andersson 2014). We are not aware of previous 
studies that have analyzed economic spillover effects of oil palm cultivation or related 
land-use changes. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Study area  
This study was conducted in the lowlands of Jambi Province on the island of Sumatra, 
Indonesia. The region has a tropical humid climate with average temperature of 
26.7±0.2°C and annual precipitation of 2235±381mm during the 1991-2011 period 
(Drescher et al. 2016). Lowland rainforests largely disappeared and agroforestry systems 
were significantly downsized in Jambi over the last 30-40 years. The land thus gained was 
used primarily for rubber and oil palm monocultures (Luskin et al. 2014; Clough et al. 
2016; Krishna et al. 2017b).  
Oil palm was introduced in Jambi on large state plantations. The diffusion among 
smallholder farmers started during the late-1980s and early-1990s. During the early stages, 
smallholder participation was promoted by the Indonesian government through subsidized 
contract schemes (Rist et al. 2010; Gatto et al. 2017). While subsidized government 
interventions declined after 1999, smallholder farmers continued to adopt and cultivate oil 
palm, often independently without any company contracts (Susanti & Budidarsono 2014). 
Yet, independent adoption is more often observed in villages where company contracts 
existed in the past, which is likely due to better access to technical information and to 
output markets in these settings (Euler et al. 2016b). Official statistics show that around 
200,000 households are involved in oil palm cultivation in Jambi, which ranks sixth among 
Indonesian provinces in terms of crude palm oil production with an estimated oil palm area 
of over 700,000 ha (Badan Pusat Statistik 2012). At the same time, the province is also 
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known for its forest and biodiversity resources; the national parks of Jambi support a 
number of threatened wildlife species (Luskin et al. 2014). 
 
3.2.2 Data 
The main unit of observation in our study is the farm household. Survey data were 
collected from 683 farm households
9
 in two rounds, 2012 and 2015, as part of a larger 
interdisciplinary research project (for details see Drescher et al 2016). The households 
were selected for interview following a multi-stage random sampling procedure. Five 
regencies of Jambi that comprise most of the lowland, non-peat smallholder systems were 
chosen for the study (Sarolangun, Bungo, Tebo, Batanghari, Muaro Jambi). The survey 
was carried out in 45 rural villages from these five regencies (40 randomly selected 
villages and 5 purposively selected ones to facilitate interdisciplinary overlaps). A map of 
Jambi showing the sample villages is provided in Figure 3.  
From each of the selected villages, depending on size, between 6 and 24 farm 
households were randomly sampled using complete lists of all farm households in 2012. 
The same households were revisited in 2015. Some sample attrition occurred due to 
outmigration or deceased household heads, among other reasons, but the attrition rate of 
6% is relatively low. Further randomly selected households in the same villages replaced 
households that were unavailable in 2015. Using a structured questionnaire, details of all 
cropping and livestock activities of households during the past 12 months were elicited in 
both survey rounds. Most farm households in the sample grow either rubber or oil palm or 
both. Socio-demographic characteristics, details of off-farm income activities, asset 
endowment, and consumption expenditures on food and non-food goods and services were 
additionally recorded. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 In total 700 were interviewed, but 17 farmers were purposively selected due to interdisciplinary 
overlaps. In the statistical analysis we thus only included 683 farmers. 
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Figure 3: Map of Jambi Province showing sample villages 
Notes: Dots and squares indicate randomly and purposively selected villages, respectively. Blue dots/squares 
represent villages where rubber is the main crop (rubber area is larger than oil palm area). Red dots/squares 
represent villages where oil palm is the main crop. 
 
3.2.3 Measuring livelihoods 
The value of household consumption (i.e., consumption expenditure) is used as an 
indicator of household livelihoods (living standards). Being less volatile and less 
influenced by measurement errors, consumption is considered a better indicator of 
household living standards than income (Blundell & Preston 1998). Household 
consumption expenditure was calculated by summing up the value of all food items and 
nonfood goods and services consumed by all household members. The expenses on food 
items were elicited through a seven-day recall, non-food expenditures were captured 
through monthly or annual recall, depending on the particular goods and services. To make 
consumption values comparable across households of different size, we calculated annual 
Map of Sumatra 
showing Jambi Province 
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household expenditures per adult equivalent. The 2012 data were adjusted for inflation to 
enable comparison with the 2015 data.  
In addition to total consumption expenditures, we also look at food and non-food 
consumption separately. The cultivation of oil palm (and other non-food cash crops) can 
affect food consumption in farm households through the subsistence pathway (possibly 
less food) and through the income pathway (possibly more food) (Sibhatu et al. 2015). A 
breakdown by type of expenditure can help better understand the various facets of 
household livelihoods. 
 
3.2.4 Estimating effects of oil palm cultivation 
We estimate the effects of oil palm cultivation on household livelihoods by using a 
standard random-effects model. To account for possible non-linearity, consumption 
expenditures in household i at time t (   ) are expressed in natural logs.     is regressed on 
oil palm cultivation (    ) and a set of   household characteristics (    ): 
 
                                                                 (6) 
                         
where    is the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity of the model, and     is the 
independent identically distributed error term. We estimate separate models for total 
consumption expenditures, food expenditures, and non-food expenditures. In all models, 
we are particularly interested in the estimates for   . As oil palm cultivation (    ) is 
defined as a dummy variable, and the dependent variables are expressed in log terms, the 
percentage effect of cultivation on consumption is calculated as {   ̂     ̂  ̂    }, where 
 ̂   ̂  is the estimated variance of    ̂ (van Garderen & Shah 2002). The variance of the 
percentage change is calculated as     ̂{   ̂   ̂      ̂   ̂ }. 
One potential problem with the random-effects models in equation (6) is that oil palm 
cultivators might differ systematically from non-cultivators in terms of certain unobserved 
characteristics, for example managerial skills or risk attitudes. Such unobserved 
characteristics may also influence household consumption, which could lead to biased 
estimates of   . Such potential bias due to unobserved heterogeneity is tested by 
additionally estimating fixed-effects models. Fixed-effects models use differencing 
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techniques, thus canceling out any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. A Hausman 
specification test (Hausman 1978) is used to compare the fixed-effects and random-effects 
estimates. A significant Hausman test statistic would suggest that the random-effects 
estimates are biased, whereas an insignificant test would mean that the null hypothesis of 
no bias through time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity cannot be rejected. 
 
3.2.5 Estimating temporal differences in oil palm effects 
To analyze whether the benefits of oil palm cultivation vary over time, we run separate 
regression models with cross-sectional data for 2012 and 2015. These cross-sectional 
models are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) and the same set of explanatory 
variables as in the panel random-effects specifications. We are particularly interested in 
comparing the effects of oil palm cultivation between 2012 and 2015. Given that the non-
cultivating households primarily rely on rubber farming and the price of rubber declined 
between 2012 and 2015, we expect larger benefits of oil palm cultivation in 2015.  
 
3.2.6 Estimating spatial patterns and spillovers 
In a separate step of the analysis, we investigate spatial patterns in the estimates. We 
can differentiate between spatial correlation in the error term and spatial spillover effects 
of the dependent variables and independent variables. There may be spatial correlation of 
unobserved factors (e.g., soil fertility). Such spatial dependence would lead to patterns in 
the error terms and may underestimate the standard errors. We cluster standard errors at the 
village level to address this problem. Spatial spillover effects can have more severe 
consequences, as they can lead to biased estimates (Wollni & Andersson 2014). Standard 
models of impact assessment, such as those in equation (6), are based on the assumption 
that outcomes for oil palm cultivators and non-cultivators depend solely on own 
cultivation, not on the cultivation of oil palm by others. This assumption is violated when 
spatial spillover effects occur. As discussed above, the cultivation of oil palm by some 
farmers could also affect others, for instance through changes in factors markets or broader 
infrastructure developments. To address the potential issue of spatial dependence and 
empirically assess the existence and magnitude of spillover effects of oil palm cultivation, 
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we use a spatial Durbin model with random effects as follows (LeSage & Pace 2009; 
Elhorst 2010): 
 
                                                       (7)    
       
where   is an       spatial weights matrix, based on the inverse distance between the 
households‟ residence, and   is the total number of households in the sample. The 
coefficient   measures the lagged effect of cultivation, while  , the spatial autoregressive 
coefficient, measures the lagged effect of consumption expenditures. Since the individual 
weight of a household decreases with an increasing number of neighbors, the weights 
matrix is row-standardized, such that for each i, ∑       . 
Taking the partial derivative of the model in equation (7) with respect to oil palm 
cultivation, the estimate not only shows the livelihood effects oil palm cultivation on 
cultivating farm households but also the effect on neighboring households.
 10
 The first 
effect is called direct effect and the latter is called indirect effect or spillover effect. We set 
the threshold of neighborhood distance for spatial effects estimation at 10km, since 
spillovers beyond that distance are rather unlikely. The use of a spatial Durbin model and 
taking the partial derivative is often the preferred method to calculate spillovers (Elhorst 
2010). However, critics also underline certain shortcomings with this method, such as the a 
priori specification of the spatial weights matrix, difficulties in justifying global spillovers, 
and possible bias due to omitted spatially dependent variables (Corrado & Fingleton 2012; 
Halleck Vega & Elhorst 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Different methods exist to estimate models that include spatial effects. Our estimation is based on 
maximum likelihood. The regression command used does only allow a balanced panel, we restrict hence our 
analysis to farmers which were surveyed both in 2012 and 2015.  
 49 
 
3.3 Results and discussion 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 4. The main crop grown by the majority of 
farmers in the study area is rubber. Oil palm was cultivated by 36% of the households in 
2015. Around 60% of the oil palm cultivators also produce rubber whereas sample farmers 
rarely cultivated food crops (Table 4). One of the notable differences between oil palm 
cultivators and non-cultivators is that the former have significantly larger farms on 
average. Farmers with large areas of rubber were found to start oil palm cultivation 
significantly earlier than farmers operating on a smaller scale (Euler et al. 2016b). Farm 
size in this context refers to all land that farmers reported as owning, including land under 
formal and informal tenure. Farmers acquired their land mostly through inheritance or 
inter-vivo transfers, land market purchases, and forest land appropriation. While about half 
of the plots owned by sample farmers were acquired through market purchases, 18% were 
acquired through forest-land appropriation. Other research in Jambi has shown that the role 
of land acquisition through forest land appropriation has declined over the last 15 years 
while the role of market purchases has increased (Krishna et al. 2017b).  
Table 4 shows that oil palm-cultivating households are more likely to own small non-
farm businesses (e.g., trading, small shops). Because oil palm requires less labor than 
rubber, oil palm farmers can save family labor. These labor savings allow oil palm 
cultivators to increase their farm size (if additional land can be acquired) and/or to spend 
more time in non-farm economic activities. The income generated from these alternative 
uses of the saved time can be seen as secondary effects of oil palm cultivation. There is no 
difference in the availability of family labor (number of adults in the household) between 
oil palm cultivators and non-cultivators. Human capital endowments, which we capture 
through age and education of the household head, are also similar between the two groups. 
Oil palm farmers are residing closer to markets, take more credits from formal sources, and 
are more likely to hold formal titles for the land cultivated.  
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Table 4: Differences between oil palm cultivators and non-cultivators 
 
Survey round 2012  Survey round 2015 
Cultivators 
[n=238] 
Non-
cultivators 
[n=441] 
 
Cultivators 
[n=248] 
Non-cultivators 
[n=435] 
Livelihood indicators: 
consumption expenditure 
(million IDR/year/AE) 
  
 
  
Total consumption 
expenditure  
24.527
**
 
(15.210) 
20.090 
(31.311) 
 23.956
***
 
(16.757) 
17.841 
(13.394) 
Non-food expenditure  11.675 
(12.710) 
9.160 
(27.643) 
 12.348
***
 
(13.982) 
8.439 
(10.738) 
Food expenditure  12.853
***
 
(6.574) 
10.931 
(6.086) 
 11.608
***
 
(6.229) 
9.402 
(4.761) 
Household characteristics       
Cultivates rubber (=1) 
 
0.613
***
 0.946  0.601
***
 0.947 
Farm size owned (ha) 5.414
***
 
(5.289) 
3.337 
(3.955) 
 5.474
***
 
(5.224) 
3.208 
(4.213) 
Number of adults in the 
household 
2.849 
(1.064) 
2.980 
(1.227) 
 2.964 
(1.125) 
2.922 
(1.141) 
Female-headed household 
(=1) 
 
0.021
***
 0.068  0.028
***
 0.103 
Age of the household head 
(years) 
45.508 
(12.183) 
45.773 
(12.277) 
 47.661 
(10.978) 
47.485 
(11.793) 
Education (years of 
schooling) 
7.752 
(3.604) 
7.302 
(3.680) 
 7.335 
(3.526) 
7.115 
(3.780) 
Own business (=1) 
 
0.231 0.186  0.335
***
 0.221 
Employed (=1) 
 
0.412 0.476  0.556 0.570 
Migrant (=1) 
 
0.576
***
 0.374  0.548
***
 0.379 
Transmigrant village (=1) 
 
0.437
***
 0.236  0.411
***
 0.248 
Distance to the nearest 
market (km) 
5.720
**
 
(7.482) 
7.154 
(7.359) 
 4.594
***
 
(5.216) 
6.036 
(6.027) 
Formal credit (=1) 
 
0.353
***
 0.184  0.480
***
 0.274 
Share of titled land (0-1) 0.303
***
 
(0.408) 
0.172 
(0.350) 
 0.339
***
 
(0.419) 
0.224 
(0.390) 
Notes: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. 
***
 ,
**
: Difference with non-
cultivators in the same survey round are statistically significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Returns to labor and land for oil palm and rubber 
 Survey round 2012 
 
Survey round 2015 
Oil palm  Rubber Oil palm  Rubber 
.n 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
 
.n 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
 
.n 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
 
.n 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
 
Returns to labor  
[000 IDR/hour] 
 
132 
78.477
***
    
(73.429) 
 313 
23.756  
(19.105) 
 168 
46.588
***
    
(114.399) 
 330 
10.698 
(12.907) 
 
Returns to land 
[Mil.IDR/ha/year] 
 
134 
13.459
***
  
(10.085) 
 314 
19.206 
(12.376) 
 168 
8.221
***
 
(8.271) 
 330 
10.260 
(7.471) 
Notes: Statistical significance was estimated using Kruskal-Wallis equality of populations rank test 
comparing the variables across the two crops. Only plots surveyed in both rounds were included in the 
analysis. All unproductive plots were excluded and tree age restricted from 5 to 25 years. Monetary values 
from 2012 were inflation-adjusted. 
***
: Difference between mean values for oil palm and rubber within the 
same survey round is statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Table 5 shows a comparison of returns to labor and land for oil palm and rubber plots. 
On average, oil palm cultivation is less profitable than rubber per unit of land but more 
profitable per unit of labor. These differences between the two crops were less distinct in 
2015 than in 2012. The profitability of rubber cultivation declined drastically between the 
two survey rounds, due to the low market prices for natural rubber prevailing in 2015 
(Figure 4). The profitability of oil palm also declined during the same period, albeit less 
steeply. In 2015, rubber continued to be more profitable per unit of land. Hence rubber is 
more attractive for households facing land constraints and relatively low opportunity costs 
of labor time. 
The cultivation of oil palm and rubber also differs in terms of inputs other than labor. 
The literature suggests that the use of chemical inputs, such as fertilizer, is lower in rubber 
than in oil palm (Budidarsono et al. 2012; Clough et al. 2016). Our data show that that 
input expenditures vary significantly, not only between crops but also over time (Table 
A8). The temporal variability is possibly a response to output price changes, which are 
depicted in Figure 4. Rubber prices decreased from about 30.000 Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 
in 2012 to about 15.000 IDR in 2015, resulting in severe reductions in income from rubber 
cultivation [1 US$ = 9370 IDR in 2012 and 13390 IDR in 2015 (World Bank 2016)]. Palm 
oil prices were also lower in 2015 than in 2012, but the difference is less pronounced than 
in rubber. The higher involvement of all farmers in own non-agricultural business activities 
and off-farm employment in 2015 (Table 4) can be interpreted as an economic strategy to 
cope with declining prices in the markets for agricultural cash crops. 
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Figure 4: Price movement of rubber and palm between 2012 and 2016 
 
Notes: Rubber price data from Gabungan Perusahaan Karet 
Indonesia (GAPKINDO), Jambi. Oil palm fresh fruit bunch price data from 
Dinas Perkebunan, Jambi. 
 
Possibly as a result of the higher involvement in off-farm economic activities, mean 
household consumption expenditures showed only a moderate decrease between 2012 and 
2015, in spite of lower output prices (Table 4). That is, farm households were mostly able 
to maintain their living standard. The decrease was more pronounced for non-cultivators of 
oil palm (-11%) than for oil palm cultivators (-2%), as one would expect given the higher 
dependence of non-cultivators on rubber prices. Among the non-cultivators of oil palm, the 
decrease was stronger for non-food expenditures (-14%) than for food expenditures (-8%). 
This is not surprising because food is a basic need, so that households try to maintain 
consumption levels to the extent possible even when their income decreases. 
 
3.3.2 Average livelihood effects of oil palm cultivation 
The effects of oil palm cultivation on household livelihoods are summarized in Figure 
5. The underlying regression models with total consumption expenditures, food 
expenditures, and non-food expenditures as dependent variables are shown in Tables A9-
A10. In all three cases, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no bias through 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in the random-effects specification. In two of the 
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models (total expenditure and non-food expenditure), the effect size of oil palm cultivation 
is larger in the fixed-effects than in the random-effects specification. However, the data 
contains only limited variation over time and the random-effects are also more comparable 
with the cross-section OLS models. Hence, we proceed with interpreting the random-
effects estimates, cautioning that these effects may possibly underestimate the true impacts 
of oil palm cultivation. We further underline that even by using fixed effects other sources 
of endogeneity such as reverse causality are not fully addressed.  
The random-effects model shows a positive and significant effect of oil palm 
cultivation on total household consumption. The point estimate in the full model suggests a 
14% improvement in household livelihoods through oil palm cultivation (Figure 5a). The 
full model controls for farm size and the existence of non-farm businesses in the 
household, hence the 14% is the primary effect of cultivation on livelihoods without 
including possible secondary effects that result from the reallocation of saved labor time. 
In an alternative model, we exclude the existence of own non-farm businesses from the set 
of explanatory variables. The point estimate of oil palm cultivation does not change much, 
suggesting that secondary effects from reallocating household labor to non-farm businesses 
are small. In yet another model we exclude farm size as explanatory variable. In this 
model, the point estimate of oil palm cultivation increases to 22% (Figure 5a), suggesting 
that there are positive secondary effects on household livelihoods resulting from farm size 
increases. As mentioned above, the lower labor requirement in oil palm allows households 
to cultivate additional land, thus further increasing the income from farming. 
The breakdown of household expenditure types shows that the effect of oil palm 
cultivation is positive and significant on both food consumption (Figure 5c) and non-food 
consumption (Figure 5b). Yet, the effect on non-food consumption (19%) is larger than the 
effect on food consumption (10%). This difference is expected. Most farm households in 
the sample are above the poverty line (Badan Pusat Statistik 2014) and not chronically 
food-insecure. Hence, a larger share of the additional income is spent on non-food goods 
and services. 
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3.3.3 Temporal differences 
The results of the cross-sectional OLS models for 2012 and 2015 are also summarized 
in Figure 5. The models include farm size and own non-farm businesses as control 
variables, so that only the primary effects of oil palm cultivation are considered. In both 
years, oil palm cultivation had positive and significant effects on household livelihoods, 
but the effects were larger in 2015 than in 2012. In 2012, the average effect on total 
household consumption was 11%, whereas in 2015 it was 17% (Figure 5a). This increase 
in the percentage effect is not because the income from oil palm increased over time in 
absolute terms. In fact, Table 5 showed that the absolute profitability of oil palm was lower 
in 2015 than in 2012 due to declining output prices. However, the relative profitability of 
oil palm increased because the decline in rubber prices was stronger than the decline in 
palm oil prices. 
The breakdown by food and non-food consumption expenditures in these OLS models 
shows another interesting result. The effect of oil palm cultivation on both types of 
expenditures was larger in 2015 than in 2012 (Figures 5b and 5c), but the relative increase 
in the mean effect was stronger for food consumption (63%) than for non-food 
consumption (31%). These patterns suggest that oil palm cultivation has helped farm 
households reduce the risk of food insecurity during the rubber price crisis. 
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Figure 5: Livelihood effects of oil palm cultivation  
 
                        (a) Total household consumption                     (b) Non-food consumption                           (c) Food consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Consumption is measured in terms of annual household expenditures for food and non-food goods and services per adult equivalent. Average marginal  
effects are shown. The underlying regression models are presented in Tables A9, A10, and A11.  
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3.3.4 Spillover effects 
Estimates from the spatial models are summarized in the lower parts of Figure 5. The 
direct effects are those that occur through own cultivation of oil palm, but now controlling 
for spatial dependence. The estimates are positive, statistically significant, and similar in 
magnitude to the ones from the random-effects specifications (full models). Hence, 
controlling for spatial dependence does not alter the findings. The estimated spillover 
effects are small and statistically insignificant, i.e., during the study period the livelihoods 
of neighboring households were not significantly influenced through the cultivation of oil 
palm by others. The insignificant estimates do not necessarily imply that the expansion of 
oil palm would leave, for example, non-cultivating households completely unaffected. It is 
possible that negative spillovers through some mechanisms were compensated by positive 
spillovers through other mechanisms. But our findings suggest that the total spillovers did 
not affect the livelihoods of other farm households in a significantly positive or negative 
way. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Our empirical study with farm household data from Jambi Province, Sumatra, shows 
that the expansion of oil palm has affected the livelihoods of cultivating farm households 
in a positive way. This result is consistent with previous research in Sumatra (Euler et al. 
2017; Krishna et al. 2017a), although previous studies had not used panel data for the 
analysis of impacts, as we have done here. 
Oil palm contributes to higher household consumption, including food and non-food 
expenditures. On average, oil palm does not generate higher profits per unit of land than 
rubber, the main alternative crop. However, oil palm requires less labor, so that oil palm-
cultivating households are able to manage larger areas of land with the same labor input. 
When holding farm size constant, the average improvement in household livelihoods 
through oil palm cultivation was 14%. When letting farm size vary, the effect increased to 
22%. These results suggest that parts of the total economic benefits are indeed the result of 
oil palm cultivators expanding their farm size. We also showed that the effects of oil palm 
cultivation vary over time. Due to the sharp price decline in international rubber markets, 
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the relative improvements in household livelihoods through cultivating oil palm increased 
between 2012 and 2015. We did not find significant spillover effects on the livelihoods of 
neighboring farm households. 
Our results refute the commonly held perception that oil palm diffusion would only 
benefit large plantation companies and would affect the livelihoods of the local population 
in a negative way. Our data are not representative for the entire population of Jambi, 
because we only looked at farm households. But most of the farm households benefit 
significantly. Unquestionably, oil palm monocultures are also associated with 
environmental problems. And the fact that the labor savings through oil palm cultivation 
allow smallholders to expand their farm size may contribute to additional forest clearing 
when effective rules to curb deforestation are not in place. Policies aimed at more 
sustainable land use are required. But such policies cannot ignore the economic benefits of 
oil palm cultivation for local farmers. Only when the incentive structures of local 
smallholders are properly understood, can socioeconomic and environmental goals be 
reconciled through appropriate policy interventions. 
 
 
Data Availability: The data used in this study are archived with openly accessible, 
keyword-searchable metadata and data holder contact details for data requests 
(https://efforts-is.uni-goettingen.de). Datasets used in this study have the following 
identification numbers: 12620, 13500, 13501, 13520, 13660, 13642, 13643, 13644, 13647, 
13648, 13649, 13650, 13651 (household-level data); 13521, 13600, 13601, 13620 (plot-
level data); 13680 (village-level data). 
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3.5 Appendix 
Table A8: Differences in input use between rubber and oil palm cultivation in 2012 and 
2015 
Expenses  
(„000 IDR/year)  
Survey round 2012  Survey round 2015 
Rubber 
farmer 
[n=560] 
Oil palm  
farmer 
[n=226] 
 Rubber  
Farmer 
[n=561] 
Oil palm  
farmer 
[n=248] 
On chemical 
fertilizers  
980.667
***
 
(6938.109) 
4842.611 
(9739.918) 
 505.859
***
 
(4017.621) 
4264.176 
(5909.125) 
On herbicides 639.284
###
 
(1762.845) 
800.360
###
 
(1326.163) 
 273.322
***
 
(773.078) 
524.459 
(940.860) 
Notes: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses.  
***
: Difference between rubber and 
oil palm in the same year is statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
 ###
: Difference with corresponding value for 
the same crop in 2015 is statistically significant at 0.01 level.  
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Table A9: Impact of oil palm cultivation on total consumption expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Fixed effects Random effects:  
Full model 
Random Effects: 
Without own 
business 
Random Effects: 
Without farm 
size  
Ordinary least 
squares 2012 
Ordinary least 
squares 2015 
Spatial Durbin 
model:  
Direct effect 
Spatial Durbin 
model: Indirect 
effect 
Oil palm cultivation (dummy) 0.229* 0.141*** 0.153*** 0.220*** 0.112** 0.167*** 0.138*** -0.027 
 (0.132) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) (0.046) (0.047) (0.032) (0.044) 
Total farm size (ha) 0.006 0.032*** 0.033***  0.039*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Number of adults in household -0.078*** -0.053*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.031* -0.067*** -0.053*** -0.005 
(0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.003) 
Own business (=1) 0.136*** 0.205***  0.219*** 0.242*** 0.180*** 0.196*** 0.016 
 (0.053) (0.038)  (0.039) (0.059) (0.050) (0.038) (0.011) 
Employment (=1) 0.074* 0.006 -0.018 -0.039 0.030 -0.053 0.006 1.9e-04 
 (0.042) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.037) (0.039) (0.023) (0.002) 
Wave (dummy; 0 = 2012; 1 = 
2015) 
0.091*** 0.095*** 0.081** 0.096***    0.084*** 0.007 
(0.025) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039)   (0.034) (0.006) 
Female headed household (=1)  -0.116** -0.120** -0.127** -0.079 -0.113 -0.115* -0.009 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.052) (0.085) (0.069) (0.060) (0.009) 
Age of household head (Years)  0.009 0.008 0.018** -0.005 0.028** 0.008 4.6e-04 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (8.1e-04) 
Age of household head squared  -9.5e-05 -9.2e-05 -1.7e-04** 4.4e-05 -2.9e-04*** -7.8e-05 -4.8e-06 
 (7.1e-05) (7.1e-05) (7.9e-05) (8.4e-05) (1.1e-04) (7.8e-05) (8.1e-06) 
Education (years of schooling)  0.022*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) 
Non-random village (=1)  0.070** 0.069** 0.130*** 0.054 0.074 0.066* 0.005 
  (0.035) (0.029) (0.044) (0.076) (0.066) (0.036) (0.005) 
Spontaneous migrant (=1)  0.069* 0.071* 0.067 0.076 0.077 0.078** 0.006 
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.056) (0.052) (0.035) (0.005) 
Transmigrant village (=1)  0.059 0.043 0.047 0.114* 0.002 0.056 0.004 
  (0.051) (0.054) (0.063) (0.065) (0.083) (0.053) (0.005) 
Distance to the nearest market 
(km) 
 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -1.0e-04 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (1.6e-04) 
Access to formal credit (=1)  0.054* 0.074** 0.068** 0.040 0.075* 0.058* 0.005 
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043) (0.038) (0.032) (0.005) 
Share of land with systematic 
land title (ratio) 
 0.069 0.074 0.039 0.025 0.099 0.067 0.007 
 (0.048) (0.050) (0.055) (0.059) (0.074) (0.047) (0.007) 
Constant 28.696 9.231*** 9.282*** 9.042*** 9.574*** 8.841***   
 (22.857) (9.231) (9.282) (9.042) (9.574) (8.841)   
F,  2, R2 6.075 496.2 498.1 436.0 13.69 19.68 0.255 0.255 
Observations 1278 1361 1361 1361 679 682 1274 1274 
Notes: Hausman test statistic (fixed versus random effects models) 2= 13.62, (p-value = 0.03). In models (7) and (8),   is 0.08 (std. dev.: 0.05).  Clustered standard errors in  
parentheses. * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
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Table A10: Impact of oil palm cultivation on non-food consumption expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Fixed effects Random effects:  
Full model 
Random Effects: 
Without own 
business 
Random Effects: 
Without farm 
size  
Ordinary least 
squares 2012 
Ordinary least 
squares 2015 
Spatial Durbin 
model:  
Direct effect 
Spatial Durbin 
model: Indirect 
effect 
Oil palm cultivation (dummy) 0.377** 0.192*** 0.207*** 0.319*** 0.163** 0.210*** 0.208*** -0.060 
 (0.222) (0.045) (0.047) (0.056) (0.070) (0.062) (0.049) (0.061) 
Total farm size (ha) 0.020 0.048*** 0.050***  0.055*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
Number of adults in household -0.124*** -0.066*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.034 -0.083*** -0.070*** -0.005 
 (0.029) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015) (0.003) 
Own business (=1) 0.119 0.252***  0.274*** 0.269*** 0.254*** 0.240*** 0.015 
 (0.076) (0.050)  (0.052) (0.080) (0.063) (0.050) (0.011) 
Employment (=1) 0.128** 0.014 -0.015 -0.053 0.020 -0.036 0.026 0.001 
 (0.064) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.057) (0.058) (0.038) (0.003) 
Wave (dummy; 0 = 2012; 1 = 
2015) 
0.029 0.039 0.023 0.040   0.031 0.002 
(0.035) (0.049) (0.048) (0.051)   (0.048) (0.005) 
Female headed household (=1)  -0.121 -0.126 -0.137 0.011 -0.174 -0.120 -0.007 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.083) (0.157) (0.096) (0.097) (0.009) 
Age of household head (Years)  0.039*** 0.038*** 0.053*** 0.026** 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.002) 
Age of household head squared  -4.4e-04*** -4.3e-04*** -5.4e-04*** -3.2e-04*** -6.3e-04*** -4.3e-04*** -2.8e-05 
 (9.9e-05) (9.8e-05) (1.1e-04) (1.1e-04) (1.7e-04) (1.2e-04) (1.9e-05) 
Education (years of schooling)  0.033*** 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) 
Non-random village (=1)  -0.016 -0.016 0.068 0.004 -0.043 0.001 5.7e-05 
  (0.062) (0.055) (0.066) (0.084) (0.089) (0.061) (0.005) 
Spontaneous migrant (=1)  0.159*** 0.162*** 0.156** 0.154* 0.177** 0.177*** 0.011 
  (0.064) (0.065) (0.074) (0.088) (0.084) (0.059) (0.008) 
Transmigrant village (=1)  -0.035 -0.053 -0.051 0.091 -0.149 -0.040 -0.003 
  (0.077) (0.078) (0.088) (0.099) (0.103) (0.075) (0.007) 
Distance to the nearest market 
(km) 
 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -1.5e-04 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (2.4e-04) 
Access to formal credit (=1)  0.069 0.093** 0.089* 0.089 0.075 0.064 0.005 
  (0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.059) (0.058) (0.048) (0.005) 
Share of land with systematic 
land title (ratio) 
 0.180*** 0.187*** 0.136* 0.045 0.292*** 0.194*** 0.014 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.071) (0.090) (0.100) (0.065) (0.011) 
Constant 8.893*** 7.545*** 7.609*** 7.265*** 7.764*** 7.188***   
 (0.119) (7.545) (7.609) (7.265) (7.764) (7.188)   
F,  2, R2 4.843 599.3 627.3 355.5 24.90 17.35 0.2523 0.2523 
Observations 1278 1361 1361 1361 679 682 1274 1274 
Notes: Hausman test statistic (fixed versus random effects models) 2= 17.20, (p-value = 0.01). In models (7) and (8),   is 0.07  (std. dev.: 0.04). Clustered standard errors in  
parentheses. * p ≤  0.10, ** p ≤  0.05, *** p ≤  0.01.
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Table A11: Impact of oil palm cultivation on food consumption expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Fixed effects Random effects:  
Full model 
Random Effects: 
Without own 
business 
Random Effects: 
Without farm 
size  
Ordinary least 
squares 2012 
Ordinary least 
squares 2015 
Spatial Durbin 
model:  
Direct effect 
Spatial Durbin 
model: Indirect 
effect 
Oil palm cultivation (dummy) 0.077 0.101*** 0.110*** 0.139*** 0.076** 0.134*** 0.089*** 0.007 
 (0.107) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.045) (0.031) (0.043) 
Total farm size (ha) 0.002 0.017*** 0.018***  0.020*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.002* 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
Number of adults in household -0.044** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.031** -0.053*** -0.041*** -0.005* 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.003) 
Own business (=1) 0.159*** 0.160***  0.170*** 0.203*** 0.121** 0.155*** 0.018* 
 (0.051) (0.032)  (0.033) (0.052) (0.051) (0.030) (0.009) 
Employment (=1) 0.044 0.020 -0.001 -0.007 0.038 -0.021 0.011 0.001 
 (0.038) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.003) 
Wave (dummy; 0 = 2012; 1 = 
2015) 
0.155*** 0.148*** 0.136*** 0.149***   0.133*** 0.015** 
(0.026) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035)   (0.030) (0.008) 
Female headed household (=1)  -0.124*** -0.127*** -0.129*** -0.160** -0.086 -0.126*** -0.016 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.055) (0.056) (0.046) (0.011) 
Age of household head 
(Years) 
 -0.011 -0.011 -0.006 -0.021** 0.002 -0.013* -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) 
Age of household head 
squared 
 1.2e-04 1.2e-04 8.3e-05 2.3e-04** -1.4e-05 1.5e-04* 1.9e-05 
 (7.7e-05) (7.6e-05) (8.0e-05) (9.3e-05) (1.0e-04) (8.0e-05) (1.5e-05) 
Education (years of schooling)  0.014*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.013** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.002* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) 
Non-random village (=1)  0.128*** 0.128*** 0.161*** 0.082 0.168*** 0.099*** 0.011* 
  (0.041) (0.038) (0.046) (0.088) (0.055) (0.040) (0.007) 
Spontaneous migrant (=1)  0.008 0.010 0.007 0.018 0.012 0.020 0.002 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043) (0.039) (0.027) (0.004) 
Transmigrant village (=1)  0.129*** 0.115*** 0.123*** 0.104** 0.143** 0.112*** 0.012* 
  (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.068) (0.045) (0.007) 
Distance to the nearest market 
(km) 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -4.5e-04 -7.3e-05 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (1.9e-04) 
Access to formal credit (=1)  0.037 0.053* 0.045 -0.007 0.071* 0.048 0.006 
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) (0.041) (0.031) (0.005) 
Share of land with systematic 
land title (ratio) 
 -0.017 -0.014 -0.034 0.022 -0.059 -0.030 -0.003 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.051) (0.054) (0.059) (0.049) (0.007) 
Constant 9.150*** 9.160*** 9.199*** 9.055*** 9.485*** 8.897***   
 (0.076) (9.160) (9.199) (9.055) (9.485) (8.897)   
F,  2, R2 8.809 276.2 253.2 268.8 4.716 17.03 0.1668 0.1668 
Observations 1278 1361 1361 1361 679 682 1274 1274 
Notes: Hausman test statistic (fixed versus random effects models) 2= 12.06 (p-value = 0.06). In models (7) and (8),   is 0.11 (std. dev.: 0.05). Clustered standard errors in 
 parentheses. * p ≤  0.10, ** p ≤  0.05, *** p ≤  0.01. 
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4 Why does a labor-saving technology decrease fertility 
rates? Evidence from the oil palm boom in Indonesia
11
 
4.1 Introduction 
There are many good reasons why reducing fertility is important. At the individual 
level, the health burden for women (including the risk of dying in childbed) as well as their 
socioeconomic wellbeing are directly associated with fertility declines (Chen et al. 1974; 
Campbell & Graham 2006; Miller 2010). At the macroeconomic level, low fertility rates 
are often associated with higher incomes and more generally with higher and more 
sustained economic growth (Barro 1991; Lee & Mason, Andrew 2006). Globally, 
population growth has been identified as an important factor contributing to environmental 
degradation and global warming (Bongaarts 1992; Dietz & Rosa 1997; York et al. 2003; 
Luck 2007). 
Different theories exist about what triggers decreasing fertility rates. Technological 
change is generally seen as one key driver of the historical fertility transition in the US and 
Europe (Galor & Weil 2000; Guinnane 2011). Galor & Weil (2000) argue in their 
theoretical model that technological change increases returns to education which leads to a 
substitution away from child quantity to child quality. The substitution effect is built on 
Becker‟s quantity-quality model (Becker & Lewis 1973; Becker 1981). The linkage 
between increasing returns to education and decreasing fertility was mostly backed up by 
empirical findings (Bleakley & Lange 2009; Becker et al. 2010; Fernihough 2017), 
although the results are not unambiguous (Black et al. 2005). Moreover, decreasing 
compatibility of work and child rearing (Rindfuss & Brewster 1996) and diminishing value 
of child labor (Doepke 2004) are often cited as important transmission mechanisms for the 
linkage between technological change and fertility reduction. Only few papers have studied 
the full range of transmission mechanism regarding the effect of new technologies on 
fertility. For the fertility transition in the US, Wanamaker (2012) argues that 
industrialization led to fertility reductions in South Carolina between 1880 and 1900 due to 
                                                 
11
 This essay is co-authored by Esther Gehrke. CK developed the research idea, reviewed the relevant 
literature, compiled the data, analyzed the data, and wrote the paper. EG contributed to the empirical design, 
data analysis, and writing of the paper. 
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increasing maternal opportunity costs of time and a separation of migrant households from 
their extended family network. Ager et al. (2017) show for the American South in the same 
time period that households switching to manufacturing face higher opportunity costs of 
raising children since manufacturing work is generally less compatible with child rearing. 
Their results further suggest that rising returns to education and diminishing returns to 
child labor led parents to invest rather in child quality than child quantity. 
In developing countries, empirical evidence on the relationship between technology and 
fertility is largely inexistent. For one, employment is still largely dominated by agriculture, 
and attempts to trigger industrialization processes often failed, limiting potential effects on 
fertility. Moreover, new technologies such as mechanization in agriculture are often 
concentrated on large farms, restricting direct income effects to a rather small elite. Only 
few studies have looked at the relationship between mechanization and fertility in low-
income settings, or at the mechanisms underlying this relationship. Rosenzweig & Evenson 
(1977) and Levy (1985) are notable exceptions. However, these two studies concentrate 
entirely on changes in the demand for child labor and its effects on fertility.  
This essay explores the effect of a different technology - the expansion of oil palm in 
Indonesia.
12
 We argue that oil palm is rather unique since it is - similarly to mechanization 
- labor-saving compared to alternative crops in the region, and can free up substantial 
amounts of labor from agriculture (Rist et al. 2010; Euler et al. 2017). Moreover, it affects 
not only large-scale farms but also smallholder farmers. Unlike factor-neutral technologies 
that only raise productivity and thus income, we hypothesize that the labor savings induced 
by the expansion of oil palm play an important role in determining fertility decisions. Our 
research question is therefore if and through which mechanisms a labor saving technology 
such as oil palm affects fertility decisions in a developing country context. 
We use Becker‟s quantity-quality model (henceforth Q-Q model) to identify different 
causal mechanism through which the expansion of oil palm could affect fertility rates. Our 
conceptual framework highlights five main mechanisms. The first mechanism is an income 
effect. While increases in income could generally increase the demand for children, it is 
generally assumed that the income elasticity of child quality is greater than the income 
elasticity of child quantity, thereby reducing fertility via a substitution effect. The second 
                                                 
12
 Although oil palm identifies as a technology only in a wider sense, we use this term to emphasize the 
changes in factor productivity and its comparability with mechanization. 
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mechanism is an effect on the price of child quantity via a reduction in child labor. The 
third mechanism is also related to the price of child quantity: we expect the expansion of 
oil palm to affect maternal opportunity costs of time. The fourth and fifth mechanisms 
relate to the price of child quality: returns to education could rise, and infrastructure 
development could reduce the price of investing in child quality. We also discuss three 
alternative mechanisms that are not in line with the Q-Q model: female empowerment, 
migration patterns and child mortality.  
In our empirical analysis, we focus on the oil palm expansion in Indonesia since the 
mid-1990s and explore a large set of different data sources. We use the National 
Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) to assess changes in fertility, measured as the total 
number of children born per woman. Changes in wages, labor supply and sector of work 
are observed in the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS). For the oil palm 
expansion, we rely on administrative data gathered by the Indonesian government, the Tree 
Crop Statistics, a data source which is also used to analyze the effects of oil palm on 
poverty rates (Edwards 2017). To complement this data source, we use land-use data from 
the Village Potential Statistics (PODES), which was collected in 1993 and 2003. Finally, 
we use Census data, the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), as well as different 
administrative data sources to explore a number of causal mechanisms. 
Our identification strategy builds on the fact that agro-ecological characteristics aﬀect a 
regency‟s suitability for oil palm cultivation.13 Similarly to Duflo & Pande (2007), we 
exploit two sources of variation in a fixed effects instrumental variables (IV) approach: 
First, we explore differences across space in terms of the maximum agro-climatically 
attainable yield for oil palm from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) data. Second, 
we explore differences in the national expansion of oil palm area across time. The national 
expansion is used as a proxy for the development in global demand for oil palm. 
Combining these two sources of variation, we instrument regency-level oil palm area by its 
predicted level if the expansion were entirely driven by productivity concerns, that is, if oil 
palm was more quickly introduced in areas that are better suited to oil palm cultivation and 
only subsequently to less well suited areas.  
                                                 
13
 In Indonesia provinces are the highest tier of the local government. At the next level provinces are 
divided into regencies (kabupaten) and city districts (kotas). Since the decentralization in 2001, regencies 
(and city districts) are mainly responsible for providing public services. 
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Using this instrumental variables approach, we find consistently negative effects of the 
oil palm expansion on fertility. These results are robust to controlling for island-year fixed 
effects and differential time trends between regencies with different initial characteristics, 
such as fertility, share of agricultural employment in total employment, agricultural wages 
and electrification. The results are also robust to using different measures for the oil palm 
expansion and for fertility, to using different time periods and to using a number of 
alternative specifications. 
Our results on the different transmission mechanisms suggest that the bulk of the 
negative effect can be explained by an income effect at the household level, as well as by 
the local economic development that was induced by the oil palm expansion. Oil palm 
expansion increased income at the household level, which induced a substitution away 
from child quantity to child quality. The income growth also triggered broader local 
economic development, leading to a growing non-agricultural sector and increasing returns 
to education. This induced parents to substitute child quality for child quantity, as well as 
women to invest more into their own education, thus reducing their fertility. We conclude 
that labor saving technologies in agriculture can reduce (rather than increase) fertility as 
long as income gains are shared by the majority of the population and high enough to 
trigger local economic development. 
Our results contribute to two different strands of literature. We add to the literature on 
the role of technology in determining fertility choices (Rosenzweig & Evenson 1977; Levy 
1985; Wanamaker 2012; Ager et al. 2017) by showing the impact and transmission 
mechanisms of a labor-saving agricultural technology, which unlike mechanization is also 
rapidly adopted by smallholder farmers.
 14
 We also contribute to the growing literature on 
the effects of oil palm in Indonesia. Previous research has documented negative 
environmental effects such as a drastic loss of biodiversity (Wilcove & Koh 2010; Clough 
et al. 2016), reduction of water resources (Merten et al. 2016) and increased carbon 
emissions (Burney et al. 2010), but also social impacts such as land conflicts (Obidzinski et 
al. 2012). However, the oil palm expansion also seems to have led to significant economic 
gains such as poverty reduction and increased welfare of smallholder farmers (Edwards 
                                                 
14
 Our research differs substantially from research using an exogenous shock on for example price of 
child quality (Bleakley & Lange 2009; Becker et al. 2010) or quantity (Black et al. 2005) to confirm model 
predictions, since we focus on a technology with a wide range of potential effects. To test these effects a 
broad set of data is necessary. The data demands might also explain why this literature is rather limited yet. 
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2017; Krishna et al. 2017a). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to address 
the demographic effects of the oil palm boom in Indonesia. 
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows: In Section 4.2, we provide 
background information on the oil palm expansion in Indonesia and present evidence on 
the factor productivity of oil palm relative to alternative crops. Section 4.3 presents the 
conceptual framework. In Section 4.4, we introduce the different data sources to test our 
hypotheses. Our estimation strategy is presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 reports main 
results, as well as several robustness checks and an analysis of the transmission 
mechanisms. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.7.   
 
4.2 Background: Oil palm in Indonesia 
Global palm oil production rose steeply by 300% between 1990 and 2010 with 
Indonesia emerging as the world‟s largest producer around 2009 (Byerlee et al. 2017). 
Although oil palm has been cultivated in Indonesia since the 1930s (Verheye 2010), the 
expansion only accelerated in the 1970s with the central government supporting the 
establishment of large-scale plantations in the outer islands. In so-called Nucleus Estate 
and Smallholder (NES) schemes, large estates surrounded by smallholder plantations were 
built up, tying the smallholder farmers via contract farming to the estates. In sparsely 
populated regions, laborers and farmers were often recruited from the central islands such 
as Java. With the decentralization process starting in 1998, market liberalizations and the 
subsequent decrease in governmental support for NES schemes, more independent 
adopters emerged and contractual ties between contract farmers and companies loosened 
(Euler et al. 2016b). Although large private estates still dominate oil palm cultivation in 
Indonesia, smallholders cultivated roughly 40% of the total oil palm area in the country in 
2016 (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).  
Positive welfare gains of oil palm have been documented for smallholders by Euler et 
al. (2017) and Rist et al. (2010). These welfare gains seem to be driven by the low labor 
intensity of oil palm compared to alternative crops such as rubber and rice, which allows 
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for farm expansion and additional off-farm work.
15
 In order to provide more detailed 
evidence on the factor productivity of oil palm compared to other crops, we explore farm 
household data collected in Jambi Province (Sumatra) in 2012 and 2015.
16
 The data 
contains detailed plot input and output information for farmers involved in the cultivation 
of oil palm and rubber.
17
 In addition, we cite evidence from the literature concerning rice 
cultivation.  
 
Table 6: Labor and land productivity of oil palm and rubber 
 Oil palm 
 
Rubber 
Obs. Mean (Std. dev.) Obs. Mean (Std. dev.) 
Labor productivity 
[000 IDR/hour] 437 88.066
***
 (110.483)  967 22.752 (25.192) 
Land productivity 
[000 IDR/ha/year] 437 16333.14 
***
 (11889.91)  967 18157.01 (12108.73) 
Capital input 
[000 IDR/ha/year] 439 2653.118
***
 (2662.383)  973 651.995 (1021.978) 
Female labor input 
[Hours/ha/year] 439 25.764
***
 (65.35)  973 313.761 (471.624) 
Male labor input 
[Hours/ha/year] 439 237.696
***
 (211.089)  973 854.687 (997.983) 
Female wages 
[000 IDR/hour] 17     12.442 (11.353)  27    10.437 (1.751)   
Male wages 
[000 IDR/hour] 167    18.227
*** 
(17.222)  319     14.411 (15.580)   
Notes: Statistical significant difference between crops was tested using a t-test. Unproductive plots were excluded and 
tree age restricted to productive age from 5 to 25 years (except for wage data). For the male wage data two outliers with 
more than 10 times the average wage were excluded. Hours worked include family as well wage labor. All monetary 
values are in constant 2012 values. 
 
Plot level estimates in Table 6 show that labor productivity per hour is significantly 
higher in oil palm compared to rubber. This is also reflected in higher wages paid in both 
activities: wages are higher for men in oil palm than in rubber cultivation. However, the 
                                                 
15
 At the national level, PODES data suggests that rubber and rice are the main alternatives to oil palm 
cultivation. In 53% of the villages where oil palm was the first or second most important planation crop in 
1993, rubber was either the first or second most important crop. In 63% of the oil palm villages, rice was also 
mentioned as important food crop. More recent data from Sumatra also shows that oil palm is increasingly 
replacing rubber as the dominant plantation crop, and to a lesser extent rice (Feintrenie et al. 2010; Gatto et 
al. 2015; Euler et al. 2016b). Evidence from Kalimantan also suggests that oil palm mainly replaced labor-
intensive crops such as rubber and rattan (Belcher et al. 2004). 
16
 We use this data, because no nationally representative micro data with detailed input and output 
information is available in Indonesia. 
17
 A multi-stage sampling framework was used to obtain a representative sample of 700 local farm 
households in 45 villages in the tropical lowlands of Jambi. For more details on the sampling framework, see 
Krishna et al. (2017b). 
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difference in wages is smaller for women and not significant. The finding that labor 
productivity is higher in oil palm relative to rubber is generally confirmed in the literature 
(Rist et al. 2010; Euler et al. 2017). The labor productivity gap between oil palm and rice is 
even larger with 47.33 to 2.27 $ per men‟s labor day (Rist et al. 2010). In contrast, land 
productivity of oil palm is lower than in rubber cultivation. This is not true in comparison 
to rice: Rist et al. (2010) report a significantly lower land productivity for inundated rice 
compared to rubber and oil palm (2846.36$ per ha for oil palm and 264.61$ per ha for 
rice). Switching from a food crop such as rice to a cash crop thus increases welfare by 
raising labor (and partly land) productivity. 
Our data also suggests that the gains in labor productivity largely translate into a 
reduction of labor inputs. As can be seen in Table 6, labor hours per hectare of women and 
men are substantially lower in the cultivation of oil palm than in the cultivation of rubber. 
Male labor hours are by 72% lower in oil palm compared to rubber. Female labor hours are 
even by 92% lower. The low labor input in oil palm in particular for women was also 
reported for large-scale plantations, and is mainly due to the tasks associated with oil palm 
cultivation. While rubber tapping is often done every day or every two days and does not 
necessitate a lot of physical strength, oil palm harvesting is done a lot less frequently (on 
average every two weeks) and is mainly done by men. Women are mainly involved in the 
collection of loose oil palm fruits and maintenance work (Koczberski 2007; Li 2015). 
Typically, food crops such as rice also involve comparably more female labor than cash 
crop cultivation, and rice cultivation in Indonesia is no exception. Rice has a low labor 
productivity in general, and there is no evidence that female labor is more or less 
productive than male labor in rice cultivation (Feintrenie et al. 2010; Li 2015).  
While welfare gains from oil palm cultivation among smallholder farmers seem to be 
driven by increases in labor productivity, expansion of farm land and the reallocation of 
working hours towards other sectors, these effects are expected to look quite differently for 
wage workers. The majority of palm oil is still produced by large private estates, which 
rely entirely on wage work, and also farm households employ significant amounts of wage 
labor (Euler et al. 2017). The wage labor is partly drawn from migrants, but evidence from 
Kalimantan suggests that local population groups that lack the financial means to establish 
their own plantations are also employed (Li 2015). Higher labor productivity in oil palm 
cultivation could increase wages. However, if land is scarce, the demand for agricultural 
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labor might decrease and thus also decrease wages, or limit welfare gains to a very small 
group of farm workers. While the welfare effect of the oil palm expansion for wage 
workers is found to be positive on average (Edwards 2017), this might mask substantial 
regional heterogeneity. 
In addition to the welfare gains documented above, one important aspect of oil palm 
that might drive broader economic development is the need to process fresh oil palm fruit 
bunches shortly after harvest in palm oil mills. This necessitates improved road 
infrastructure in order to quickly transport the fresh fruit bunches from the producer to the 
mill and reliable access to electricity to run palm-oil mills. Finally, some high-skilled labor 
is needed to operate the mills (Edwards 2017). In general, welfare gains and infrastructure 
development might have contributed to broader local economic development through 
increased demand and reduced costs in transportation and production, thereby increasing 
wages and creating job opportunities outside the oil palm sector. 
 
4.3 Conceptual framework 
The previous Section highlighted a range of mechanisms through which oil palm could 
raise household welfare. This Section builds on the Q-Q model developed in Becker and 
Lewis (1973) to derive testable predictions of the effect of the oil palm expansion on 
fertility. In particular, we seek to highlight the mechanisms through which this effect might 
be operating. Possible extensions of the Q-Q model are discussed in Section 4.3.2.  
 
4.3.1 A simple model on oil palm expansion and demand for children 
We follow Becker and Lewis (1973) in assuming a household utility function of the 
form          with   being the quality of each child,   the number of children and 
  other commodities. This utility function is maximized subject to the following budget 
constraint: 
 
                    (8) 
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In this budget constraint,   is the full income of the household.    is the cost of having 
one additional child, thus the opportunity cost of time of pregnancy and individual child 
rearing, and all other monetary costs of having children that are largely independent of 
child quality. The net cost of having children    falls if children contribute to farm income, 
and falls with increasing costs of avoiding pregnancies.    is the cost of child quality 
which is independent of number of children, such as reusable school books and clothing, or 
accessing information on the school system.    is the cost of augmenting the quality of any 
child, such as school fees, and the respective price of other commodities is      
We now consider how the adoption of a new agricultural technology, such as oil palm, 
affects the demand for children. We assume that the crop is adopted because it increases 
farm income and do not model the agricultural production function explicitly. Furthermore, 
we assume that the positive income effect dominates in all population segments. Given the 
effects on labor productivity, income and infrastructure development cited above, we 
expect oil palm to affect fertility mainly through five mechanisms, which will be discussed 
in the following. 
Income. If oil palm raises farm income and potentially also income from agricultural 
employment, households can invest this additional income in increasing the number of 
children, in increasing child quality or both. The number of children could hence decrease 
or increase. However, following Becker and Lewis (1973), we assume that the income 
elasticity of child quality is higher than the income elasticity of child quantity. Because 
increasing the quality of each child affects the shadow price of child quantity through the 
interaction term between quality and quantity, even a small increase in q could have a large 
and negative effect on n.
18
 This is why we generally expect the income effect on child 
quantity to be negative. 
Child labor. A price effect of child quantity might stem from differences in the returns 
to child labor between oil palm and alternative crops. In many countries children generate 
income through family work or wage work, thereby offsetting some of their direct costs 
such as clothing and food. We are not aware of any detailed empirical analysis of child 
labor in oil palm cultivation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that children can be involved in 
picking up loose fruits, which fell off the main bunch during harvest, but also in more 
demanding work such as carrying harvest and other heavy loads (Koczberski 2007; 
                                                 
18
 See Becker (1981) or Becker & Lewis (1973) for more details. 
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Amnesty International 2016). However, harvesting and cutting of oil palm necessitates too 
much physical strength to involve child labor. Rubber and rice cultivation, in contrast, 
involve more family labor and theoretically also more child labor. We therefore expect that 
oil palm would rather decrease the returns to child labor.
19
 If returns to child labor fall, this 
increases the cost of child quantity   , thereby reducing the demand for children.  
Maternal opportunity costs of time. The price of child quantity also shifts with 
changing maternal opportunity costs of time. As noted in the previous Section, oil palm 
cultivation is less labor intensive, and employs considerably less women than alternative 
crops. If female shadow wages in agriculture fall, women could either stop working or shift 
to other sectors. However, as the oil palm expansion might go hand-in-hand with income 
growth and local economic development, wages for women in other sectors than 
agriculture could even increase, thus drawing more women into the labor force and out of 
agriculture. This provides two possible scenarios: If female labor is not sufficiently 
demanded, we would expect that female labor force participation and female wages 
decrease. This implies a reduction of    and ceteris paribus an increase in the demand for 
children. In the second scenario, the income gains in the agricultural sector spur broader 
economic development and while women still leave the agricultural sector, they now enter 
an increasingly more profitable non-agricultural sector. Then, we would expect    to 
increase due to higher wages and women reallocating their time from child rearing to 
income earning activities. If the non-agricultural sector is less suitable to combine child 
rearing and income generation due to the distance between dwelling and workplace or less 
amenable working environment, we would expect additional increases in the opportunity 
costs of time and fertility reductions. Also, if local economic development creates more 
jobs in the high education sector, then the wage gap between low education and high 
education jobs might widen and returns to education increase. This might again affect 
maternal opportunity costs of time and thus the price of child quantity   , as we would 
expect that women reallocate their time away from child rearing to schooling. 
Returns to children’s education. Not only the price of child quantity, also the price of 
quality is expected to change with the oil palm expansion. Building on the second scenario 
mentioned above, we assume that higher returns to education not only increase maternal 
                                                 
19
 Note that the microdata presented in Section 2 do not provide information about child labor, which by 
2012 was largely abolished. This does not imply that child labor did not play a more important role in the 
1990s.   
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opportunity costs of time, but also the returns to children‟s education. Investing into 
children‟s education is likely to pay off more if profitable jobs in the high education sector 
exist. If returns to education increase, parents are more likely to substitute child quality for 
quantity, thus decreasing their demand for children.   
Infrastructure. Finally, the infrastructure created due to oil palm could reduce the price 
of child quality. Since fresh fruit bunches have to be brought to palm oil mills within two 
days to guarantee high quality oil, transportation infrastructure such as asphalt roads are in 
particular likely to be associated with the oil palm expansion. In addition, higher incomes 
can provide higher tax revenues for local governments, which can in turn lead to higher 
investments in health, education and transportation infrastructure. These investments 
would reduce the cost of accessing education, thereby decreasing the cost of investing in 
any child‟s quality. In the Q-Q model, a reduction in the price of child quality would 
increase investments in child quality, and through the interaction between quality and 
quantity, this would again decrease the demand for children.  
 
4.3.2 Alternative explanations 
While the Q-Q model highlights a range of important mechanisms, it imposes a set of 
assumptions which might not necessarily be true. For one, the assumption of a unitary 
household has been subject to a lot of debate recently. Furthermore, fertility might respond 
more strongly to social preferences rather than household choice. In the following, we will 
discuss three potential alternative explanations, which seem particularly relevant in the 
context of oil palm cultivation: Migration, child mortality and female empowerment. 
Migration. The oil palm boom increased internal migration flows into oil palm 
cultivating areas through the transmigration program as well as through spontaneous 
migration (Euler et al. 2016b). In the very short term migrant families might have faced 
increasing opportunity costs of child rearing since the establishment of a new farm and 
household are labor intensive tasks. On the other hand, men are more likely to be involved 
in internal migration, increasing the share of women in sending regions (Sukamdi & 
Mujahid 2015). This could have decreased fertility in sending regions compared to oil 
palm cultivating areas due to the decreasing likelihood of marriage. In the long run both 
these factors might be less important and childbearing patterns might depend more on the 
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question if there was a selection of migrants by fertility preference and if migrants‟ fertility 
preferences differed from the local population (Kulu 2005).  
Child mortality. An alternative mechanism could be that fertility decreases as more 
children survive (Kirk 1996). The idea is that families have a desired fertility with respect 
to the number of surviving children, and that this target can be achieved with lower overall 
fertility rates as child mortality decreases. Since oil palm expansion improved 
infrastructure and incomes, and this probably decreased child mortality, households might 
have simply adjusted the number of births but not the number of desired children.  
Female empowerment. A substantial body of literature suggests that female bargaining 
power within the household increases as women earn their own income (Atkin 2009; Heath 
& Mobarak 2015). If women have per se lower fertility preferences than men, a reduction 
in fertility could stem from the fact that women leave the agricultural sector (and on-farm 
work) and start earning their own income over which they have higher control than farm 
income. The fertility reduction would then simply reflect the increased bargaining weight 
of women within the household that is associated with the oil palm expansion.  
 
4.4 Data 
We combine different datasets to assess the effect of the oil palm expansion on fertility 
and to analyze the underlying mechanisms. We merge all datasets at the regency level 
using 1993 boundaries. This was necessary due to Indonesia‟s decentralization process, 
which involved a continuous division of regencies over the past 20 years. A detailed list of 
all data sources can be found in Table A12 in the Appendix. Table 7 presents summary 
statistics.  
Administrative data on the oil palm expansion at regency level is available since 1996. 
The Tree Crop Statistics are published annually by the Indonesian government (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2017), and can be accessed through the Indonesia Database for Policy and 
Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER) which is maintained by the World Bank (World 
Bank 2018a).
20
 The data provides information on the area under oil palm cultivation, and 
                                                 
20
 We update the database with more recent data from the Tree Crop Statistics to complete the time series 
until 2015. We do not have consistent data for oil palm expansion on regency level for 2016 and thus use 
2015 data if necessary. 
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distinguishes between four producer categories, smallholder, government estate, national 
private estate, and foreign private estate. However, time series at regency level dating back 
to the 1990s are only available for smallholder producers and not for private or government 
estates.  
 
Table 7: Summary statistics (1996-2006-2016) 
 Obs. Mean SD 
For women 15-49:    
Number of children born alive 604159 1.875 1.927 
Age 604219 30.745 9.885 
Age at first marriage 447766 19.772 3.783 
Ever married (=1) 604219 0.741 0.438 
Working (=1) 604218 0.465 0.499 
Working hours 604219 16.042 21.239 
Working in agriculture (=1) 604219 0.217 0.412 
Working in family agriculture (=1) 604219 0.138 0.345 
Working in service sector (=1) 604219 0.187 0.390 
HH head self-employed  in agri. (=1) 604219 0.385 0.487 
HH head employed in agri. (=1) 604219 0.080 0.271 
Monthly expenditures per cap. (IDR) 604219 69899.75  65353.81  
Share of food expenditures of total exp.  604219 0.623 0.140 
Living in rural area (=1) 604219 0.709 0.454 
Educational attainment    
Primary school (=1) 604219 0.364 0.481 
Secondary junior school (=1) 604219 0.190 0.392 
Secondary high school (=1) 604219 0.194 0.395 
Tertiary schooling (=1) 604219 0.050 0.218 
    
Regency level:    
Share of smallholder OP area in regency 626 0.009 0.025 
Share of villages in regency with asphalt main road 626 0.721 0.187 
Share of villages in regency with kindergarten 626 0.692 0.260 
Share of villages in regency with primary school 626 0.984 0.031 
Share of villages in regency with junior high school 626 0.511 0.164 
Share of villages in regency with hospital 626 0.040 0.039 
Share of HH in regency with access to public grid 626 0.638 0.254 
Share of girls 12-14y with primary degree 626 0.568 0.111 
Share of boys 12-14y with primary degree 626 0.523 0.115 
Share of individuals ever migrated to regency 569 0.084 0.112 
Share of individuals migrated in last 5y to regency 569 0.045 0.029 
    
Province level:    
Female wage in non-agr. employment (IDR/hour) 66 774.734 171.636 
Female wage in agr. employment (IDR/hour) 66 528.272 215.961 
Male wage in non-agr. employment (IDR/hour) 66 947.589 198.003 
Male wage in agr. employment (IDR/hour) 66 669.341 249.506 
Child mortality (per 1000 births) 66 14.526 9.050 
Notes: Data is available for 209 regencies. We miss data for one regency in 2016. For migration multiple regencies have 
missing data. Indonesia had 26 provinces in 1996. However, we do not have data for Maluku, Papua and Aceh and 
Jakarta is exclusively urban; we hence end up with 22 provinces. No data on child mortality and migration are available 
in 2016, we use data from 2012 and 2010 instead. All monetary values are in constant 1996 IDR. Exchange rate was at 
2342 IDR/US$ in 1996 (World Bank 2018b).  
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As can be seen in Figure A1 in the Appendix, the expansion of oil palm over time in 
the smallholder sector is fairly parallel to the expansion in the private estates. Government 
estates are less important. Also, the expansion of the large-scale plantation sector and the 
smallholder sector are likely to correlate regionally, since the smallholder sector depends 
on access to palm oil mills which are often established within the large-scale plantations 
(Euler et al. 2016b). Figure 6 illustrates the expansion of smallholder oil palm area on the 
different islands of Indonesia. It shows a strong concentration of oil palm on Sumatra, but 
also the growing importance of Kalimantan and to some extent of Sulawesi.  
 
Figure 6: Regional oil palm expansion of smallholders in Indonesia in 1996 and 2015 
 
Source: Tree crop statistics, INDO-DAPOER. 
 
The PODES – Indonesia‟s village census – provides the earliest data on oil palm 
expansion that is nationally representative and can be disaggregated by regency. The 
PODES data covers all villages and urban neighborhoods in Indonesia. It collects 
information on village-level land use in the years 1993 and 2003. Based on this 
information, we calculate the share of villages within a regency that cultivate oil palm. We 
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use this variable for additional robustness checks. The PODES dataset also provides 
additional controls such as the share of villages with schools, hospitals and asphalt roads 
within a regency, as well as the share of households with access to the public electricity 
grid. 
We use Indonesia‟s socioeconomic survey (SUSENAS) to construct individual 
fertility.
21
 The SUSENAS collects demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
individuals in annually repeated cross sections. Since 1993 the sample size increased to 
more than 200.000 households from formerly around 65.000, being representative at the 
regency-level. The SUSENAS provides information on the number of all ever occurred 
live births per woman, including all women older than 10 years. We use this variable as 
our measure of fertility, and restrict the sample to women aged 15 to 49. Our measure of 
fertility is not directly comparable to the total fertility rate (TFR). The TFR is the average 
number of children that would be born to every woman over her lifetime based on current 
age-specific fertility rates, assuming constant age-specific fertility rates over time and no 
premature deaths of women. Our measure of fertility, in contrast, has no reference period 
and is therefore sensitive to fertility changes that already happened in the past. These 
differences are also reflected in differential time trends: Between 1996 and 2016, fertility 
decreased from 2.11 to 1.70 children born per woman in Indonesia, while the TFR only fell 
from 2.6 to 2.4 in the same time period (World Bank 2018c). Figure 7 presents the fertility 
trends based on SUSENAS for different islands in Indonesia.
22
 The figure shows that the 
fertility rate decreased until 2005, stagnating in some islands in subsequent years. 
Additional variables derived from SUSENAS are age, age at marriage, education, 
consumption expenditure, labor supply and type of work.
 23
   
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 The regencies of Papua, Aceh and the Maluku islands were dropped since data in these regions are not 
available for all years due to social unrest. Since oil palms are not cultivated within cities, we also exclude all 
city districts from the analysis. 
22
 Although we speak of islands, these are the main islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Java and Bali and 
Sulawesi, including their adjacent islands. All islands which do not belong to these regions are included in 
the fifth category “other islands”. 
23
 We deflate all monetary values to 1996 values using the province-level poverty lines for rural and 
urban regions. 
 77 
 
Figure 7: Regional fertility trends in Indonesia 
  
Source: SUSENAS data from 1993, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2016. 
 
We use the National Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) to capture labor market 
characteristics of working age individuals. The SAKERNAS provides information on labor 
supply, the sector of activity, as well as on wages of men and women in different sectors. 
The SAKERNAS has regency identifiers from 2000 onwards. The survey is, however, 
representative at the regency level only since 2007. We use the SAKERNAS to calculate 
province-level controls since 1996, and to test for the effects of oil palm on labor market 
outcomes at regency level in the time period 2001 to 2015. 
Additional control variables are derived from the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS), the Census, as well as from different administrative data sources. We use the DHS 
to control for child mortality, which is defined as the number of child deaths between the 
ages of one to five years per 1000 live births. Furthermore, we use the DHS to estimate the 
effect of the oil palm expansion on current fertility, in addition to the total number of live 
births per woman. Finally, the DHS provides a number of interesting outcomes that proxy 
for female bargaining power, such as the difference between actual and desired fertility, 
women‟s influence on household and personal decisions, and women‟s control over their 
own income. Since neither SAKERNAS nor SUSENAS provide detailed information on 
internal migration, we use data from the Indonesian Census to calculate the share of 
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individuals who ever migrated as well as the share of individuals who migrated in last 5 
years at the regency level.
24
 Administrative data, such as poverty lines, are retrieved from 
Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) and public revenue data are retrieved from the Ministry of 
Finance, Information System for Sub-National Budget. We also calculate average altitude 
at regency level from the NASA Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (SRTM) digital 
elevation data.
25
 
Finally, we use data from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database for our 
instrumental variables approach. The GAEZ provides agro-climatically attainable yield 
data for different crops under specific levels of inputs and management conditions. It uses 
information on agro‐climatic conditions to predict attainable yield based on agronomic 
models in grid cells of 5 arc‐minute and 30 arc‐second (approximately 10x10km) 
resolution (Fischer et al. 2012). We use the maximum attainable yield of palm oil under 
rain-fed conditions and low-input management for the average climate in the baseline 
period 1961-1990. The low-input level was chosen since its predictions yield the highest 
correlation with the actual expansion of oil palm in a test area (Jambi Province, Sumatra), 
where land-use classification based on LANDSAT satellite imagery is available (Melati et 
al. 2014). Low-input levels may be not adequate by definition since fertilizer use is 
common in oil palm cultivation, however, the usage may not be optimal, especially in the 
case of smallholder farming. The GAEZ data is used to calculate the average attainable 
yield of oil palm within a regency by aggregating the pixel values within 1993 regency 
boundaries. Figure 8 illustrates our calculations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 We use the subsample of the census from the IPUMS database. 
25
 Country-specific data can be downloaded from http://www.diva-gis.org/gdata.  
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Figure 8: Regency-wise attainable yield for oil palm in Indonesia 
 
 
Source: GAEZ. Max attainable yield is in palm oil (kg/ha). Conversion factor to oil palm fresh fruit bunches is 0.225. 
 
4.5 Estimation strategy 
Eliciting a causal effect of oil palm expansion on fertility involves two major 
challenges: First, we cannot observe a lot of regency characteristics such as cultural and 
political traits, as well as time variant macro shocks such as the transmigrant program, 
which may correlate with the proliferation of oil palm as well as the fertility transition.
26
 
Second, reverse causality such as high or low population growth which may induce oil 
palm expansion, could be driving our results.  
We therefore use an instrumental variables approach combined with regency-fixed 
effects to identify causal effects. Our instrument combines time-invariant agro-climatic 
suitability for oil palm with the national expansion of oil palm, and is inspired by Duflo & 
Pande (2007). We interact the suitability of oil palm at regency level with the annual 
expansion of oil palm at national level. We assume that national expansion is driven by 
world market prices and policies of the central government and is not affected by 
idiosyncratic regional developments which could be correlated with both fertility and oil 
palm expansion. 
This approach provides a prediction of how much area in each regency should be 
cultivated with oil palm in a given year, based on the regency‟s suitability for oil palm 
cultivation, and the national expansion of oil palm area. This delivers an instrument which 
highly correlates with the actual expansion, since next to access to land and transport costs, 
                                                 
26
 The importance of cultural and linguistic boundaries for fertility patterns is shown inter alia by 
Munshi & Myaux 2006; Cleland & Wilson 1987). 
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agro-ecological suitability is a major determinant of agricultural land-use patterns. 
Importantly, we expect this instrument to be exogenous, i.e. to affect fertility only through 
its effect on oil palm expansion, and not through any other mechanisms.  
A couple of possible threats to identification remain. The first is that other crops have 
similar agro-ecological requirements as oil palm and have a similar expansion pattern over 
time. This would imply that our instrument captures very different levels of initial 
agricultural and probably also economic activity, which also suggests different trends in 
fertility outcomes. A second threat to identification could be that our instrument captures 
general geographic characteristics (such as altitude) which strongly correlate with initial 
levels of development and fertility. It seems fairly plausible that differences in initial levels 
in development and fertility also imply differential trends of fertility reduction. In order to 
address these concerns, we allow time trends between regencies to vary based on initial 
values of fertility, electrification, share of agricultural employment in total employment, 
and agricultural wages.
27
 Our results are not affected by the inclusion of these controls. A 
third caveat in our identification strategy could be the high regional concentration in the oil 
palm expansion. As depicted in Figure 6, the oil palm expansion started mainly in Sumatra 
and spread only later to Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The fact that these regions also had very 
different initial levels of fertility could indicate cultural and regional differences in 
underlying preferences towards children, and consequently very different trends in fertility 
declines without oil palm expansion. Also higher initial fertility could lead to a more rapid 
decline in subsequent years, when regions start to catch up with the development of the 
central regions, introducing a spurious negative correlation. It is thus not unlikely that 
these islands were on different fertility trends, or that regional shocks affected both the oil 
palm expansion as well as fertility. Therefore, we control for island-year fixed effects in all 
our estimations.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 We do not control for differential trends based on attainable yield, since the oil palm expansion is 
fairly linear through time and the regression would suffer from high collinearity. We also control for 
differential trends based on altitude as a robustness check and our results are robust to this control. 
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Our first stage is then:   
 
           (         )             (      )                           
 
where       is the share of smallholder oil palm area in regency  , island   and time  . 
     is the attainable yield of oil palm in regency j and      is the oil palm area in hectare 
at national level in year t.       is a vector of individual controls, such as a woman‟s age. 
    are initial characteristics, such as regency-average fertility, share of workers in 
agriculture, share of households with access to electricity, and province-average 
agricultural wages. These initial characteristics are multiplied with a time trend   . We also 
control for year fixed effects   , island-year fixed effects     and regency fixed effects   .  
The second stage of our fixed effects 2SLS models is:  
 
               ̂              (      )                                                
 
 where        is the number of children born to each woman aged 15 to 49 in regency  , 
island   and year  . All remaining variables are defined as in equation (9), and       is an 
individual error term. We use household survey weights in all our estimations and cluster 
standard errors at regency level. 
Despite having annual data on the oil palm expansion from administrative sources, we 
use a long-differences approach, and concentrate on the changes in oil palm cultivation and 
fertility over 10-year periods (1996, 2006 and 2016). This is because we expect the effect 
of oil palm on fertility to work through different mechanisms, which materialize over 
different time periods, and which might feed back into each other. By using 10-year 
differences we hope to account for the full impact on fertility.
28
 
In order to test for the relative importance of different causal mechanisms, we employ a 
mediating analysis. That is, we first test if the oil palm expansion has a significant effect of 
the mediating variable of interest and then test if controlling for this variable in equation 
(10) affects the point estimate on the share of oil palm area.  
                                                 
28
 We test for the importance of time-lags as additional robustness check. 
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4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Effect of oil palm expansion on fertility  
In Table 8 we present our main results for equation (10). In column (1) we use ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with regency and time fixed effects. Column (2) additionally includes island-year 
fixed effects and initial level of fertility, electrification, share of agricultural labor in total 
employment, and wages in agriculture multiplied with a time trend. In columns (3) to (6) we use 
the instrumental variables approach described in Section 4.5. To assess the robustness of our 
findings, we subsequently add different controls. We add island-year fixed effects in column (4). In 
column (5) we then additionally control for differential time trends based on initial levels of 
fertility, electrification, share of agricultural employment, and agricultural wages. In column (6) we 
add a woman‟s age to the controls. The age control is included because the age structure in a 
regency strongly determines fertility and it is not unlikely that age structure are on different fertility 
trends. 
 
Table 8: Effect of oil palm expansion on fertility 
   1996-2006-2016   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS IV IV IV IV 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
-0.422 -0.278 -6.421** -14.841** -4.614** -6.707** 
(0.414) (0.376) (2.572) (7.167) (2.117) (2.727) 
       
Regency & year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Island-year FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Initial levels * year No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Woman‟s age No No No No No Yes 
      
F-stat 377.129 413.431 218.526 81.247 289.315 564.73 
Kleibergen F-stat    15.352 8.192 10.586 10.586 
Observations 602758 602758 602758 602758 602758 602758 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
The results show a consistently negative effect of the oil palm expansion on fertility. The effect 
is always statistically significant in the instrumental variables estimations. Column (6) is the 
preferred specification, as it presents the most conservative estimates that allow for differential 
fertility shocks between islands and between regencies with different levels of initial fertility and 
economic development.  
Between 1996 and 2016 the average share of oil palm area at regency level increased from 
0.26% to 1.57%. This would lead to a decrease of 0.088 children born per woman over a period of 
20 years. Between 1996 and 2016 fertility decreased from 2.133 to 1.63 in our sample, the oil palm 
expansion could hence explain up to 17% of the observed fertility reduction.  
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The estimated effect size is increasing significantly when moving from OLS to our 
instrumental variables approach. This could indicate a weak instrument problem; however, our 
first-stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic suggests that our instrument is reasonably strong in 
most regressions ranging between 8.192 and 15.352. There could be three other reasons for having 
lower OLS than IV estimates. First, our IV estimates capture the local average treatment effect of 
oil palm expansion. We thus show an effect for regencies where oil palm was planted because of 
favorable agro-ecological conditions and not for example because of policy regulations. Plantations 
in favorable agro-ecological conditions are likely to have higher returns, leading to higher income 
effects and potentially stronger fertility reductions. We caution hence that our estimates present an 
upper bound to the average treatment effect. Second, the IV approach might have corrected 
endogeneity biases. Oil palm plantations which were incentivized by government policies rather 
than agro-ecological suitability have been targeting regions with low population density and poor 
economic development in order to pursue the national development agenda, filling the demand for 
labor with migrants from densely populated islands (Gatto et al. 2017). Migrants from densely 
populated regions could have had lower fertility preferences, which could have reduced the initial 
level of fertility and possibly the subsequent decrease. This could explain an upward bias in OLS. 
Lastly, administrative data on the expansion of oil palm could involve significant measurement 
error, while the suitability index is based on agro‐climatic, soil and terrain conditions which may be 
more precisely measured. Thus, our IV approach may correct measurement errors, which induce an 
attenuation bias in our OLS estimates. 
We do not expect effects to be uniform across the population. Figure 9 reports the result 
disaggregated by age groups based on the specification in column (6) in Table 8. The figure shows 
that the negative effect is only statistically significant in the age groups between 25 and 39, peaking 
for the age-group 30 to 34. The apparent zero effect for younger age groups is likely to be driven 
by our long-difference estimation strategy, combined with a relatively static fertility measure. The 
25 to 29 age cohort, for which we observe a significant effect, was only 15 to 19 years old 10 years 
earlier. The negative fertility effect of oil palm could have hence taken place anywhere between the 
age of 15 to 29. The insignificant effect for older women is in line with our expectations.  
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Figure 9: Effect of oil palm on fertility by age cohorts 
 
Notes: Marginal effects and 90% CI are reported. Standard errors are clustered at regency 
level. IV estimates are reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s 
age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, 
electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages times year. 
 
4.6.2 Robustness checks 
We conduct several additional checks to gauge the robustness of our findings. First of 
all, we use the PODES dataset to measure oil palm expansion at the village level. 
Unfortunately this information is only available in 1993 and 2003. We replicate the 
specifications used in Table 8 with the new variable on oil palm expansion in Table A13 in 
the Appendix. The results show a consistent negative and significant effect of oil palm 
expansion on fertility, confirming our previous results. 
In the next step, we test in the 1996 to 2016 sample if our results are sensitive to our 
choice of specification. Results are reported in the Appendix, Table A14. First, we run the 
same regression without survey weights. The change in effect size is negligible, but the 
Kleibergen F-Statistic increases. Second, we include province-time trends instead of 
island-year fixed effects. Again, our results remain robust and of the same magnitude, 
although the first stage F-Statistic decreases. Third, we use attainable yield of oil palm 
under rain-fed conditions and medium-input management instead of low-input 
management as cross-sectional component of our instrumental variable. Again, the results 
are not affected. Fourth, we test if our results are sensitive to excluding Java, Indonesia‟s 
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main island, from our sample. Close to 40% of Indonesia‟s population lives on Java. At the 
same time, Java grows oil palm only to a very small extent. We find in column (4) that the 
effect remains highly significant and the precision of the first stage increases, since the low 
levels of oil palm cultivation in Java are not driven by low suitability but little available 
land. Fifth, we control for each regency‟s average altitude multiplied by a time trend. As 
discussed previously, one concern with the validity of our instrument stems from the fact 
that the attainable yield of oil palm changes with altitude. Since regencies with high 
altitude are generally more remote, they might also be on different trends of economic 
development and fertility compared to low-land regencies. If this effect is not picked up by 
any of our trends, this could possibly bias our results. As can be seen in column (5), the 
effect size remains stable and significant. Only the Kleibergen F-stat drops to 7.7, which is 
to be expected given that we substantially reduce the variation in our instrument. Finally, 
in columns (6) and (7), we compare the effect of oil palm on fertility between producer 
types. We use the sample of 2005-2011-2016 since we do not have consistent data for total 
oil palm area before 2005 and no data in 2006. We find that the effect on fertility is lower 
when using total oil palm area rather than smallholder oil palm area as explanatory 
variable, but the effect remains statistically significant. One possible explanation could be 
that the income effect is more pronounced for smallholders compared to agricultural wage 
laborers. We also show in Table A15 that our results are robust to using 5-year differences 
rather than 10-year differences. 
One weakness of our measure of fertility is that it captures the total number of children 
born per woman, rather than current fertility. This variable is sensitive to past changes in 
fertility and, given serial correlation in the expansion of oil palm, might capture changes in 
fertility that happened some time ago. Moreover, the full effect of oil palm expansion on 
income might only be realized after some years since oil palm trees are only productive 
two to three years after being planted. We therefore split our sample by age groups and test 
if lagging the oil palm expansion by two or five years affects the observed pattern by age 
group. Results are reported in the Appendix, Figure A3. We find that the effect of oil palm 
on fertility is now more pronounced for the older cohorts. This is expected since the lagged 
oil palm expansion is restricted to fertility decisions which occurred at least two or five 
years ago, limiting the effect on young cohorts. 
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As additional robustness check, we use fertility data from the DHS to illustrate 
differences between our fertility variable and current fertility. The DHS data is only 
representative at the province level, which is why our identification strategy has to rely on 
controlling for province and time fixed effects. We use DHS data from the years 1997, 
2002, 2007 and 2012. Figure A4 in the Appendix reports the results. The figure on the left 
shows the effect on total fertility (consistent with our fertility measure in SUSENAS), 
while the figure on the right shows the effect on current fertility. Current fertility is defined 
as the number of births for each woman in the last 12 months, and is the standard measure 
used to construct the TFR. The figure on the left overlaps 1:1 with our results from 
SUSENAS, which shows that our results are robust to the use of alternative data and 
identification strategies. In the figure on the right, we can see that current fertility 
reductions are driven by two age groups: First, the 20-24 year olds, and, second, women 
aged 35-44. Younger women may be reducing current fertility because they delay marriage 
and stay longer in school. Consistently, the observed positive effect on fertility in the 25-29 
age group might be a catch-up effect. However, the fact that 35-44 year old women also 
reduce their current fertility could indicate changing preferences towards very large 
families. While the DHS data confirms our results, it also indicates that our fertility 
variable limits the scope for detailed cohort analyses. 
 
4.6.3 Transmission mechanisms 
4.6.3.1 Income  
In Section 4.2, we cite evidence that the oil palm expansion induced positive income 
effects. Increasing income would lead to decreasing fertility rates in Becker‟s Q-Q model. 
We test this proposition using consumption expenditure per capita as proxy for income, 
calculated at the household level in the SUSENAS data. Table 9 presents the results. In 
column (1), we show that oil palm expansion has a significantly positive effect on 
consumption expenditures. Columns (2) and (3) show that this effect is driven by 
households whose head is involved in agriculture as his main job. In the subsequent 
columns, we test if the effect of oil palm expansion on fertility declines when controlling 
for changes in per capita consumption expenditure. We find in column (4) that the point 
estimate on oil palm decreases from -6.7 to -4.9 after controlling for household-level 
 87 
 
consumption expenditure per capita. In columns (4) and (5), we split the sample by the 
primary occupation of the household head. While the income effect seems to be driven by 
households who are engaged primarily in agriculture, fertility effects can be observed in 
both groups. Taken together these results suggest that part of the effect on fertility can be 
explained by an income effect, but that other mechanisms must be at work, too. 
 
Table 9: Transmission mechanisms - Income effect  
   1996-2006-2016   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Consumption 
Exp. p. c. 
Consumption 
Exp. p. c. 
  HH in agr. 
Consumption 
Exp. p. c. 
HH in non-
agr. 
Fertility Fertility 
 
HH in agr. 
Fertility 
 
HH in non-
agr. 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
3.376* 3.822** 1.611 -4.887* -6.222** -8.488** 
(2.046) (1.902) (2.537) (2.797) (2.627) (3.800) 
 
Consumption 
expenditures p. c. 
   -0.513***   
   (0.016)  
 
 
F-stat 161.573 172.506 170.022 630.011 365.880 551.342 
Kleibergen F-stat  10.706 12.995 8.481 10.577 13.209 8.276 
Observations 2294491 1102206 1192285 602758 280546 322212 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. Consumption expenditures are in log constant 1996 values. 
 
4.6.3.2 Child labor 
As discussed in Section 4.3, decreasing returns to child labor could increase the price of 
child quantity. We therefore test if the oil palm expansion is associated with changes in 
child labor, and if average child labor at the regency level mediates the effect of oil palm 
on fertility.  
Child labor can be calculated only for children between 10 and 14 years.
29
 Results are 
reported in the Appendix, Table A16. In summary, we find no evidence that child labor 
explains the negative effect of oil palm on fertility. Oil palm does not seem to affect total 
child labor, nor on-farm or gender-specific child labor. Likewise, controlling for child 
labor or on-farm child labor does not change the effect of oil palm on fertility. Since 
schooling and child labor are substitutes in time use, the finding that oil palm does not 
affect child enrollment in Table A17 gives additional support to our findings. We conclude 
                                                 
29
 We do not have any data on working activities of children below the age of ten. 
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that changes in child labor are not an important mechanism in explaining the negative 
effect of oil palm expansion on fertility.  
 
4.6.3.3 Maternal opportunity costs of time  
We argue in our theoretical model that maternal opportunity costs of time might 
decrease or increase depending on whether the oil palm expansion triggers local economic 
development and how this affects wages. In the absence of such effects, oil palm may only 
induce labor savings, which would reduce the opportunity costs of child rearing. We 
therefore start by estimating the effect of oil palm on wages and labor supply. Columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 10 show a positive and significant effect of oil palm on wages in the non-
agricultural sector and a negative (albeit not statistically significant) effect of oil palm on 
women‟s wages in the agricultural sector in the SAKERNAS dataset from 2001 to 2015.30 
In Table A18 in the Appendix, we use a set of different control variables to identify the 
drivers of the increase in non-agricultural wages for women. We find that changes in 
average consumption expenditures at the regency level as well as government revenues 
from own sources explain the positive wage effect of the oil palm expansion. In contrast, 
changes in women‟s educational attainment or in the sectoral composition of the workforce 
do not seem to explain the increase in wages. This suggests that local economy effects 
driven by income growth are primarily responsible for increasing women‟s non-
agricultural wages.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 The reason for restricting the sample to 2001 is that older SAKERNAS rounds do not contain regency 
identifiers and the questionnaire is only consistently eliciting all variables starting from 2001. 
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Table 10: Transmission mechanisms - Opportunity costs of time  
 2001-2006-2011-2015   1996-2006-2016   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
 Women‟s 
non-agr. 
wages 
Women‟s agr. 
wages 
Work Working 
hours 
Fertility Fertility 
(Working 
women) 
Fertility 
(Working 
women) 
Fertility Fertility 
Share of smallholder OP area in 
regency 
16.127* -7.902 -0.476 14.344 -6.800** -8.114** -8.057** -3.894* -2.284 
(9.239) (6.769) (1.256) (47.436) (2.704) 
 
(3.293) (3.331) (2.171) (2.355) 
Work (=1)     -0.195***     
     (0.015) 
 
    
Working hours        -0.004***   
      (4.E-4) 
 
  
Women‟s non-agr. wages        -0.371*** -0.382*** 
       (0.084) 
 
(0.093) 
Women‟s agr. wages        0.069 0.117 
        (0.078) (0.077) 
 
Consumption expenditure p. c.         -0.513*** 
         (0.015) 
 
F-stat 43.680 5.182 134.651 45.525 551.033 377.703 350.224 612.908 650.996 
Kleibergen F-stat  9.296 14.476 10.588 10.822 10.585 10.818 10.818 10.460 10.452 
Observations 72585 14624 602817 280152 602757 280113 280113 602758 602758 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s 
age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages times year. All 
monetary values are in log constant 1996 values, and wages calculated per hour. 
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We proceed by testing if increased wages led to higher labor supply. In columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 10 we show that women do not change their labor supply either at the 
extensive margin or at the intensive margin. Little surprisingly, controlling for labor supply 
does also not change the effect of oil palm on fertility, as reported in columns (5) to (7). 
Interestingly, however, increases in women‟s wages seem to mediate strongly the effect of 
oil palm on fertility (columns 8 and 9). And as can be seen by comparing column (9) to 
Table 9, col. (4), this cannot be explained by an income effect.
31
  
In order to analyze how wage increases affect fertility if not via changes in labor 
supply, we proceed by testing if oil palm affects the sector in which women work (Table 
11, cols. 1 and 2). Consistent with the finding of rising non-agricultural wages, we find that 
women shift out of agriculture and into the services sector. However, we do not find that 
controlling for the sector in which a woman works changes the coefficient of oil palm on 
fertility substantially. Controlling for whether a woman works in agriculture reduces the 
coefficient on oil palm for working women from -8.1 (Table 10, col. 6) to -7.5 (Table 11, 
col. 5).
32
 Sectoral shifts alone are thus not able to explain the strong mediating effect of 
women‟s wages. 
Table 11: Transmission mechanisms - Opportunity costs of time II 
   1996-2006-2016   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work in 
agriculture 
Work in 
service 
sector 
Education 
women 
(15-25y) 
Education 
women 
(26-35y) 
Fertility 
(Working 
women) 
Fertility 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
-2.793** 2.600** 5.235* 10.036** -7.514** -5.601** 
(1.307) (1.160) (2.820) (4.957) (3.192) (2.736) 
       
Work in agriculture 
(=1) 
    0.215***  
    (0.019)  
       
Women‟s education 
level 
No No No No No Yes 
       
F-stat 51.713 52.839 357.177 262.315 382.410 719.396 
Kleibergen F-stat  10.822 10.822 10.349 10.614 10.812 10.578 
Observations 280152 280152 211238 181646 280113 602758 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. Education level is a categorical variable. Categories are no degree, primary, junior secondary, senior 
secondary and tertiary schooling.  
 
                                                 
31
 The SAKERNAS 1996 does not provide regency identifiers. We thus control for average province-
level wages in columns (8) and (9). We merge SAKERNAS data from 2015 with SUSENAS data from 2016. 
32
 The effect of oil palm on labor supply and sector of work is robust to using SAKERNAS instead of 
SUSENAS data, see Table A19. 
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To understand what else could drive the relationship between increasing wages and 
fertility reductions, we regress wages at different educational levels on oil palm in Table 
12. Again, we use wage data from SAKERNAS. We find that the oil palm expansion 
mostly increased wages for more highly educated individuals, in particular for men and 
women with tertiary education, as shown in column (3) and (6).
33
  
 
Table 12: Effect of oil palm on wages - Returns to education 
   2001-2006-2011-2015   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Women‟s wages Men‟s wages 
 <Primary Secondary 
 
Tertiary <Primary Secondary 
 
Tertiary 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
-0.476 1.508 38.828*** -10.141 13.110* 31.250** 
(8.761) (8.415) (14.035) (6.641) (7.570) (14.574) 
       
F-stat 13.300 57.607 72.715 37.428 272.367 67.720 
Kleibergen F-stat  8.877 9.568 12.212 9.335 9.851 9.817 
Observations 31653 37951 17605 73130 97042 17038 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. All monetary variables are in log constant 1996 values. Dep. var.: Log hourly wages. 
 
Rising returns to education might have induced a reallocation of time away from child 
rearing to education.  In Table 11 columns (3) and (4), we show that the educational 
attainment of women in the age groups 15-25 and 26-35 increased significantly due to the 
oil palm expansion. The latter group is included because we work with 10-year differences 
and therefore this group is also likely to be affected by changes in oil palm expansion. In 
column (6), we add controls for the educational attainment of a woman to the regression of 
fertility on oil palm. This decreases the point estimate of oil palm on fertility from -6.7 to    
-5.6.  
 Taken together, these results indicate that oil palm triggered local economic 
development, which raised average wages as well as the returns to education. This 
increased the opportunity costs of child rearing, and women opted to change into the 
                                                 
33
 These results do not necessarily imply that there are no income effects for low education households. 
Although wages are reported individually, wages obtained in family work are not reported and most likely 
included in the wage reported by the household head. Since women left family work (see Table A19), this 
might have decreased the contribution of family labor to own farm work and sharecropping and therewith the 
wage men reported. Multiple jobs are also more likely in the low education sector. By only measuring the 
wage from the main job, we might also miss the income effects stemming from reallocating working time 
between jobs. Still, also comparing wage increases between the secondary and tertiary education group, 
where the aforementioned issues play a less significant role, indicates that returns to education increased. 
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service sector and to invest more time in their education, both of which then led to 
reductions in fertility. 
 
4.6.3.4 Returns to children’s education 
Changes in returns to education also affect the price of child quality, encouraging 
parents to invest more in the education of their children and to reduce fertility. In Table 13, 
columns (1) and (2), we regress the educational attainment of boys and girls between the 
age of 12 and 14 on oil palm.
34
 We use the age of 12 as cutoff point since children are 
unlikely to have finished primary school before the age of 12. We observe a positive effect, 
which, however, is only significant for girls in column (2). One reason could be that since 
the educational attainment of girls is in general lower investing in their education provides 
higher returns. Although the increase is only small, literature argues that even small shifts 
in child quality can induce major reductions in child quantity. In column (3), we test if 
investing in the quality of children explains part of the effect of oil palm on fertility by 
including the average educational attainment of girls and boys between the age of 12 and 
14 in a regency as controls. We restrict the variable to below 14 years in order not to 
confound the effect on an increase in women‟s education with that of children. We find 
that the oil palm effect is decreasing from -6.7 to -5.4. We find similar results when 
expanding the sample to children aged 12-19 (as reported in Table A21 in the Appendix). 
In column (4), we add consumption expenditures to control for the income effect, and all 
controls which are related with increasing maternal opportunity costs of time such as labor 
force participation, working hours, sector dummies and women‟s educational attainment. 
We additionally add women‟s wages in column (5) and find that this only reduces the 
coefficient oil palm from -3.8 to -2.9, which implies that the major part of the wage effect 
found in Table 10 column (8) can be explained by an income effect, by changes in returns 
to education and to limited extent by sectoral shifts. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 We also estimate the effect of oil palm on enrollment rates in Table A17 in Appendix, and find no 
significant effects. The reason could be that enrollment does not necessarily imply effectively attending 
school or investing time and effort into achieving a higher degree.   
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Table 13: Transmission mechanisms - Returns to children‟s education 
  1996-2006-2016  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Education 
level boys  
(12-14y) 
Education 
level girls  
(12-14y) 
Fertility Fertility Fertility 
Share of smallholder OP area in 
regency 
2.152 2.358* -5.444* -3.827 -2.948 
(1.409) (1.352) (3.048) (3.247) (3.890) 
      
Education level of 12-14y in reg. No No Yes Yes Yes 
All control variables except wages No No No Yes Yes 
Women‟s wages No No No No Yes 
      
F-stat 767.839 1379.357 393.164 631.100 608.982 
Kleibergen F-stat  10.777 11.061 10.748 10.738 9.474 
Observations 78388 74235 602758 602757 602757 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. Education level is a categorical variable. Categories are no degree, primary, junior secondary, senior 
secondary and tertiary schooling. In columns (3) to (5) we use the share of the age group having attained the respective 
degree as control. 
 
4.6.3.5 Infrastructure 
The infrastructure effect suggests that the oil palm expansion might reduce the cost of 
child quality through better infrastructure. We use a wide range of variables as controls for 
infrastructure such as share of households with access to electricity from the public grid, 
share of villages with kindergarten, primary school, junior high school, asphalt main road 
and hospital. Table 14 reports the results in columns (1)-(6). We find a negative effect of 
oil palm on the share of villages with an asphalt road as main road, which is contrary to our 
expectations. However, initial oil palm expansion might have involved rather low quality 
roads and roads might have been asphalted only later with increasing income generation 
from oil palm. When using a three-year lag of the oil palm expansion, the effect is not 
statistically significant.
35
 Of all infrastructure indicators tested, we only find a positive and 
significant effect of oil palm for the share of villages with a hospital. We then proceed to 
testing if controlling for these infrastructure variables mediates the effect of oil palm on 
fertility in columns (7) to (10).
36
 We do not find any evidence that reductions in the price 
of child quality – via infrastructure development - explain part of the observed negative 
effect of oil palm on fertility. 
                                                 
35
 Results are available from authors on request. 
36
 We merge PODES 2014 on SUENAS 2016. 
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Table 14: Transmission mechanisms - Infrastructure 
   1996-2006-2014    1996-2006-2016  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Kindergarte
n 
Primary 
school 
Junior high 
school 
Asphalt road Hospital Electricity Fertility Fertility Fertility Fertility 
Share of smallholder OP 
area in regency 
-0.468 0.327 -2.418 -2.380* 0.879** 0.004 -7.725** -7.710*** -7.707*** -8.450** 
(1.988) (0.274) (1.509) (1.366) (0.438) (1.327) (3.004) (2.852) (2.905) (3.440) 
           
Share of villages with 
kindergarten in regency 
      0.112 0.104 0.104 0.113 
      (0.127) (0.129) (0.130) (0.136) 
           
Share of villages with 
primary school in regency 
      0.908 1.032 1.031 1.110 
      (0.813) (0.802) (0.794) (0.865) 
           
Share of villages with junior 
high school in regency 
      -0.223 -0.214 -0.214 -0.234 
      (0.166) (0.166) (0.167) (0.182) 
           
Share of households with 
electricity in regency 
       0.201** 0.200** 0.236** 
       (0.083) (0.084) (0.097) 
           
Share of villages with 
asphalt road  in regency 
        0.001 0.004 
        (0.128) (0.131) 
           
Share of villages with 
hospital in regency 
         0.301 
         (0.423) 
           
F-stat 93.850 15.264 44.833 12.460 5.632 474.933 458.137 487.045 470.665 439.641 
Kleibergen F-stat  16.485 16.485 16.485 16.485 16.485 16.485 11.638 11.513 11.257 8.945 
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620 601025 601025 601025 601025 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s 
age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages times year.  
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4.6.3.6 Alternative explanations 
As mentioned in Section 3, other mechanisms that are not captured by the Q-Q model 
could explain a negative effect of oil palm on fertility, namely migration, changes in child 
mortality or female empowerment. These mechanisms are addressed in the following. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table A22 (in the Appendix) report the effect of oil palm on 
migration. We find that oil palm increases short-term migration (i.e., in the last five years), 
but not long-term migration. The data on migration is derived from the Indonesian Census 
and only available for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. We thus merge the migration data with 
a one year lead on the SUSENAS dataset.
37
 Columns (3) to (5) assess the role of migration 
on fertility. We do not observe a significant change in the magnitude of the oil palm 
coefficient after controlling for either of the two migration variables. This suggests that 
migration does not explain the negative effect of the oil palm expansion on fertility. 
We also control for changes in child mortality at province level. Unfortunately, the 
DHS data does not match well with our fertility data. We match DHS data form 1997, 
2006 and 2012 with SUSENAS data from 1996, 2006 and 2011. Results are reported in the 
Appendix, Table A23. While we find that the expansion of oil palm is associated with 
decreasing child mortality, controlling for this variable again does not seem to affect the 
observed effect of oil palm on fertility. We therefore conclude that reductions in child 
mortality were no major transmission mechanism. 
Finally, we explore the link between the oil palm expansion and female empowerment. 
Since we only have a few proxies for female empowerment in SUSENAS, we also use the 
DHS data to test if our results could be driven by an empowerment effect. One indication 
for female empowerment could be an increase in investments in children‟s education, in 
particular for girls, assuming that women have a higher preference for investing in their 
children (and in their daughters relative to their sons) than men. However, while we find 
that educational investments in children increase, the magnitude of the effect is almost 
identical for boys and girls, and could be explained equally well by the changes in returns 
to education (cf. Table 13). Therefore, we also test if the share of food expenditures in total 
household expenditures is increasing due to the oil palm expansion, assuming that women 
have a higher preference to spend money on food than men. Results are reported in Table 
                                                 
37
 Census data is missing for some regencies. 
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A24 in the Appendix. We do not find any significant effect. Moreover, we test using DHS 
data if the oil palm expansion has an effect on several proxies of female empowerment 
such as the gap between desired and actual fertility, an index of female autonomy, and if 
women have control over their labor income. The results in Table A24 do not show any 
evidence that the oil palm expansion increased female empowerment. We also do not find 
any evidence that controlling for these variables changes the observed effect of oil palm on 
fertility (cf. Table A25). 
We conclude that none of these mechanisms provide an alternative explanation for the 
negative effect of oil palm on fertility, and that the income effect as well as increasing 
wages and returns to education have a greater potential in explaining the negative effect of 
oil palm on fertility.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
We contribute to the literature by disentangling the effect of a labor saving technology 
on fertility. Using the oil palm expansion in Indonesia as empirical example, we show that 
a labor saving technology does not necessarily lead to higher fertility. Rather positive 
income effects coupled with broader local economic development eventually decreased 
fertility in the context of oil palm production in Indonesia.  
This essay presents evidence that oil palm induced labor savings under the condition of 
land scarcity, but also income gains in particular in the smallholder sector. Based on these 
observations, we develop testable hypotheses using Becker‟s Q-Q framework. Using an 
instrumental variables approach with regency-fixed effects, we find that the oil palm 
expansion significantly reduced fertility. This effect is persistent even after controlling for 
island specific time fixed effects and for differential trends depending on initial values of 
fertility, electrification, agricultural wages and sectoral shares. While our estimates likely 
represent an upper bound to the average treatment effect, they suggest that the oil palm 
expansion explains up to 17% of the fertility reduction observed in rural Indonesia in the 
time period between 1996 and 2016.  
We then explore different transmission mechanisms and find evidence that the negative 
effect of oil palm on fertility is largely driven by income effects, as well as by local 
economy effects, which led to increasing wages in the non-agricultural sector as well as to 
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higher returns to education. Our results suggest that increasing returns to education 
increased maternal opportunity costs of time resulting in a reallocation of time from child 
rearing to education. In addition, increasing returns to education induced higher 
investments in children‟s education, leading to further reductions in fertility. We conclude 
that the income growth coupled with local economic development outweighed the potential 
fertility increasing effects of the oil palm expansion. 
While we find a negative effect of a labor saving technology on fertility, we argue this 
might depend on several preconditions. Indonesia has a long tradition of cash crop 
cultivation. People obtain a considerable part of food and non-food consumption goods 
from markets and are surrounded by a relatively well established institutional and 
infrastructural framework. In settings with less amenable conditions for the development of 
a prospering non-agricultural sector, labor force participation as well as wages could 
decrease, potentially decreasing maternal opportunity costs of time. Second, the 
availability of schools might matter. Our results suggest that investments in education were 
an important transmission mechanism. If high transaction costs impede such investments, 
fertility reduction might be less evident. Lastly, it is important to note that oil palm is 
largely adopted by smallholder farmers. Since oil palm adoption was voluntary, we have 
good reasons to expect that it was adopted due to expected income gains. A technology 
that is labor saving but not increasing the incomes of the majority of the population might 
have different effects. For example, mechanization in large-scale agriculture might 
increase labor productivity; however, an abundant labor supply might still depress wages, 
or restrict income gains to a minority. The income and local economic development effects 
might therefore be less pronounced or absent, which would substantially reduce the scope 
for fertility reduction. While our results indicate that a labor saving technology in the 
smallholder sector might be beneficial to fertility reduction, labor savings technologies in 
other sectors where income effects are smaller might not lead to the same reduction in 
fertility rates.  
A number of caveats apply. Due to data limitations, the variable we use for fertility 
represents the number of all ever occurred live births per woman. Our variable thus 
captures events which possibly happened decades ago. While our results are robust to 
using lags and five-year differences, the potential serial correlation in oil palm expansion 
combined with our fertility variable limits the scope for a more detailed cohort analysis. 
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Second, our data includes only a limited number of good indicators for child quality, as we 
can only observe variables related to schooling. And finally, we want to emphasize that 
although we find positive effects of oil palm expansion on consumption expenditures and 
on educational attainment, this does not imply that oil palm is to be favored as means of 
reducing poverty. The detrimental effects of the oil palm expansion on a large set of 
ecosystem functions such as biodiversity, hydrological cycles and carbon storage are 
widely documented, as well as equity issues and land conflicts, posing serious threats to 
the long-term sustainability of oil palm. An assessment of the societal impact of oil palm 
needs to carefully weigh these different outcomes against each other.  
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4.8 Appendix 
4.8.1 Supplementary figures 
Figure A1: Expansion of oil palm in Indonesia by producer type 
 
Source: Tree crop statistics. 
Figure A2: Expansion of plantation crops in Indonesia 
 
Source: Tree crop statistics. 
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Figure A3: Effect of oil palm expansion on fertility using lags               
 
Notes: First figure uses a two year lag and second figure a five year lag for oil palm expansion both using the SUENAS 
data from 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016. IV estimates and 90% CI are reported. All regressions control for national oil palm 
area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, 
share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages times year. 
 
Figure A4: Effect of oil palm expansion on fertility using DHS data 
 
Notes: Marginal effects and 90% CI are reported. All regressions include national oil palm area, province fixed effect and 
year dummies. 
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4.8.2 Supplementary tables  
Table A12: Description of data sources 
Data-source Data availability Description 
SUSENAS 1993, 1996, 2001, 
2003, 2006, 2009, 
2011, 2013, 2016 
The National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) is a multi-
purpose socioeconomic survey at the individual level. The 
SUSENAS is representative at the regency-level. 
PODES 1993, 1996, 2003, 
2006, 2014 
The Village Potential Statistics (PODES) collects village and 
urban neighborhood characteristics for all of Indonesia. 
SAKERNAS 1993-2015 
 
The National Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) collects labor 
market characteristics of working age individuals. 
SAKERNAS is representative at the regency-level starting 
from 2007. 
GAEZ 1960-1990 (baseline) The Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database provides 
simulations on agro-climatic attainable yield and suitability 
indices for crops under different conditions. 
Tree Crop Statistics 
& 
INDO-DAPOER 
1967-2016  
(national level) 
1996-2016  
(regency level) 
The Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research 
(INDO-DAPOER) and Tree Crop Statistics of the Ministry of 
Agriculture provide data on smallholder oil palm area. Data is 
available at the regency level starting 1996. Total oil palm area 
at regency level is available since 2005. 
DHS 1997, 2002, 2007, 
2012 
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) provides 
representative data on health and population at the province 
level, including details on child mortality, TFR, and number of 
live births per woman. Proxies for female bargaining power 
include the difference between actual and desired fertility, a 
woman‟s influence on household and personal decisions and 
her control over her own income. 
Indonesian Census 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2010 
From the IPUMS International database, we use the 10% 
subsample of the Population Census of 2000 and 2010, as well 
as the 0.43% and 0.51% subsamples of the Intercensal 
Population Surveys of 1995 and 2005, respectively. We 
calculate permanent migration as share of individuals aged 15-
49 who were born in a different regency than regency of 
residence. Recent migration is the share of migrants who 
moved to the regency in the last 5 years. The data is 
aggregated at the regency level. 
Badan Pusat Statistik 
(BPS) 
1993 – 2016 Rural and urban poverty lines are published annually in the 
Statistic Year Book of Indonesia. Regional GDP by sector is 
available since 2000.  
Ministry of Finance 1994- 2016 Public revenue data by source are available from the 
Information System for Sub-National Budget. 
NASA Shuttle Radar 
Topographic Mission 
(SRTM) 
n.a. The SRTM digital elevation data is used to calculate average 
altitude for each regency. 
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Table A13: Effect of oil palm expansion on fertility – 1993-2003 
   1993-2003   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV  
Share of villages with 
OP  
-0.467*** -0.315** -3.056*** -5.143** -2.804*** -1.902** 
(0.117) (0.159) (0.736) (2.046) (1.052) (0.897) 
       
Regency & year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Island-year FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Initial levels * year No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Woman‟s age No No No No No Yes 
       
F-stat 371.677 154.411 148.439 69.810 97.262 787.982 
Kleibergen F-stat    25.996 8.905 10.664 10.663 
Observations 366496 366496 366496 366496 366496 366496 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
Table A14: Robustness checks 
  1996-2006-2016  2005-2011-2016 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 No 
weights 
Province 
trends 
included 
IV with 
inter-
mediate 
input level 
Excluding 
Java 
Including 
altitude x 
time trend 
Small-
holder OP 
area 
Total OP 
area 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
-6.256*** -7.315** -7.025** -4.354** -6.393* -5.778*  
(2.419) (2.900) (2.900) (1.851) (3.333) (3.484)  
 
Share of total OP 
area in regency 
       
-2.755* 
      (1.548) 
 
F-stat 589.720 178.269 561.969 1033.998 567.656 313.331 311.721 
Kleibergen F-stat  12.389 8.603 10.586 15.711 7.719 9.815 18.993 
Observations 602758 602758 602758 332373 602758 658100 658100 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. 
 
 
 
Table A15: Effect of oil palm expansion on fertility - Five year differences 
  1996-2001-2006-2011-2016  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS IV IV IV IV 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
-0.214 -0.304 -6.063** -14.005** -3.657** -6.642** 
(0.446) (0.414) (2.478) (7.094) (1.808) (2.588) 
       
Regency & year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Island-year FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Initial levels * year No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Women‟s age No No No No No Yes 
      
F-stat 226.705 564.779 148.756 100.667 465.440 521.266 
Kleibergen F-stat    15.046 7.482 9.719 9.719 
Observations 1006039 1006039 1006039 1006039 1006039 1006039 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table A16: Transmission mechanisms – Child labor 
   1996-2006-2016   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Child labor On-farm 
child labor 
Male child 
labor 
Female child 
labor 
Fertility Fertility 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
0.392 0.627 0.399 0.386 -6.929** -7.056** 
(0.807) (0.665) (0.897) (0.782) (2.880) (2.818) 
Share of child labor 
in regency  
    0.501**  
    (0.197)  
Share of on-farm 
child labor in 
regency 
     0.541** 
     (0.231) 
F-stat 59.995 36.020 56.162 42.155 539.516 546.300 
Kleibergen F-stat  10.876 10.876 10.847 10.919 10.703 10.814 
Observations 255708 255708 131987 123721 602758 602758 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. 
 
 
Table A17: Effect of oil palm on enrollment rates 
 1996-2016-2016 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 School enrollment 
boys (6-14y) 
School enrollment 
girls (6-14y) 
Fertility 
Share of smallholder OP area in 
regency 
0.063 -0.271 -6.743** 
(0.840) (0.789) (3.009) 
    
Share of 6-14 year olds enrolled 
in regency 
No No Yes 
   
F-stat 123.715 121.733 475.657 
Kleibergen F-stat  10.915 10.872 11.188 
Observations 233283 219973 602758 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. 
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Table A18: Effect of oil palm on women‟s non-agricultural wages 
   2001-2006-2011-2015   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Women‟s 
non-agr. wages 
Women‟s 
non-agr. wages 
Women‟s 
non-agr. wages 
Women‟s 
non-agr. wages 
Women‟s 
non-agr. wages 
Women‟s 
non-agr. wages 
Women‟s 
non-agr. wages 
Share of smallholder OP 
in regency (%) 
16.127
*
 15.559
*
 15.810
*
 13.107 17.607
*
 14.535
*
 12.724 
(9.239) (9.019) (9.069) (8.411) (9.383) (8.506) (8.389) 
 
Women‟s educational 
attainment 
  
0.301
***
 
 
0.299
***
 
    
 (0.008) (0.010)     
 
Own revenue  of 
regency government 
    
0.772
***
 
   
0.752
***
 
   (0.084)   (0.088) 
 
Transfers from province 
government 
     
0.032
**
 
  
    (0.015)   
 
Transfers from central 
government  
     
0.825
***
 
  
    (0.093)   
 
Average consumption 
exp. p.c. in regency  
      
0.456
***
 
 
0.132 
     (0.090) (0.090) 
        
Sector dummies No No Yes No No No No 
        
F-stat 43.680 250.615 219.492 40.306 45.935 46.922 38.361 
Kleibergen F-stat  9.296 9.297 9.288 9.270 8.908 9.133 9.251 
Observations 72585 72585 72585 72505 72161 72585 72505 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s 
age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages times year. All 
monetary values are in constant 1996 Indonesian Rupees. Dependent variable: log hourly wages in non-agricultural activities. 
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Table A19: Effect of oil palm on sectoral shifts  
    2001-2006-2011-2015    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Female labor 
force 
participation 
Share of women 
in non-
agricultural work 
Share of women 
in  agricultural 
family work 
Share of women 
in agricultural 
wage work 
Male labor force 
participation 
Share of men in 
non-agricultural 
work 
Share of men in 
agricultural 
family work 
Share of men in 
agricultural wage 
work 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
-1.986 3.905 -5.181** 1.308 0.212 0.751 -1.235 2.865* 
(2.008) (2.476) (2.622) (1.077) (0.938) (1.844) (1.020) (1.477) 
 
F-stat 45.802 51.767 21.117 11.149 819.621 36.130 22.793 8.323 
Kleibergen F-stat  10.892 12.033 12.033 12.033 11.206 11.710 11.710 11.710 
Observations 371458 178948 178948 178948 367473 294740 294740 294740 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s 
age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages times year.  
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Table A20: Effect of oil palm on wages - Returns to education 
   2001-2015   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Women‟s wages Men‟s wages 
 <Primary Secondary 
 
Tertiary <Primary Secondary 
 
Tertiary 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
-1.767 6.734 25.756*** -2.231 12.638** 29.466** 
(5.318) (4.423) (9.804) (3.910) (6.340) (11.942) 
 
F-stat 37.982 75.811 89.707 67.473 337.881 104.867 
Kleibergen F-stat  9.136 7.974 9.885 8.666 8.221 8.646 
Observations 137131 144666 61671 312686 375286 62201 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. All monetary values are in constant 1996 Indonesian Rupees. Wages are reported as log hourly wages. 2008 
and 2013 data are not included due to inconsistent data for oil palm expansion. 
 
Table A21: Transmission mechanisms - Returns to children‟s education II 
  1996-2006-2016  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Education level 
boys 12-19 
Education level 
girls 12-19 
Fertility 
(>19y) 
Fertility 
(>19y) 
Share of smallholder OP area in 
regency  
1.959 2.732* -8.300** -6.885** 
(1.382) (1.502) (3.404) (3.432) 
     
Education level of 12-19 year old 
in regency 
 
No No No Yes 
    
F-stat 1302.717 1273.496 480.203 387.524 
Kleibergen F-stat  10.834 10.810 10.553 10.646 
Observations 190581 177484 499521 499521 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. Education level is a categorical variable. Categories are no degree, primary, junior secondary, senior 
secondary and tertiary schooling. In column (4) we control for the share of the children in the age group having attained 
the respective degree. 
 
Table A22: Transmission mechanisms – Migration 
 1995-2000-2005-2010 1996–2001-2006-2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Share migrated 
in last 5y to 
regency (%) 
Share ever 
migrated to 
regency (%) 
Fertility 
(baseline) 
Fertility Fertility 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency  
 
0.844* 0.513 -6.723** -6.895** -6.424** 
(0.472) (0.584) (3.112) (3.454) (3.030) 
Share ever migrated 
to regency  
 
   0.162  
   (0.501)  
Share migrated in last 
5 years to regency  
 
    -0.327 
    (0.354) 
F-stat 5.825 8.484 290.006 278.255 287.211 
Kleibergen F-stat  8.614 8.614 7.264 6.382 7.381 
Observations 778 778 750076 750076 750076 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year.  
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Table A23: Transmission mechanisms – Child mortality 
 1997-2002-2007-2012 1996-2001-2006-2011 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Child mortality  
(province level) 
Fertility 
(baseline) 
Fertility 
Share of smallholder OP 
area in province/regency   
-109.888* -7.477** -8.214** 
(55.954) (3.379) (3.500) 
 
Child mortality  
(province level) 
  0.004 
 
 (0.003) 
 
F-stat 6.824 302.543 286.543 
Kleibergen F-stat   7.460 8.389 
Observations 80 794267 794267 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. OLS estimates 
reported in col (1) and IV estimates reported in cols. (2) and (3). Column (1) controls for national oil palm area, province 
and year fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed 
effects, island-year fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and 
agricultural wages times year. 
 
 
 
Table A24: Transmission mechanisms – Female empowerment 
 1997-2002-2007-2012 
(DHS) 
1996-2006-2016 
(SUSENAS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fertility gap Autonomy Control over 
income 
Share of 
expenditures for 
food 
Share of smallholder OP 
area in province/regency  
-0.201 2.551 0.350 -0.807 
(0.951) (1.968) (0.706) (0.655) 
F-stat 210.909 399.465 5.233 765.523 
Kleibergen F-stat    10.579 
Observations 91330 73488 28836 602818 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at province level in cols. (1) to (3) and at regency level in col. (4)) in parentheses. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. OLS estimates reported in cols. (1) to (3) and IV estimates reported in col. (4). Columns (1) 
to (3) control for national oil palm area, province and year fixed effects. Column (4) controls for national oil palm area, 
woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share 
of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages times year as well as consumption expenditure. All monetary 
values are in log constant 1996 values. 
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Table A25: Transmission mechanisms – Female empowerment II 
 2001-2006-
2016 
2001-2006-2011 1996-2001-2006-2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Fertility Fertility 
(baseline) 
Fertility Fertility Fertility 
(baseline) 
Fertility 
Share of smallholder 
OP area in regency 
-4.935* -5.501 -5.005 -6.628 -7.395*** -8.644*** 
(2.793) (4.201) (3.982) (4.713) (2.172) (2.524) 
       
Share of expenditures 
for food 
-0.059*      
(0.032) 
 
     
Consumption 
expenditure p. c. 
-0.519***      
(0.014) 
 
     
Autonomy   0.167**    
 
  
(0.078) 
 
   
Control over income    -0.276*   
 
   
(0.153) 
 
  
Fertility gap      -0.222*** 
 
     
(0.084) 
 
F-stat 640.976 240.163 254.516 250.456 319.620 292.408 
Kleibergen F-stat 10.580 5.254 5.375 4.928 17.236 16.586 
Observations 602758 531606 531606 531606 668945 668945 
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at regency level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. IV estimates are 
reported. All regressions control for national oil palm area, woman‟s age, regency and year fixed effects, island-year 
fixed effects, and initial values of fertility, electrification, share of agriculture in total employment and agricultural wages 
times year. All monetary values are in log constant 1996 values. 
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Table A26: Additional summary statistics  
 Obs. Mean SD 
SUSENAS (1996-2006-2016): 
 
   
Children (10-15y):    
Child labor (=1) 256332 0.059 0.236 
Child labor on own farm (=1) 256332 0.037 0.189 
Children (6-14y):    
Enrollment rate boys 233809 0.895 0.307 
Enrollment rate girls 220537 0.902 0.297 
    
SAKERNAS (2001-2006-2011-2015): 
   
Individual level (15-49y):    
Female labor force participation 372425 0.511 0.500 
Share of working women in non-agr. sector 179482 0.593 0.491 
Share of working women in agr. sector (family work) 179482 0.274 0.446 
Share of working women in agr. sector (wage work) 179482 0.060 0.237 
Male labor force participation 368477 0.841 0.365 
Share of working men in non-agr. sector 295608 0.573 0.495 
Share of working men in agr. sector (family work) 295608 0.079 0.270 
Share of working men in agr. sector (wage work) 295608 0.103 0.303 
    
Regency level:    
Government revenue (mil. IDR)    
Own revenue of regency government 832 36788.59 31317.13 
Transfers from central government 832 29183 27551.28 
Transfers from province government 832 4544.316 5122.167 
    
DHS (1997-2002-2007-2012): 
 
   
Women (15-49y):    
Control over income (=1) 28836 0.650 0.477 
Autonomy index 73488 4.112 1.110 
Fertility gap  91330 -0.534 1.642 
    
Notes: All monetary values are in constant 1996 IDR.  
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5 General conclusion 
One of the most rapid changes in land use in recent decades was the expansion of oil-
producing crops and the associated loss of tropical rainforest. While increasing production 
was necessary to meet the global demand for food, feed and fuel derived from oil crops, 
the associated loss and degradation of natural ecosystems sparked widespread concerns 
about the sustainability of oil crop cultivation. In particular, oil palm in Indonesia 
expanded rapidly due to its high land productivity compared to other oil crops. Oil palm 
covered approximately one million hectare in 1990 in Indonesia, rising to an estimated 12 
million hectare in 2016 (Ministry of Agriculture 2017). It is widely documented that the oil 
palm expansion aggravated ecological hazards such as greenhouse gas emission and 
biodiversity loss through clearing tropical forest. Furthermore, oil palm expansion is also 
adversely affecting ecosystem functions through replacing less intensive agricultural 
production systems with higher levels of ecosystem functions. Yet, increasing evidence 
exists that oil palm cultivation contributed to welfare gains among smallholder farmers and 
beyond. These positive economic and negative environmental effects depict a strong trade-
off for local and global policy makers. Finding the right balance in policy-making requires 
a better understanding of the determinants of land-use change and its impacts in terms of 
various dimensions. This dissertation has contributed in these directions, analyzing land-
use change and rural development in Indonesia with a particular focus on economic, 
institutional and demographic aspects of deforestation and oil palm expansion. 
 
5.1 Synopsis of three essays 
The dissertation consists of three substantive essays. The first essay has examined the 
linkages between secure property rights for agricultural land, agricultural 
productivity/intensity and potential outcomes for deforestation. We hypothesized that 
stronger land property rights could enable farmers to increase input intensity and 
productivity on the already cultivated land, thus reducing incentives to increase agricultural 
output by deforesting additional land. Our results show that formal land titles significantly 
increase agricultural intensity and productivity. However, due to land policy restrictions, 
 111 
 
farmers located at the historic forest margins are less likely to hold formal titles for the 
land they cultivate. We hypothesized that without land titles, these farmers are less able to 
intensify and might have been more likely to expand into the surrounding forest land to 
increase agricultural output. Indeed, historic forest closeness and past deforestation 
activities by households are found to be positively associated with current farm size. Our 
results suggest that the property right insecurity induced by the unregulated deforestation 
activities of farmers, combined with the fact that at forest margins farmers can more easily 
increase output by extending farm size via deforestation is highly problematic. The reason 
is that the incentive patterns induced by insecure property rights might even accelerate 
further deforestation. In addition to improving farmers‟ access to land titles for non-forest 
land, better recognition of customary land rights and more effective protection of forest 
land without recognized claims could be useful policy responses. 
In the second essay, we have examined whether local farmers in Indonesia benefit from 
cultivating oil palm, examining also temporal variation in the welfare effect, and whether 
oil palm cultivation has spillover effects on other farm households. Using different 
regression models, we show that oil palm cultivation contributes to higher household 
consumption, measured in terms of expenditures on food and non-food goods and services. 
Oil palm has higher returns to labor than rubber, the main alternative cash crop in the 
region. However, returns to land are higher in rubber cultivation. The welfare gains are 
thus driven mainly by labor savings in oil palm cultivation. The lower labor requirements 
allow oil palm farmers to further expand their farmland and to reallocate saved labor to 
non-farm work. Due to declining rubber prices, the positive welfare effect of oil palm 
increased even more in 2015 compared to 2012. We do not find significant spillover 
effects of oil palm cultivation on neighboring farm households. Our results thus largely 
confirm the findings of the previous literature on the positive welfare effects of oil palm 
cultivation for smallholder farmers. Our findings also imply some important policy 
recommendations. First, policies aimed at regulating further oil palm expansion will have 
to account for the economic benefits for the local population. Second, part of the economic 
benefits of oil palm cultivation can be explained by labor savings in oil palm cultivation 
and the associated land expansion. To impede that land expansion leads to unregulated 
deforestation, it is of critical importance to improve forest and land governance. Since the 
economic gains of oil palm cultivation are substantial, small fines or low probabilities of 
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conviction are unlikely to influence farmers‟ decision making and to deter further 
unregulated farm expansion. On the other side, high fines will adversely affect policy goals 
such as poverty reduction in rural areas. This suggests that improving governments‟ 
capacities to regulate land use, providing incentives for sustainable land use practices and 
alternative sources of income in rural areas might be more promising strategies.  
While the introduction of new production technologies is often regarded as one of the 
key drivers of the historical fertility transition in the US and Western Europe, empirical 
evidence on the relationship between technology and fertility in a developing country 
context is largely inexistent. In the third essay, we address this gap by exploring why a 
labor-saving technology (crop choice) such as oil palm decreases fertility in rural 
Indonesia. Based on the current literature but also micro-level plot data, we show that oil 
palm indeed induces large labor savings per hectare compared to competing crops. We 
then use Becker‟s quantity-quality model to identify different causal mechanism through 
which the expansion of oil palm could affect fertility rates. While a labor-saving 
technology could theoretically increase fertility rates by decreasing maternal opportunity 
costs of time, we find consistently negative effects of the oil palm expansion on fertility. 
Our results suggest that income gains among agricultural households coupled with broader 
local economic development explain this effect. Specifically, local economic development 
seems to have raised returns to education and triggered investments into women‟s and 
children‟s education, which together with direct income effects explain the bulk of the 
negative effect of the oil palm expansion on fertility. From a policy perspective focused on 
female empowerment and reducing population growth, this indirect effect of the oil palm 
boom is certainly welcomed. However, to harness this effect more effectively, policies that 
improve female education and access to the non-agricultural employment are necessary. 
This does not mean that oil palm expansion is an effective instrument for rural 
development. The detrimental effects on ecosystem functions are widely documented as 
well as equity issues and land conflicts. Understanding the socioeconomic effects of the oil 
palm expansion may, however, contribute to design more sustainable agrarian systems. 
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5.2 Broader policy implications 
Overall, our research suggests that the oil palm expansion driven by smallholder 
farmers has contributed to rising human welfare in rural Indonesia.
38
 This finding is 
supported by our analyses based on both primary data from Sumatra and nationally 
representative data. However, current environmental research raises serious doubts on the 
sustainability of the oil palm boom. Policy interventions are in need to address this issue. 
While large-scale plantations are theoretically easy to regulate due to a limited number of 
actors and the implementation of sustainability standards such as RSPO (Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil), the smallholder sector is more complex to regulate. In principle, the 
strong involvement of smallholders in palm oil production is certainly important from a 
policy perspective focused on poverty reduction, since the welfare gains benefit 
households which are often among the poorest of society. Furthermore, if the growth in the 
agricultural sector is meant to be inclusive, it will be fundamental to integrate smallholders 
into sustainable value chains. Yet, our results show that large parts of the welfare gains of 
oil palm cultivation for smallholders run via labor savings and the subsequent reallocation 
of labor. Labor can be either allocated to additional farm land or to the non-farm sector. 
We have shown that the land and forest governance in Indonesia is rather weak, which 
could incentivize farmers to expand farm area at the expense of natural ecosystems. 
Besides improving land governance, it will hence be highly important to support farmers to 
reallocate their saved labor to the non-farm sector or to increase input intensity in a 
sustainable manner. This could include supporting the development of downstream 
industries in the palm oil sector as well as improving access to high quality seed and 
fertilizer, knowledge on sustainable management methods and secure land rights. Through 
creating additional jobs in the non-farm sector, potential adverse effects for women and 
landless households, who face low labor demand in oil palm cultivation, could also be 
addressed. We conclude that to manage the negative externalities of a labor-saving crop-
choice such as oil palm, having secure property rights for agricultural land and forest as 
well as access to the non-agricultural sector might be particularly important. Future policy 
interventions should address these issues. 
 
                                                 
38
 Our data is based on oil palm expansion driven by the smallholder sector; welfare outcomes for the 
estate sector might be different. 
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5.3 Limitations and research gaps 
In the following, some limitations of this dissertation and gaps for potential future 
research are given. While the positive impact of stronger property rights on agricultural 
intensity and productivity are well established and our results support the findings in the 
literature, the effect of secure property rights for agricultural land on deforestation 
outcomes is more ambiguous due to data limitations. In particular, longer and spatially 
explicit panel data sets on land titling and deforestation patterns of smallholders are 
necessary to further confirm our findings. Research in this direction might be able to 
confirm if insecure property rights at the forest margins lead to cascade effects, 
accelerating deforestation and whether improved land and forest governance are able to 
stabilize forest margins. The Indonesian government is currently reforming their land and 
forest governance system, the potential effects on welfare and deforestation should be 
therefore of further interest.  
Our analysis in the second essay focuses on determining the welfare effect of oil palm 
cultivation on farm households. However, a considerable part of households in many 
Indonesian villages identify as labor households without the necessary land to sustain 
them. Due to a combination of abundant labor supply and land scarcity, the increased labor 
productivity and savings in labor found in oil palm cultivation might have decreased the 
wages of laborers or restricted income gains to a small fraction of laborers. Although 
literature suggests that the average welfare effect on labor households might be positive 
(Edwards 2017), these findings might conceal considerable heterogeneity. Future research 
might also account for the long-term welfare effects of oil palm cultivation. Two issues 
might be in particular critical for long-term economic sustainability. First, ecosystem 
functions such as soil fertility, pollination and water supply have to stay at a sufficient 
level for oil palm cultivation. While increasing evidence exist regarding the adverse effects 
of oil palm expansion on hydrological cycles and soil fertility, oil palm was only recently 
introduced at a large scale and the full extent of production risk might only materialize in 
the long term. Second, prices for agricultural products fluctuated remarkably in recent 
decades, exposing small-scale farmers to a considerable price risk. The strong 
concentration of oil palm both at farm level and wider geographical scale and the limited 
possibility of adaption through changes in cropping patterns due to long growing periods 
and expensive planting are likely to exacerbate the risk. To avoid that fluctuation in 
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income will lead to forced land sales or will drive households below the poverty line, 
access to credit and saving facilities to smooth consumption as well as access to alternative 
income sources might be crucial. Overall, understanding the effects of price risks and 
related uncertainties on farmers‟ livelihoods as well as designing respective 
countermeasures will be critical to support the long-term sustainability of smallholder-
driven oil palm cultivation in Indonesia.  
Concerning the effect of oil palm expansion on demographic variables such as fertility 
in the third essay, our results show a stable reducing effect on fertility. Yet, this effect may 
depend on several conditions such as accessible schooling, positive income effects and the 
growth potential of the non-agricultural sector as well as on specific changes in factor 
productivity. While we discuss these aspects, the evidence on the linkage between 
agricultural technologies on fertility is in general scarce, limiting the scope for 
comparisons. Future research might contribute to delineate how specific initial conditions 
and changes in factor productivity, shape the effect of new production technologies on 
fertility. Second, we have shown that oil palm expansion can lead to vast labor saving in 
particular for women and induces a shift from agriculture to the service sector. The 
implications of this effect reach certainly beyond fertility decisions. Women might have 
higher control over income and in general higher autonomy, which might change 
expenditure patterns and even political and social participation. We reported some average 
effects of oil palm expansion on female empowerment, however, the effects might be 
heterogeneous depending on the cultural context and access to non-agricultural 
employment. Furthermore, our proxies for female empowerment are aggregated at a high 
level. Detailed studies on gender-specific impacts of the oil palm expansion can be 
therefore promising. 
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Farm household survey questionnaire 
 
(Farm survey; round 2; 2015)   
 
1. Household identification 
1. Village (name):  
2. Dusun (name or number):  
3. RT (number):   
4. Household code (given by supervisor):   
5. Name of the current household head:  
6. Name of the current respondent:  
7. Was the household interviewed in 2012? (If 
no, go to question 14) 
Yes/No 
8. Name of household head in 2012:  
9. Did the household head change since 2012? Yes/No 
10. Name of respondent in 2012:  
11. Did the respondent change since 2012? Yes/No 
12. Why did the respondent change? (Code A)  
13. Did the household change place of 
residence after 2012? 
Yes/No 
14. GPS co-ordinates of the household :  …………….….S; …………..…. E;………....…Alt 
15. Mobile phone numbers:  Primary: 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
16. Distance from the household‟s dwelling to 
the nearest market /trading center (km) 
 
17. Household interviewed by other sub-
projects? 
C01:   Yes / No B09:   Yes / No 
18. Interviewer (name):  
19. Supervisor (name):  
20. Date of interview: ...../ ...../ 2015 Enumerator‟s signature:  
21. Date questionnaire was checked by 
supervisor:  
...../ ...../ 2015 Supervisor‟s signature: 
 
Code A: currently out of village = 1; moved out of the household = 2; passed away = 3; others 
(specify) = 4. 
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2. General farm data  
2.1 Cropping activities  
What kind of crops are you currently growing on your farm:  
 Area under cultivation (ha)  For how much of this land (ha), you 
have  
In 2012 
 
In 2015 Systematic 
certificate  
Sporadic 
certificate 
1. Oil palm  (total)     
a. Oil palm (independent)     
b. Oil palm (under contract)     
2. Plantation and jungle rubber (total)     
a. Plantation and jungle rubber 
(independent) 
    
b. Plantation and jungle rubber 
(under contract) 
    
3. Other plantation crops 1: 
_________________ 
    
4. Other plantation crops 2: 
_________________ 
    
5. Other plantation crops 3: 
_________________ 
    
6. Homestead and kitchen garden  
 
    
7. Rice 
 
    
8. Other annual crop 1: 
_________________ 
    
9. Other annual crop 2: 
_________________ 
    
10. Other annual crop 3: 
_________________ 
    
11. Fallow land (no cultivation in last 12 
months) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Land ownership and management 
1a. In the last 12 months, did you own any 
land, which is cultivated by some other 
household? (e.g., sharecropping as landlord) 
 
 
(Land should be included in table 2.1) 
 
Yes/No 
If yes, under output sharing?.......... Yes/No 
If yes, share of harvest received as rent:…………..% 
Size of land under output sharing:…………   ha 
If no, rent you received for renting out:………..Rp „000/ha/year 
Size of land under rent arrangements:………   ha 
1b. In the last 12 months, did you own any 
land, which is cultivated by a company? 
 
Yes/No 
If yes:   
Size of such land: …………   ha 
Rent you received for renting out:…………… „000/ha/year. 
2. In the last 12 months, did you cultivate 
any land together with another farmer or 
group of farmers or co-operative society?  
(Collective farming) 
Yes/No 
If yes:  
Total land under this arrangement:………  ha 
How much of the land you own is under this arrangement? …… ha 
No. of farmers in the group: …………   
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3a. In the last 12 months, did you cultivate 
any land, owned by others? (e.g., sharecropping 
as tenant) 
 
 
(Land should not be included in table 2.1) 
 
Yes/No 
If yes, under output sharing?.......... Yes/No 
If yes, share of harvest received as wage:………..% 
Size of land under output sharing:…………   ha 
If no, rent you paid for renting in:……………..Rp „000/ha/year. 
Size of land under rent arrangement:………   ha 
3b. In 2012, did you cultivate any land, 
owned by others? (e g. sharecropping as laborer) 
 
 
(Land should not be included in table 2.1) 
 
Yes/No If yes, under output sharing?.......... Yes/No 
If yes, share of harvest received as wage:…………..% 
Size of land under output sharing:…………   ha 
If no, rent you paid for renting in:…………….. Rp „000/ha/year 
Size of land under rent arrangements:………   ha 
 
3. History of crop cultivation   
3.1 Migration (ONLY FOR NEWLY ADDED FARMERS, OTHERWISE CONTINUE 
TO 3.2) 
a. Did the household migrate from somewhere to this village? ……. (Yes/No) (If no, go to 3.2).  
b. If yes, did the household migrate as part of transmigrant program? …………… (Yes/No) 
c. If yes, the crop associated with transmigrant program: Oil palm/ Rubber/Others (specify):…….. 
Details of starting of cultivation and contract for transmigrant households: 
1. When did the household migrate to the village? (Year)   
2. Who was the head of the household at the time of migration? (Code A)  
3. If you were not the head of household at time of migration, age of the 
household head at that time (Years) 
 
4. The place from where the household migrated to this village? (Code B)  
5. What was the major source of income for the household before migration? 
(Code C) 
 
6. What was your household size before migration? (number of household 
members) 
 
7. How many of your family members…. (number)   
a. Came to this village in your group of migration? (including respondent)  
b. Arrived in this village after you came? (exclude the members born here)  
8. Was there a house already built for you in this village (e.g. by the government)?  Yes / No  
9. What was the size of land provided by 
government as part of the transmigrant 
program? 
a. Plantation (ha)                  
b. Food crops (ha)  
c. Housing (m2)  
10. Number of years you obtained livelihood assistance (food, cloths etc.) from 
government? 
 
Code A: current HH head = 1, father/mother of current HH head = 2; grandparent of current HH 
head = 3; brother/sister of current HH head = 4; other (specify )= 5 
Code B: Other part of Jambi = 1; Java = 2; North Sumatra = 3; South Sumatra = 4; Kalimantan = 
5; Sulawesi = 6; others (specify) = 7   
Code C: crops = 1; fisheries and livestock = 2; wage labour = 3; small business = 4; others (specify) 
= 5  
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3.2. Household details at plantation start (Do not include the crop covered under 
transmigrant program. But if a transmigrant household started another crop later, that 
information should be included in this table.)  
 Oil palm Plantation 
or jungle 
rubber 
1. Have you ever cultivated the crop? (If no, go to next column) Yes / No  Yes / No  
a. Was the household already interviewed in 2012? (If no, go to 
question 2) 
Yes / No  Yes / No  
b. Have you started cultivating the crop after 2012? (If no, go to 
next column) 
Yes / No  Yes / No  
2. When did the household start cultivating the crop? (Year)   
3. Which of your family members first started the cultivation/ 
obtained the plantation? (Code A) (If Code A=1 go to question 5) 
  
4. If some other household member (and not the current head) 
started the plantation, then:   
  
a. Relation of that member with the current household head 
(Code B) 
  
b. Age of this member at starting of the estate (Years)      
c. Gender of this household member (male =0, female = 1)   
d. Education of this member when the estate was started (Years in 
school): 
  
e. Was he/she residing in this village for all his/her life?  Yes / No Yes / No 
f. If no, when did he/she migrate to this village (Year)   
5. Was the whole estate planted by the household? (If yes, go to 
question 6) 
Yes / No Yes / No 
a. Size of the estate that was not established by household (ha)    
b. Number of oil palm / rubber trees already existing in that field    
c. What was the average age of trees?  (years)   
6. Before the plantation was started,   
a. How many adult family members were there in your household 
(number)?  
  
b. How much land did your household have under cultivation? 
(ha) 
  
c. For how much of this land did your household have a land 
title? (ha) 
  
d. Were any of your relatives already cultivating the crop? Yes / No Yes / No 
e. How many of the other farmer households in your 
neighborhood/RT started the cultivation before you? (number) 
  
7. Total number of households in the neighborhood/ RT at that 
point of time? 
  
 Please go to 
next column 
Please go to     
next table 
Code A: current HH head = 1; previous HH head = 2; acquired through marriage = 3; others 
(specify) = 4 
Code B: father/mother =1; grandparent = 2; brother = 3; in-laws = 4; others (specify) = 5 
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3.3. Oil palm   
 If the farmer ever cultivated oil palm (If not, go to 3.4.):  
a. Area under oil palm in 2012:…………. ha  
b. How many hectares do you have today? ……………. ha 
 If newly added farmer: 
c. With how many hectares did you start cultivation? ………………….ha 
d. How many times was the area under this crop changed from the start of cultivation until 
today? …… 
 If the farmer was already interviewed in 2012:  
e. How many times the area under the crop was changed after 2012 until today? ………times (if 
0, go to 3.4) 
Details of changes (changes after 2012 for farmers interviewed in 2012; all changes for newly 
added farmers):  
 Starting 
or 2012 
Change 
1 
Change 
2 
Change 
3 
1. What was the size of land under oil palm at the beginning OR 
after the change (ha)? 
    
2. Nature of change (Expansion=1; Reduction=2)     
3. When did the farmer start cultivating/ changed the area under the 
crop? (Year) 
    
4. How did this change in land area happened? (Code A)     
a. If Code 
A = 1 
or 2  
Land area (ha) purchased/sold      
Land price paid/received („000 Rp/ha)     
b. If Code A =1 or 3, what crops/plants were there on the land 
when converted? (Code B) 
    
c. If Code A =6, 7 or 8, what crops/plants were there on the land 
when land was received? (Code B)  
    
d. If Code A =7 or 8, which year did you got the land title in your 
name? (NA if not obtained so far).  
    
5. Total plantation establishment costs per ha  („000 Rp/ha; 
excluding the land price; only for clearing the land and planting 
the seedlings) 
    
6. How did you organize the investment amount (land price + 
conversion cost)? (Code C) (If Code C is not 2 go to question 7) 
    
a. Source(s) of this credit? (Code D)     
b. Amount of credit („000 Rp)     
c. (Prescribed) duration of the credit (months)     
d. Interest rate (% annual)     
e. Repayment completed? (Yes/No)       
f. Year of last payment     
In case of reduction of land area     
7. Why was plantation size reduced? (Code E)     
a. If Code E =4, was there a conflict associated?  Yes/ No Yes/ No Yes/ No 
b. If Code E = 3, what was the total amount compensation 
obtained („000 Rp) 
    
Code A: purchasing = 1; selling = 2; converted from/to other crops = 3; conversion from forest = 4; obtained as part 
of a government program (e.g.“transmigransi”) = 5; established plantation obtained from company=6; inherited = 7; 
received as gift = 8; others (specify) = 9 
Code B: oil palm = 1; plantation rubber = 2; jungle rubber = 3; other plantation = 4; annual crops (specify) = 5; 
grassland=6; forest=7; bush =8; others (specify) = 9 
Code C: savings = 1; credit = 2; parents/spouse = 3; no need to pay at the beginning = 4; others (specify) = 5 
Code D: banks = 1; private company = 2; money lender = 3; friends/relatives = 4; farmer cooperative = 5; other 
farmers =6; others (specify) = 7   
Code E: land sold=1; land contracted out to other family = 2; land submitted to a company = 3; land lost without 
compensation=4; land given away to other family member or relative = 5; other (specify) = 6
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3.4. Plantation and Jungle Rubber   
 If the farmer ever cultivated rubber (If not, go to 3.5.):  
a. Area under rubber in 2012:…………. ha  
b. How many hectares do you have today? ……………. ha 
 If newly added farmer: 
c. With how many hectares did you start cultivation? ………………….ha 
d. How many times was the area under this crop changed from the start of cultivation until 
today? …… 
 If the farmer was already interviewed in 2012:  
e. How many times the area under the crop was changed after 2012 until today? ………times (if 
0, go to 3.5) 
Details of changes (changes after 2012 for farmers interviewed in 2012; all changes for newly 
added farmers):  
 Starting 
or 2012 
Change 
1 
Change 
2 
Change 
3 
1. What was the size of land under rubber (plantation and jungle) at 
the beginning OR after the change (ha)? 
    
2. Nature of change (Expansion=1; Reduction=2)     
3. When did the farmer start cultivating/ changed the area under the 
crop? (Year) 
    
4. How did this change in land area happened? (Code A)     
a. If Code 
A = 1 
or 2  
Land area (ha) purchased/sold      
Land price paid/received („000 Rp/ha)     
b. If Code A =1 or 3, what crops/plants were there on the land 
when converted? (Code B) 
    
c. If Code A =6, 7 or 8, what crops/plants were there on the land 
when land was received? (Code B)  
    
d. If Code A =7 or 8, which year did you got the land title in your 
name? (NA if not obtained so far).  
    
5. Total plantation establishment costs per ha  („000 Rp/ha; 
excluding the land price; only for clearing the land and planting 
the seedlings) 
    
6. How did you organize the investment amount (land price + 
conversion cost)? (Code C) (If Code C is not 2 go to question 7) 
    
a.     Source(s) of this credit? (Code D)     
b. Amount of credit („000 Rp)     
c. (Prescribed) duration of the credit (months)     
d. Interest rate (% annual)     
e. Repayment completed? (Yes/No)       
f. Year of last payment     
In case of reduction of land area     
7. Why was plantation size reduced? (Code E)     
a. If Code E =4, was there a conflict associated?  Yes/ No Yes/ No Yes/ No 
b. If Code E = 3, what was the total amount compensation 
obtained („000 Rp) 
    
Code A: purchasing = 1; selling = 2; converted from/to other crops = 3; conversion from forest = 4; obtained as part 
of a government programme (e.g.“transmigransi”) = 5; established plantation obtained from company=6; inherited = 
7; received as gift = 8; others (specify) = 9 
Code B: oil palm = 1; plantation rubber = 2; jungle rubber = 3; other plantation = 4; annual crops (specify) = 5; 
grassland=6; forest=7; bush =8; others (specify) = 9 
Code C: savings = 1; credit = 2; parents/spouse = 3; no need to pay at the beginning = 4; others (specify) = 5 
Code D: banks = 1; private company = 2; money lender = 3; friends/relatives = 4; farmer cooperative = 5; other 
farmers =6; others (specify) = 7   
Code E: land sold=1; land contracted out to other family = 2; land submitted to a company = 3; land lost without 
compensation=4; land given away to other family member or relative = 5; other (specify) = 6 
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3.5. Changes in area under other crops (from the establishment of household) 
a. Kitchen garden  
Have you ever maintained a kitchen garden? ……………… (Yes/No). (If no, go to next table) 
 Starting Change 1 Change 
2 
Change 
3 
1. What was the size of land under these crops at the beginning OR 
after the change (ha)? 
    
2. Nature of change (Expansion=1; Reduction=2)     
3. When did the farmer start cultivating/ changed the area under the 
crop? (Year) 
    
4. How did this change in land area happened? (Code A)     
a. If Code A =1 or 3, what crops/plants were there on the 
land when converted? (Code B) 
    
b. If Code A =6, 7 or 8, what crops/plants were there on 
the land when land was received? (Code B)  
    
How many % of the area are productive now :…………..… 
How many % of the area were productive three years ago :…………..… 
How many % of the area were productive ten years ago :…………..… 
 
b. Homestead garden       
Have you ever maintained a homestead garden? ……………… (Yes/No). (If no, go to next table) 
 Starting Change 
1 
Change 
2 
Change 
3 
1. What was the size of land under these crops at the beginning OR 
after the change (ha)? 
    
2. Nature of change (Expansion=1; Reduction=2)     
3. When did the farmer start cultivating/ changed the area under the 
crop? (Year) 
    
4. How did this change in land area happened? (Code A)     
a. If Code A =1 or 3, what crops/plants were there on the 
land when converted? (Code B) 
    
b. If Code A =6, 7 or 8, what crops/plants were there on the 
land when land was received? (Code B)  
    
How many % of the area are productive now :…………..… 
How many % of the area were productive three years ago :…………..… 
How many % of the area were productive ten years ago :…………..… 
 
c. Other annual and perennial crops  
    Have you ever maintained other annual and perennial crops? ……………… (Yes/No). (If no, go to next 
table) 
 Starting Change  
1 
Change 
2 
Change 
3 
1. What was the size of land under the crop at the beginning OR after 
the change (ha)? 
    
2. Nature of change (Expansion=1; Reduction=2)     
3. When did the farmer start cultivating/ changed the area under the 
crop? (Year) 
    
4. How did this change in land area happened? (Code A)     
a. If Code A =1 or 3, what crops/plants were there on the 
land when converted? (Code B) 
    
b. If Code A =6, 7 or 8, what crops/plants were there on 
the land when land was received? (Code B)  
    
How many % of the area are productive now :…………..… 
How many % of the area were productive three years ago :…………..… 
How many % of the area were productive ten years ago :…………..… 
 
Code A: purchasing = 1; selling = 2; converted from/to other crops = 3; conversion from forest = 4; obtained as part 
of a government programme (e.g. “transmigransi”) = 5; established plantation obtained from company=6; inherited = 
7; received as gift = 8; others (specify) = 9 
Code B: oil palm = 1; plantation rubber = 2; jungle rubber = 3; other plantation = 4; annual crops (specify) = 5; 
grassland=6; forest=7; bush =8; others (specify) = 9 
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3.6 Information and institutional context of smallholder plantation (Complete the columns irrespective of whether the farmer cultivates this crop) 
 Oil palm 
 
Plantation & Jungle Rubber 
1. Have you or any of the household members ever associated with the crop as a trader 
or laborer?  
Yes/ No 
(If no, go to next column) 
Yes/ No 
(If no, go to next table) 
a. If yes, how or in what context?  Trader / Laborer / Both Trader / Laborer / Both 
If involved as a trader:   
b. In which year did you/ household member start associating with the crop as a 
trader? 
  
c. In which year did you/ household member stop associating with the crop as a 
trader? 
(Put NA if still working as trader) 
  
If involved as a laborer:   
d. Were you/household member associated as a laborer/tenant in a sharecropping or 
a wage arrangement?  
Sharecropping / Wage / Both Sharecropping / Wage  / Both 
    If involved as a wage laborer:   
e. In which year did you/household member start associating with the crop as a wage 
laborer? 
  
f. In which year did you/household member stop associating with the crop as a wage 
laborer? 
(Put NA if still working as laborer) 
  
If involved as a sharecropping tenant:   
g. In which year did you/household member start associating with the crop as a 
tenant? 
  
h. In which year did you/household member stop associating with the crop as a 
tenant? 
(Put NA if still working as laborer) 
  
2. In 1992 or at the time of household establishment (whichever is recent) did any of 
your close relatives cultivate the crop? 
Yes/No Yes/No 
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4. Cost of cultivation of all crops cultivated during the last 12 months (including the kitchen garden) 
a. How many permanent laborers are employed on your farm? ……………………. (number) 
b. Wages paid per month: ………………..  („000 Rp/month) 
Crop name Perennials Annuals Home-
stead 
and 
kitchen 
garden  
Oil palm Rubber 
(plantation 
+ jungle) 
Other 
1 
Other 
2 
Other 
3 
Crop 
1 
Crop 
2 
Crop 
3 
Crop 
4 
1. Name of the main crop (if an annual crop is cultivated in more 
than one season, consider it as an additional crop) 
          
2. Which household members are more involved in crop 
management, like selecting varieties, choosing fertilizers etc.  
      (Male = 1; Female = 2; Both equally = 3.) 
          
3. Total area under cultivation under this crop (ha)           
4. Area under production (ha)           
5. Area under share-cropping (ha)           
6. If yes, which share does the farmer receive?           
7. Do you intercrop the plots? (If no, go to question 13) Yes/ 
No 
Yes/ 
No 
Yes/ 
No 
Yes/ 
No 
Yes/ 
No 
Yes/
No 
Yes/
No 
Yes/
No 
Yes/
No 
 
8. If yes, number of intercrops (report number of types of crops in 
homestead and kitchen farm)  
          
9. Area under intercropping (ha)           
10. Names of major intercrops (different plants/trees in case of 
homestead farming)  
1           
2           
3           
11. Intercrop 1             
a. Number of harvests during last 12 months           
b. Quantity (kg) produced during last 12 months            
c. Quantity (kg) marketed           
d. Avg. price received during last 12 months („000 Rp/kg)           
12. Intercrop 2            
a. Number of harvests during last 12 months           
b. Quantity (kg) produced during last 12 months            
c. Quantity (kg) marketed           
d. Avg. price received during last 12 months („000 Rp/kg)           
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Crop name Perennials Annuals Home-
stead 
and 
Kitchen 
garden 
 
Oil palm Rubber 
(plantation 
+ jungle) 
Other 
1 
Other 
2 
Other 
3 
Crop 
1 
Crop 
2 
Crop 
3 
Crop 
4 
13. Intercrop 3                 
a. Number of harvests during last 12 months           
b. Quantity (kg) produced during last 12 months            
c. Quantity (kg) marketed           
d. Avg. price received during last 12 months („000 Rp/kg)           
14. Main Crop           
a. Number of harvests during last 12 months           
b. Quantity (kg) produced during last 12 months            
c. Quantity (kg) marketed           
d. Avg. price received during last 12 months („000 Rp/kg)           
15. Quantity of inputs applied for the crop plots (quantity/season 
for annuals and quantity/year for perennials) for all main and 
inter-crops in last 12 months* 
          
a. Seeds/Seedlings („000 Rp spent by household)           
b. Manures („000 Rp spent by household)           
c. Chemical fertilizers („000 Rp spent by household)           
d. Pesticides („000 Rp spent by household)           
e. Herbicides („000 Rp spent by household)           
f. Hired male and female labour on daily basis  („000 Rp spent 
by household) 
          
g. Hired animal/machine labour („000 Rp. spent by household)           
* Remember that we are not asking for the total cost of inputs/labour used for the crop, but the actual amount spent by the household for the crop. In case of 
sharecropping, these two values may differ. 
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5. Plantation crops: Plot endowment and production relations  (Only OIL PALM / RUBBER) 
 
 
 
5.1. General plot information [A plot is defined as a piece of land under one crop, which is not spatially segmented and where the managerial practices are 
common and palms/trees are of approximately same age. Complete one column before going to the next.]. How many plots do you own?................................... 
 Research plot 1 Plot 2 (C01/B09) Plot 3 Plot 4 
1. Area of plot (ha)                                                                                       
2. Number of palms/trees in the plot     
3. Number of productive palms/trees in the plot     
4. Do you intercrop the plot? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
5. Ownership of land: Owned/Leased-in  Own/Lsd-in Own/Lsd-in Own/Lsd-in Own/Lsd-in 
6. Are you employing sharecropping tenants in this plot? (If no, go to question 7) Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
a. If yes, how many of farm households are involved? (number)     
b. When did this sharecropping arrangement start for this plot? (year)     
c. Does the sharecropping tenant belong to your ethnic group?  Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
d. Is the sharecropping tenant your close relative? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
e. Did you sign a written agreement before starting the sharecropping?  Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
f. Input cost (%) provided by your household     
g. Share of output (%) provided as wage     
h. Did the share of output provided as wage increase over last 3 years? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
i. If applicable, was the drop in rubber price the main reason for the increase? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
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 Research plot 1  Plot 2 (C01/B09) Plot 3 Plot 4 
7. Who is currently managing the plot? (Code A)39 (If Code A is 1 go to question 9)     
8. If entrusted someone else (e.g. plantation company, other farmer etc.):     
a. Monthly costs paid by household („000 Rp.)     
b. Monthly revenues obtained by household („000 Rp.)     
9. Is there a land title (certificate) for this land in your (or some other household 
member‟s) name, at present? (Code B) (If none go to question 10) 
    
a. If there is a land title or certificate in your (or some other household member‟s) 
name, do you have it with you at present (and not with other person/ 
institution, e.g. a credit institution)? 
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
b.  Was there a land title (for this plot when you obtained the land?              
(Code B)  
    
c. If the farmer ever applied for 
systematic certification for this plot 
(If the household had sporadic certificate earlier, 
only the details on converting sporadic to 
systematic be given) 
Year and Month of application 
(MM.YYYY) 
    
Year and Month of obtaining 
certificate at hand (MM.YYYY) 
(NA: if not available yet) 
    
Total costs of application („000 
Rp/plot) 
    
d. If the farmer ever applied for 
sporadic certification  
(Careful: Sometimes the farmers may have had 
sporadic certificate before having systematic 
certirficate) 
Year and Month of application 
(MM.YYYY) 
    
Year and Month of obtaining 
certificate at hand (MM.YYYY) 
(NA: if not available yet) 
    
Total costs of application („000 
Rp/plot) 
    
10. Was the plot purchased? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
a. If yes, year of purchase?     
b. If yes, from whom was the plot purchased? (Code C)     
c. What was the reason of the household for selling the land? (Code D)     
                                                 
  Code A: household = 1; entrusted to company = 2; entrusted to farmer cooperative = 3; other farmer =4; others = 5 (specify) 
  Code B: Yes, Systematic Certificate = 1; Yes, Sporadic certificate = 2; Yes, Letter from village head or Segal = 3; None = 4 
  Code C: migrant household= 1; transmigrant household = 2; autochonous household = 3. 
  Code D: Financial needs = 1; Migration = 2; Unproductive land = 3, Other (specifiy) = 4. 
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 Research plot 1 Plot 2 (C01/B09) Plot 3 Plot 4 
11. Was this plot self-established (that is, the household did not obtain an estate 
established by someone else)? (If no go to question 11) 
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
12. In case of self-establishment; year of establishment?      
13. In case plot was not established by the household, how did you acquire the plot? 
(Code E)40 
    
14. If at least part of the estate was not established by the household      
a. Year of procurement/purchase      
b. Number of palms/trees already existing in the plot     
c. Age of palms/trees at the time of procurement     
15. Year of first harvest ever     
16. Year of last replanting in the plot (put NA if never replanted).      
17. If replanted, year of first harvest after replanting (if harvesting is not started, 
indicate expected year of first harvest) 
    
18. Varieties grown (1 = Improved;  0 = Local)     
19. Distance from the plot to:     
a. Home (meters) Now     
At the time of establishment of plot     
b. Nearest road (meters) Now     
At the time of establishment of plot     
c. Nearest village center (meters) Now     
At the time of establishment of plot     
20. Have you noticed any land grabbing or land expropriation from any farmers 
by government, other farmers, plantation company near this plot? 
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
If yes, the year of occurrence of this event(s). A time period may be given 
(e.g., 1998-2001) if the event is occurring over time  
    
 
                                                 
Code E: transmigrant program = 1; other government program = 2; purchased from other farmers = 3; inherited = 4; obtained from company = 5; 
others (specify) = 6.   
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5.2. Product marketing: All productive plots of the crop   
a. Number of times output was sold during the last 12 months:……………………… (number) 
b. Through how many outlets the output was sold during last 12 months:……………. (number) 
c. During the last 12 months, from how many traders can you choose one for selling output: ……………………. (maximum number) 
Outlets where the 
output was sold in 
last 12 months 
(name) 
Type of 
outlet (Code 
A) 
Do you have 
a contract 
relation with 
outlet? 
% of output sold through 
this outlet during the last 
12 months 
Product transport to the outlet point  
in km  
(0 if purchased at farm- 
gate) 
mode of 
transportation 
(Code B) 
time taken for 
transportation (hours) 
1.  Yes/ No     
2.  Yes/ No     
3.  Yes/ No     
4.  Yes/ No     
5.  Yes/ No     
6.  Yes/ No     
Code A: private plantation = 1; government plantation = 2; private trader in village = 3; private trader outside village = 4; farmer group or cooperative 
= 5; others (specify) = 6 
Code B: farm-gate selling = 0; walking = 1; cycle = 2; ojek = 3; angkot = 4; bus = 5; truck = 6; tractor = 7; others (specify) = 8 
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6. Plot identification 
a. Did the farmer start to cultivate the crop after 2012 or is newly added?............(Yes/No)  [If farmer started to cultivate the crop 
after 2012 or the farmer is newly added use additional pages to report information on all new plots in chapter 5.2; 5.3 and 5.4 and proceed to 
section 6.1] 
 
b. Please let the farmer identify the plots with the data provided from all his plots.  
Research Plot: Size:……… ha; Age of plantation:…….. years; Distance from home:…………m 
Additional C01/B09/Research Plot: Size:……… ha; Age of plantation:…….. years; Distance from home:…………m 
Additional C01/B09/Research Plot: Size:……… ha; Age of plantation:…….. years; Distance from home:…………m 
Other Plot: Size:……… ha; Age of plantation:…….. years; Distance from home:…………m 
Other Plot: Size:……… ha; Age of plantation:…….. years; Distance from home:…………m 
Other Plot:: Size:……… ha; Age of plantation:…….. years; Distance from home:…………m 
Other Plot:: Size:……… ha; Age of plantation:…….. years; Distance from home:…………m 
Other Plot:: Size:……… ha; Age of plantation:…….. years; Distance from home:…………m 
 
a. Did the farmer clearly identify the research plot? ……....(Yes/No) 
b. If applicable, did the farmer clearly identify the additional C01/B09/Research plot? ……....(Yes/No) 
c. If applicable, did the farmer clearly identify the additional C01/B09/Research plot? ……....(Yes/No) 
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6.1. Input use during last 12 months: Research plot (Report only data from the identified research plot) 
Inputs  in  research plot 1. Name of 
input 
2. Number 
of times 
used 
 
3. Unit of 
measurement 
 
5. Quantity used 
(QU/plot/year) (report in 
total and not per times) 
 
6. Average price of input as used 
during last 12 months („000 
Rp/Unit) 
1. Seedlings (I planting)*   Number   
2. Seedlings (replanting)*   Number    
3. Manure: Plant waste   kg   
4. Manure: Animal waste   kg   
5. Soil amendments  Lime / Gypsum  kg   
6. Chemical fertilizers    kg   
  kg   
  kg   
  kg   
  kg   
7. Herbicides    litres   
  litres   
  litres   
8. Pesticides   litres   
  litres   
  litres   
9. Irrigation (excl. labour cost)   „000 Rp   
10. Machinery    „000 Rp / liter   
11. Input transport   „000 Rp / liter   
12. Output transport    „000 Rp /liter   
13. Materials for output processing 
in rubber 
  „000 Rp   
14. Others (specify)   „000 Rp   
*only if planting or replanting was done during the last 12 months 
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6.2. Labor use during last 12 months: Research plot 
 Labour use  in  research 
plot 
1.a Rainy season 1.b Dry season 2. 
Average 
working 
hours 
per day 
3. 
Contracted 
out the 
operation? 
(Yes = 1/ 
No = 0) 
4. If 
contracted 
out, cost of 
operation 
(„000 Rp) 
5. If not 
contracted out, 
hired laborers/ 
operation 
(number) 
6. Wage rate 
(„000 Rp/worker 
day)  
(put sc if 
sharecropping) 
7. Family 
members 
involved/ 
operation 
(number) 
# of 
opera
-tions 
Days  
per 
operation 
# of 
opera
-tions 
Days 
per 
operation 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
1. Land clearing for planting              
2. Other pre-planting activities              
3. Taking pits for planting              
4. Seedling transportation              
5. Planting               
6. Replanting              
7. Manure application              
8. Fertilizer application               
9. Chemical weeding on the 
ground 
             
10. Manual weeding on the 
ground 
             
12. Manual weeding on trees               
13. Chemical weeding on trees              
14. Pesticide application              
16. Irrigation              
17. Intercultural operations 
(esp. for soil improvement) 
             
18.  Tapping (only for rubber)              
19. Harvesting               
20. Processing of product              
21. Transportation to market              
22. Marketing               
23. Cutting leaves of oil palm              
24.  Others (specify)              
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6.3. Average harvested quantity in the last 12 months: Research plot 
Season of year   1. Frequency of 
harvests (once in 
how many days?) 
2. Quantity harvested 
per month from this 
plot (kg/plot) 
3. Average price obtained 
for output in that season                  
(„000 Rp/kg) 
1. Dry season   (June to November) 
 
   
2. Rainy season (December to May) 
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7. Shock events  
7.1. Shock events during the last 3 years: For all plots and crops and livestock 
a. Did you suffer from any shocks (e.g. drought, flood, pest) concerning your agricultural 
activities during the last three years?................ (Yes/No)  (If no, go to next table) 
 1. Did the 
specific shock 
occur in the 
last three years?  
2. Year and 
month of 
the shock 
event‟s start  
(MM.YYYY) 
3. Year and 
month of the 
shock event‟s 
end 
(MM.YYYY) 
4. Which 
plots were 
affected?  
(Code A) 
(Multiple 
answers 
possible) 
5. How much 
of your total 
harvest/ 
livestock did 
you lose in 
total over the 
whole shock 
period? (%) 
1. Drought Yes/No     
2. Too much rain (Flood) Yes/No     
3. Late rain Yes/No     
4. Fire Yes/No     
5. Theft (Eg: Livestock or crops) Yes/No     
6. Crop pest/disease Yes/No     
7. Livestock disease Yes/No     
8. Critical illness or demise of 
HH members 
Yes/No     
9. Other……………. Yes/No     
Code A: Main plot reported for oil palm = 1; Main plot reported for rubber = 2; Additionally reported 
core/C01/B09 plot = 3; Other plot = 4.  
 
7.2. Rubber price shock 
Does the household cultivate rubber? …………… (Yes/No) (If no, go to next table) 
Since 2012 the price of rubber decreased drastically, how did your 
  household react to the decrease in income? 
(PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT THESE EVENTS HAPPENED AS A RESPONSE TO THE 
REDUCTION IN THE RUBBER PRICE) 
 
1. Did you decrease your household savings due to income loss from rubber? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
2. Did you sell land to get additional money to cover the income loss? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
3. Did you apply for more credit (from bank, family or friends) to cover the income loss from 
rubber? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
4. Did you change some of your plantation from rubber to oil palm? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
5. Did you open up new plantations to cover the income loss from rubber?  (0=No; 1=Yes)  
a. If yes, did this include deforestation? (0=No; 1=Yes)´ 
b. If yes, did you purchase the land? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
6. Did you start or increase wage labour to cover the income loss from rubber? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
a. If yes, did you start working in an oil palm plantation or company? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
7. Did you open an own business to cover the income loss from rubber? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
8. Did you stop tapping the rubber trees? (0=No; 1=Yes)  
a. If stopped tapping, for which period did you stop tapping the rubber trees?  
(MM.YY – MM.YY)  
b. If stopped tapping, at which price did you stop tapping rubber? („000 Rp/kg)  
c. If stopped tapping, at which price did/would you start again tapping rubber? („000 Rp/kg)  
9. Did you reduce the use of farm inputs? (e.g. fertilizer, herbicides) (0=No; 1=Yes)  
10. Did you apply any other measures to address income loss from rubber price reduction? Specify 
(…………………………………………….)(0=No; 1=Yes)  
HH number: ...................................                                                                                                                                                          Section 3 
147 
 
8. Forest dependent activities (Include all the timber and non-timber products your household collects or used to collect)  
1. Forest product 
collected 
2. How often 
do you collect 
it or do it? 
(Once in how 
many days) 
3. How many 
members of 
your HH are 
involved in 
collection 
(number) 
4. How many 
other 
households are 
involved in this 
activity? 
(number) 
5. Quantity 
obtained during 
last 12 months  
6. Quantity sold 
during last 12 
months  
7. Average 
price obtained 
(000 Rp/Unit) 
during last 12 
months 
8. Share of 
revenue (%) for 
your household if 
more than 1 
households are 
involved 
a.  
Quantity 
b.  
Unit 
a. 
Quantity 
b. 
Unit 
Timber          
Honey           
Firewood          
Hunting birds in forest          
Other hunting          
Other:…………          
 
 
9. Caged/singing bird questions 
 Did you collect any caged (singing) birds in the last 12 months? .......... (Yes/No) 
 Is any of your household members breeding singing birds?.................... (Yes/No) 
 Are you keeping any caged (singing) birds now in the house? .......... (Yes/No) 
 If yes, name of bird type and number. 
Name 1:……………………………….. (number = …..); Name 2:……………………………….. (number = …..) 
Name 3:……………………………….. (number = …..); Name 4:……………………………….. (number = …..) 
 Were you keeping any other species of caged (singing) birds in the last 3 years? .......... (Yes/No) 
 If yes, name of bird type.. 
Name 1:……………………………….. ; Name 2:………………………………..  
Name 3:……………………………….. ; Name 4:………………………………..  
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10. Livestock production 
a. Animals possessed and produced by the household during the last 
12 months 
  
 
Cow/ 
Buffalo/ 
Bullock 
Goat/ 
Sheep  
Poultry 
1. Did you own any of these livestock in the last 12 months? (If 
no, go to next column or table) 
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
2. Which household members are more involved in livestock 
management (1 = Male; 2 = Female; 3 = Both equally) 
   
3. How many heads do you own at this point of time? (number)    
4. If you were to sell all of them today, how much money 
would you receive? („000 Rp)  
   
5. If sold in 
last 12 
months 
a. Number of animals sold    
b. Amount obtained in total from sale(s) 
(„000 Rp) 
   
6. Animals you 
consumed 
as meat in 
last 12 
months?  
c. Number of animals/birds    
b. Total quantity of meat consumed (kg)    
c. Market price of meat („000 Rp/kg)    
7. How many animals did you give to someone as gift in the last 
12 months? (number) 
   
8. How many died or were lost during the last 12 months? 
(number) 
   
9. If purchased 
in last 12 
months 
a. Number of animals purchased     
b. Total amount spent for purchasing („000 
Rp) 
   
10. How many were born on your farm during the last 12 
months? (number) 
   
11. How many animals did you receive as gift during the last 12 
months? (number) 
   
12. The main product     
a. Name of the main product    
b. Quantity (Unit) produced during last 12 months     
c. Quantity (Unit) marketed during last 12 months    
d. Avg. price received during last 12 months („000 
Rp/Unit) 
   
e. Unit (Used for Questions b. c. d.) (e.g. kg, number)    
13. The byproduct     
a. Name of the byproduct    
b. Quantity (Unit) produced during last 12 months     
c. Quantity (Unit) marketed during last 12 months    
d. Avg. price received during last 12 months („000 
Rp/Unit) 
   
e. Unit (Used for Questions b. c. d.) (e.g. kg, number)    
14. Total feed cost during last 12 months („000 Rp spent by the 
household) 
   
15. Total hired labour cost during last 12 months („000 Rp spent 
by the household) 
   
16. Total other input cost during last 12 months („000 Rp spent 
by the household) 
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    b. Fish culture during the last 12 months 
1. Have you been involved in fish culture in the last 12 months? 
(If no, go to next table) 
Yes/No 
2. Which household members are more involved in fish culture  
(1 = Male, 2 = Female; 3 = Both equally) 
 
3. Number of households involved in fish cultivation (if done 
jointly with others)? 
 
4. Number of ponds under cultivation  
5. Total size of all fish ponds under cultivation (m²)   
 Fish type 1 Fish type 2 Fish type 3 
6. Name of major fish types being grown    
7. How many times did you harvest during the last 12 months?    
8. What is the average quantity of fish obtained per harvest (kg)?    
9. Did you sell fish? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
10. Amount of fish sold during last 12 months (kg)?    
11. If sold, average price obtained („000 Rp/kg)?    
12. How much did you spend on fish feed during the last 12 
months („000 Rp)? 
 
13. How much did you spend on non-feed materials during the last 
12 months („000 Rp)? 
 
14. How much did you pay for hired labour during last 12 months 
(„000 Rp)? 
 
 
 
 c. Fishing during the last 12 months 
1. Apart from fish pond cultivation, do you or any of your HH members go 
fishing? 
Yes/No 
(if no, go to next table) 
2. How many of your HH members go for fishing? (number)   
3. Are female household members involved in fishing?  Yes/No 
4. How often do you or your HH members go fishing? (once in …..days)  
5. How much time do you spend on average when you go fishing (hours/day)?   
6. What is the quantity of fish you obtain in an average month? (kg)  
7. What is the quantity of fish you sell in an average month? (kg)  
8. How much money did you receive from fishing in an average month? („000 
Rp) 
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11. Credit and Savings 
11.1.  Formal credit institutions  
a. Have you taken or payed back credit during the last 12 months from a bank, farmer group or 
cooperative?........ (Yes/No)     
b. If yes, type of the institute ………… (Code: Bank = 1; farmer group = 2; farmer cooperative 
= 3, Other = 4)  
c. If no, what was the main reason for not taking credit? …………  
[Code: Not required or necessary = 1; Can easily obtain from friends or family = 2; It is difficult 
to get = 3; High interest rate = 4; No land title to pledge to get credit = 5; It is morally wrong to 
take credit = 6;           Others = 7 (specify:…………………………)] 
If credit was taken or being paid back in the last 12 months from a bank/farmer 
group/cooperative/other formal groups:  
 1. Bank 2.Coopera
tive 
3. Farmer 
group 
4. Others 
1. Amount taken („000 Rp)                                           
2. In which of the 
household members‟ 
name the credit was taken  
a. Relationship with 
HoH (Code A) 
    
b. Gender (Code B)     
3. Date of obtaining credit (DD/MM/YY)     
Interest payment     
4. If interest rate:    Rate of interest (% annual)       
5. If fixed amount: a. Amount per time („000 Rp)     
b. Number of times per year     
6. Repayment period (months)     
7. % of credit used for consumption     
8. % of credit used for farming     
9. If used for farming,      
     a.    % used for oil palm     
b. % used for rubber     
10. Did you have to submit your land 
title/certificate to get the credit? 
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
11. Did you have to submit your house 
title/certificate to get the credit? 
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
Code A: household head or wife = 1; son or daughter=2; father or mother=3; 
grandchild=4; mother or father in law=5; son or daughter in law=6; brother/sister = 7; 
other relative=8; non-relative=9.  
Code B: male = 1; female = 2. 
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11.2 Informal credit sources 
a. Have you taken credit payed back credit during the last 12 months from other households/ 
trader/ input dealer? ………..     (Yes/ No)  
b. If yes, type of the institute ………… (Code: Other household = 1; Trader = 2; Input dealer 
= 3)  
c. If no, what was the main reason for not taking credit? …………  
[Code: Not required or necessary = 1; Can easily obtain from banks or other formal source = 2; 
It is difficult to get = 3; High interest rate = 4; No land title to pledge to get credit = 5; It is 
morally wrong to take credit = 6; Others = 7 (specify:…………………………)] 
 If credit was taken or being paid back in the last 12 months from trader/ dealer:  
 Traders of output 
Trader 1 Trader 2 Trader 3 
1. Name of the trader who provides credit     
2. In which household 
members‟ name the credit 
was taken  
a. Relationship with HoH 
(Code A) 
   
b. Gender (Code B)    
3. Output handled by the trader (Code C)     
4. Total credit amount taken in last 12 months („000 Rp)    
Interest payment    
5. If interest rate:    Rate of interest (% annual)  
  (Put 0 if no interest)  
   
6. If fixed amount: a. Amount per time („000 Rp)    
b. Number of times per year    
7. Mutually agreed repayment period (months)    
8. Does the repayment take place through a reduction in the 
product price (against repayment in cash)? 
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
9. % of credit used for consumption    
10. % of credit used for farming    
11. If used for farming,                              
a. % used for oil palm    
b. % used for rubber    
12. Did you have to submit your land title/certificate to 
get the credit? 
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
Code A: household head or wife = 1; son or daughter=2; father or mother=3; 
grandchild=4; mother or father in law=5; son or daughter in law=6; brother/sister = 7; 
other relative=8; non-relative=9.  
Code B: male = 1; female = 2. 
Code C: oil palm = 1; rubber = 2; rice = 3; other (specify) = 4 
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If credit was taken or being paid back in the last 12 months from other 
households/ other informal sources:  
 Other household (major credit sources) 
HH 1 HH 2 HH 3 HH 4 
1. Which of the household 
member took the initiative to 
obtain credit?  
a. Relationship with 
HoH (Code A) 
    
b. Gender (Code B)     
2. Total amount taken in last 12 months („000 Rp)     
Interest payment     
3. If interest rate:    Rate of interest (% annual)       
4. If fixed amount: a. Amount per time („000 Rp)     
b. Number of times per year     
5. Mutually agreed repayment period (months; NA if not 
fixed) 
    
6. His/her farm size (ha; 0 if non-farmer)     
7. Shortest distance between your farm and his/her farm 
(km; NA if not a farmer) 
    
8. Is she/he your relative or friend? Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
9. Does she/he belong to your village?  Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
10. Does she/he belong to your dusun? Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
11. What is the distance between your houses? (km)     
12. Do you both belong to same ethnic community? Yes/ No  Yes /No Yes / No Yes / No 
13. Did he/she borrow money from you in past 12 
months? 
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
14. % of credit used for consumption     
15. % of credit used for farming     
16. If used for farming,                    
a. % used for oil palm     
b. % used for rubber     
17. Did you have to submit your land title/certificate 
to get the credit? 
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No 
Code A: household head or wife = 1; son or daughter=2; father or mother=3; 
grandchild=4; mother or father in law=5; son or daughter in law=6; brother/sister = 7; 
other relative=8; non-relative=9.  
Code B: male = 1; female = 2; joint = 3. 
 
11.3 Savings 
 1. Bank 2.Co-
operative 
3. Chit 
fund 
4. Other: 
(……….) 
1. Do you have an account or are a member of this 
institution? 
Yes/No 
(If no, go to 
next column) 
Yes/No 
(If no, go to    
next column) 
Yes/No 
(If no, go to    
next column) 
Yes/No 
(If no, go to 
next table) 
 
2. Average amount of 
savings („000 Rp)    
                                    
a. At present     
b.    In 2012     
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12. Household characteristics 
12.1. Asset baseline 
a. When was the household established? …………. (year) 
 Number of items owned  
 in 1990 or time of household establishment (if 
established after 1990)? 
at this point of time 
1. Television  (colour)   
2. Satellite Dish   
3. Motorbike   
4. Car   
5. 4-wheel tractor    
6. Jeep/Truck   
7. Fridge   
8. Air conditioner (AC)   
9. Washing machine   
 
 
 
 
 
12.2. Asset accumulation   
a. Number of cellphones owned by the household in the present:………. 
 Number of items 
owned in last 25 years 
or from HH estabt.   
Year of 
ownership 
/purchase  
Purchase 
price  
(´000 Rp) 
Year 
sold/lost 
(Put NA if 
still owned) 
If was registered, under 
whose name? 
Relationship 
with HoH 
(Code A)41 
Gender 
(1 = male;  
2 = female) 
1. Television 
(colour) 
      
     
     
     
2. Satellite Dish       
     
     
     
     
3. Motorbike       
     
     
     
     
4. Car       
     
     
     
5. 4-wheel 
tractor 
      
     
     
                                                 
Code A: not registered=0; household head or wife = 1; son or daughter=2; father or mother=3; grandchild=4; mother 
or father in law=5; son or daughter in law=6; brother/sister = 7; other relative=8; non-relative=9. 
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 Number of items 
owned in last 25 years 
or from HH estabt.   
Year of 
ownership 
/purchase  
Purchase 
price  
(´000 Rp) 
Year 
sold/lost 
(Put NA if 
still owned) 
If was registered, under 
whose name? 
Relationship 
with HoH 
(Code A)41 
Gender 
(1 = male;  
2 = female) 
6. Jeep/Truck       
     
     
7. Fridge        
     
     
     
8. Air 
conditioner (AC) 
      
     
     
     
9. Washing 
machine 
      
     
     
     
Code A: not registered=0; household head or wife = 1; son or daughter=2; father or mother=3; grandchild=4; 
mother or father in law=5; son or daughter in law=6; brother/sister = 7; other relative=8; non-relative=9. 
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12.3. Housing  
a. Did you build or purchase a house in the last 25 years? …………….(Yes/No) 
b. If yes, in which year: ………….. 
1. a. What was the number of bedrooms in 1990 or at the time 
of household establishment? 
 
b. Number of bedrooms in main house now  
c. Year and number of room extension Year Number of added 
rooms 
  
  
  
2. a. What was the main floor material of the living room in 
1990 or at the time of household establishment? (Code A)  
 
b. Main floor material (of living room) now (Code A)  
c. If changed, year and type of change Year Type of change  
( X  Y) 
(Code A) 
  
  
3. a. What was the wall material of the living room in 1990 or 
at the time of household establishment? (Code B) 
 
b. Wall material (of living room) now (Code B)  
c. If changed, year and type of change Year Type of change 
 ( X  Y) 
(Code B) 
  
  
Code A: Tiles=1; Cement=2; Wood=3; Earth=4; Other (specify)=5. 
Code B: Un-plastered brick=1; Brick covered with cement=2; Brick with ceramics =3; Low quality wood=4, 
High quality wood (e.g. ornamentation)=5; Other(specify)=6. 
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12.4. Household member details  
Details of household members.  
a. Total members in the household staying in the house:……………….. (number) during the last 12 months.  
b. Religion of HoH: Muslim/ Christian/ Hindu/ Buddhist/ Others (specify: ………………………….) 
c. Ethnic group (specify):……………………………………………….. 
1. HH member 
(Relationship with HoH) 
2. 
Member 
ID 
3. Age 
(years) 
4. Sex 
(m/f) 
5. Marital status 
(married = 1, 
Unmarried = 0) 
6. Education (number 
of years in school and 
college) 
7. Last 
graduation 
(Code A)   
8. Main Occupations (Code B) 
a. Primary b. Secondary  
Respondent 1        
Head of household* 2        
 3        
 4        
 5        
 6        
 7        
 8        
 9        
 10        
 11        
 12        
 13        
 14        
 15        
* Do not fill this column if respondent is head of the household. Use more rows if household size is more than 15. 
Code A: never attended=1; attended but not completed=2; completed SD (primary)=3; completed SMP (Middle)=4;  completed SMA (High School)=5; 
D3 or S1 (Associates Degree or University level first stage)=6; student at present = 7; other (specify)=8.  
Code B: own-agriculture=1; wage or contract labour=2; own-business activities=3; still attending school=4; household activities=5; other (specify)=6.  
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b. Residency status of household members (Only ask if household is newly added to sample or household head got married after 2012) 
 1. Used to live in the 
village whole life?(Code A) 
2. If no, answer the following questions 
a. Year of migration to the village  b. From where moved to the village (Code B) 
Head of the household (HoH)    
Parents of the HoH    
Spouse of the HoH    
Parents of the spouse     
Code A: no = 0; yes = 1; never lived in the village = 2. 
Code B: outside village in Jambi = 1; outside Jambi, but in Sumatra = 2; outside Sumatra, but in Indonesia = 3; outside Indonesia = 4. 
13. Non-own agriculture household income sources 
13.1. Wage and contract labour  
a. Have any of your household members worked as a tenant in a sharecropping arrangement in the last 12 months? …………….  (Yes/No).  
If yes:  (i). Does the sharecropping landlord belong to your ethnic group? …………….  (Yes/No) 
          (ii). Is the sharecropping landlord your close relative? …………….  (Yes/No). 
          (iii). Did you sign a written agreement before starting the sharecropping? …………….  (Yes/No). 
          (iv). How much does your household (tenant) spend on inputs per month (e.g. fertilizer) for the sharecropped plots? ……(„000 Rp) 
b. Have any of your household members worked as daily laborer (daily /weekly / monthly payment of money), as contracted for work (fixed payment for specific 
jobs) or sharecropping tenants during the last 12 months? …………….  (Yes/No). (If no, please go to the next table) 
1. Member ID (from 
Table 12.4a) 
2. Type of 
activity 
(Code A) 
3. Type of 
payment 
(Code B) 
4. Seasonal 
(=0) or 
permanent 
(=1)? 
5. If permanent, 
wage rate („000 
Rp/month)* 
6. If seasonal 
a. No. of months 
worked 
in last 12 months 
b. No. of days 
engaged per work 
months 
c. Average amount 
earned/received during a 
month worked („000 Rp.) 
        
        
        
        
Code A: work in agriculture=1; work in forestry=2; work in manufacturing =3; work in services=4; government employee=5; other (specify)= 6 
Code B: per hour wage=1; daily wage=2; weekly wage=3; monthly wage=4; contract (fixed arrangement)= 6; other arrangement (specify)=7; share cropping 
arrangement as tenant=8.  
* Please estimate the monthly income (deducting the input costs) of household members working as sharecropping tenants  
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13.2. Own business activities 
 Did any of your household members gain any income from any type of own-business activities during the last 12 months?…………….  (Yes/No)  
(If no, please go to the next table)  
1. Type of 
enterprise 
or business 
(Code A) 
2. Shortly 
describe the type 
of business in 
words 
3. When 
started? 
(year) 
4. No. of 
family 
members 
engaged  
5. Household member 
who is mainly responsible 
for the business (ID from 
12.4a) 
6. Total hours a 
member worked  
in business on 
average per 
month? 
7. Total net amount 
(costs subtracted) 
earned from business 
per month on 
average? („000 Rp) 
8. Number of 
months the 
business was 
running during last 
12 months? 
        
        
        
        
Code A: shop=1; trading=2; restaurant (food)=3; hotel (stay)=4; chauffeur/driver=5; carpenter=6; construction worker=7; other (specify)=8.   
 
13.3. Public and private transfers 
 Have any of your household members benefited from some kind of public/NGO transfer program (given money in daily/weekly/ monthly basis) 
during the last 12 months? ………………….  (Yes/ No). (If no, please go to the next table) 
1.Member IDs 
(from 12.4a) 
2. Type of program 
(Code A) 
3. Who is providing the 
program? (Code B) 
4. What kind of benefits do you 
receive? (Code C) 
5. Estimated amount received 
during last 12 months („000 Rp.) 
     
     
     
Code A: pensions=1; education subsidies=2; health care benefits=3; poverty reduction program=4; others (specify) = 5.  
Code B: local government=1; federal government=2; NGO=3; other (specify)=4.  
Code C: cash=1; clothes=2; food=3; agricultural inputs =4; others (specify)=5.  
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13.4. Private transfers and remittances 
 Did your household sent any money to anybody (e.g. a family member, not included in 12.4a) staying outside the household during the last 12 
months? ………. (Yes/No).  
 Did anybody (e.g. a family member, not included in 12.4a) staying outside the household sent money to your household during the last 12 months? 
………. (Yes/No). (If no to both questions, go to next table.) 
1. If money is sent outside 2. If money is received from outside  3. Region where 
the sender or 
receiver resides 
(Code D) 
a. Receiver´s 
relation with your 
household head 
(Code A) 
b. 
Receiver´s 
Gender 
(Code B) 
c. Estimated amount 
sent during last 12 
months („000 Rp.) 
d. Main 
reasons for 
remittance     
(Code C) 
a. Sender´s  
relation with 
your household 
head (Code A) 
b. 
Sender´s 
Gender 
(Code B) 
c. Estimated 
amount received 
during last 12 
months („000 Rp.) 
d. Main 
reasons for 
remittance 
(Code C) 
Receiver Sender 
          
          
          
          
Code A: Son/daughter=1; father or mother=2; grandchild=3; mother or father in law=4; son or daughter in law=5; other relative=6; nonrelative=7.  
Code B: Male = 1; Female = 2.  
Code C: emergency spending = 1; financing education = 2; supporting livelihood = 3, other (specify) = 4. 
Code D: outside village in Jambi = 1; outside Jambi, but in Sumatra = 2; outside Sumatra, but in Indonesia = 3; Outside Indonesia = 4; same village=5. 
 
14. Membership in the village-level organizations in last 12 months 
1. Household member ID 
(see Table 12.4a) 
2. Name of 
organization  
3. Position in 
organization (other than 
being member) 
4. How many 
people  in the 
village participate? 
5. How often do you 
meet? (Code A) 
6. Describe functions of the 
organisation (Code B) 
(Multiple answers allowed) 
      
      
      
Code A: Each year=1; each half year=2; each quarter=3, each month=4; each week=5; no meetings=6; other (specify)=7. 
Code B: Religious meetings=1; to save jointly=2; share experience=3; collective purchases of inputs=4; collective sales of farm outputs=5; plan village related 
events=6; give out credit=7; other (specify)=8. 
 
 
HH number: ...................................                                                                                                                                                   Section  3 
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15. History of off-farm income generation activities by the household members (male and female separately) 
Year Number of household members involved 
1. Working as daily wage labourer 2. Working as permanent labourer 3. Working as labourer in a share 
cropping arrangement  
4. Own business activities 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1990         
1991         
1992         
1993         
1994         
1995         
1996         
1997         
1998         
1999         
2000         
2001         
2002         
2003         
2004         
2005         
2006         
2007         
2008         
2009         
2010         
2011         
2012         
2013         
2014         
2015         
HH number: ...................................                                                                                                                                                   Section  3 
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16. Perceptions of land titles and certification programs 
16.1 Land titles 
a. In the last 15 years, how many conflicts/litigation happened in this village between farmers over land ownership? …… number 
b. Are there any incidents in the village over the last 15 years that the land was taken from a farmer by government agencies or 
plantation/mining companies using force? ……………. (yes = 1; no = 0; NI = No idea) 
 
Details on land title documents: 
 No title With sporadic With systematic 
1. What is the maximum amount of credit obtainable from a bank, having one hectare 
land with the specific title? („000) Rp 
   
2. Price of one hectare of land without plantation but with road access („000) Rp    
 
16.2 Certification schemes  
 ISPO 
Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil  
Certification 
RSPO 
Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil Certification 
1. Are you familiar with the name of the certification schemes?  
(1 = yes; 0 = no) (If no, go to next column/section) 
  
2. How have you heard about the schemes?  (Code A)   
3. Are you currently involved in any of these certification schemes? 
(1 = yes; 0 = no) (If no, go to next column/section) 
  
4. If yes, since which year are you involved?   
5. If yes, what was the main reason for your involvement? (Code B)   
Code A: Other farmers = 1; Processing companies = 2; Government agencies = 3; Non-Governmental organizations = 4; Mass media = 5; Others (specify) = 6. 
Code B: Requirement by processing company = 1; legal requirement = 2; expecting higher prices = 3; expecting higher output = 4; got external support for 
implementing scheme = 5; health benefits = 6; others (specify) = 7 
HH number: ...................................                                                                                                                                                   Section  3 
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17 Decision-making  
Who is primarily responsible for the following consumption expenditure items and tasks?  
Consumption and task items Example Persons responsible (Put √ mark or NA if not applicable) 
Male members Female members Both male and female members equally 
1. Purchase of food items Rice, vegetables, meat etc.     
2. Paying the bills Telephone, electricity, gas etc.     
3. Selecting clothing and 
footwear 
Cloths, tailoring, footwear etc.     
4. Paying for recreation and 
membership  
Movies etc.    
5. Spending on education of 
children (if applicable) 
School fees, books etc.     
6. Travel and transport  Taxi, public bus etc.     
7. Purchase and sale of 
durable goods 
Purchasing television etc.    
8. Purchasing and sale of land 
and houses 
Including involving in sharecropping    
9. Representing the 
household in the public 
Talking to officials, participating in 
the discussions and group meetings etc.  
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Household Survey Questionnaire C07 
(Consumption; Round 2, 2015) 
 
1. Household identification 
1. Village (name):  
2. Dusun (name or number):  
3. RT (number):   
4. Household code (given by supervisor):   
5. Name of respondent:  
6. Did the respondent change since 2012? Yes/No 
7. Why did the respondent change? (Code A)  
8. Gender of respondent: Male / Female 
9. Name of head of household:  
10. Respondent‟s relationship with head of 
household (Code B):  
 
11. Number of persons regularly consuming 
food from your house in last 7 days: 
 
12. Interviewer (name):  
13. Supervisor (name):  
14. Date of interview 
………../………../2015 
Enumerator‟s 
signature: 
 
15. Date questionnaire was checked by 
supervisor:  
………../………../2015 
Supervisor‟s 
signature: 
 
Code A: currently out of village  = 1, moved out of the household=2; passed away=3; other (specify)= 
4 
Code B: Wife/Husband = 1; Daughter/Son = 2; Mother/Father = 3; Sister/Brother = 4;                  
Niece/Nephew = 5; Others (specify) = 6 
 
2. Household expenditure: In the following questions, we want to ask about all items 
consumed in your household, regardless of which person consumed it.  
2.1. Weekly consumption: Has your household consumed following goods during the 
past 7 days? Please exclude from your answer any purchases for processing or resale in a 
household enterprise. 
Item consumed Quantity 
consumed in 
last week (units) 
Unit (number, liter, kg, bag, pieces, etc.) Market 
price, if 
purchased 
(Rp./unit) 
Name  How much kg or litre 
(approx..) one unit is? 
1) Rice (whole)     
2) Rice flour     
3) Wheat (whole)     
4) Wheat flour     
5) Maize     
6) Long bean     
7) Other cereals     
8) Other rice     
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Item consumed Quantity 
consumed in 
last week (units) 
Unit (number, liter, kg, bag, pieces, etc.) Market 
price, if 
purchased 
(Rp./unit) 
Name  How much kg or litre 
(approx..) one unit is? 
9) Cassava     
10) Flour of cassava     
11) Potato     
12) Sweet potato     
13) Gaplek      
14) Taro     
15) Sago     
16) Fish (fresh)     
17) Fish (dry)     
18) Seafood     
19) Beef     
20) Chicken     
21) Duck     
22) Mutton      
23) Buffalo     
24) Goat      
25) Lamb     
26) Sheep     
27) Entrails     
28) Liver      
29) Spleen      
30) Dried jerky meat     
31) Eggs of chicken     
32) Eggs of goose      
33) Eggs of quail     
34) Fresh Milk     
35) Milk powder      
36) Condensed milk      
38)    Water spinach     
39) Land spinach and 
Cassava leaves  
    
40) Cucumber      
41) Carrots      
42) Sprout      
43) String bean      
44) Garlic      
45) Chili      
46) Tomato      
47) Onion      
48) Bitter gourd      
49) Eggplant      
50) Cabbage      
51) Beans      
52) Peanut      
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Item consumed Quantity 
consumed in 
last week (units) 
Unit (number, liter, kg, bag, pieces, etc.) Market 
price, if 
purchased 
(Rp./unit) 
Name  How much kg or litre 
(approx..) one unit is? 
53) Soybeans      
54) Cashew     
55) Tofu     
56) Tempe     
57) Tauco     
58) Oncom     
59) Orange     
60) Mango     
61) Apple     
62) Durian     
63) Rambutan     
64) Duku     
65) Pineapple     
66) Watermelon      
67) Banana     
68) Papaya     
69) Jack fruit     
70) Avocado      
71) Guava      
72) Grapes     
73) Snake fruit     
74) Dragon fruit     
75) Coconut (whole)     
76) Coconut milk     
77) Other fresh fruits     
78) Dry fruits      
79) Honey     
80) Coconut oil     
81) Palm oil     
82) Soybean oil      
83) Other cooking oil      
84) Butter     
85) Sugar      
86) Brown sugar     
87) Tea      
88) Coffee     
89) Syrup     
90) Salt     
91) Candlenut fruit      
92) Coriander      
93) Pepper     
94) Shrimp paste     
95) Soy sauce     
96) Taste enhancer     
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Item consumed Quantity 
consumed in 
last week (units) 
Unit (number, liter, kg, bag, pieces, etc.) Market 
price, if 
purchased 
(Rp./unit) 
Name  How much kg or litre 
(approx..) one unit is? 
97) Ginger     
98) Crackers     
99) Melinjo crackers     
100) Noodles     
101) Rice noodles     
102) Macaroni noodles     
103) Bread     
104) Biscuits     
105) Cakes     
106) Porridge      
107) Meatballs     
108) Iced syrup     
109) Assorted 
vegetable with 
peanut sauce 
    
110) Snacks     
111) Readymade soups       
112) Canned food      
113) Mie instan      
114) Nasigoreng 
Nasikuning 
    
115) Nasi Bungkus     
116) Fried bananas      
117) Baby food     
118) Bottled water     
119) Cola, soda etc.      
120) Fresh fruit juices     
121) Lemonade     
122) Clove cigarettes     
123) Tobacco 
cigarettes 
    
124) Cigars      
125) Tobacco     
126) Betel leaves     
127) Betel nut and 
others 
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Outside house food consumption  No. of times in 
last week 
No. people/time Cost („000 
Rp/person/time) 
128) Breakfast    
129) Lunch    
130) Dinner    
131) Tea/Coffee/Snacks    
 
 
 
2.2. Monthly and annual consumption: Has your household bought or received 
gifts during the past 30 days/ 12 months? Please exclude from your answer any 
purchases for processing or resale in a household enterprise. 
Item Monthly expenditure („000 
Rp./month) 
Yearly expenditure („000 
Rp. /year) 
137) Rent of house if contracted   
138) Rent, estimated if house is owned    
139) Electricity bill  (not for generator)   
140) Telephone bill (fixed phone line)   
141) Gas bill (kitchen)   
142) Kerosene bill   
143) Water bill    
144) Firewood    
145) House maintenance and renovation    
146) Personal care items (soap, shampoo, 
toothpaste, etc.) 
  
147) Personal services (haircuts, shaving, 
etc.) 
  
148) Cosmetics   
149) Tailoring expenses   
150) Laundry   
151) Newspaper and magazines   
152) Membership fees   
153) Toys   
154) Making of ID card/ driver‟s license   
155) Telephone card (mobile phone)   
156) Postal goods    
157) Recreation    
158) Entertainment (e.g., movies, drama)   
159) Travel   
160) Ornaments   
161) Registration fee   
162) SPP   
163) POMG/BP3 /entrance- / re-
registration fee 
  
164) Boy scout   
165) Handcraft   
166) Courses   
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Item Monthly expenditure („000 
Rp./month) 
Yearly expenditure („000 
Rp. /year) 
167) Hospital    
168) Community health center   
169) Doctor´s practice   
170) Traditional healer    
171) Medicine   
172) Footwear (men, women and children)   
173) Clothing (men, women and children)   
174) Household tools   
175) Hand tools   
176) Kitchen tools   
177) Television   
178) Dish TV   
179) Other entertainment facilities   
180) Sports equipment   
181) Jewelry   
182) Vehicles   
183) Umbrellas   
184) Wristwatch    
185) Camera   
186) Install telephone   
187) Install electricity   
188) Electronic equipment   
189) Taxes (House and building tax, TV 
fee, motor vehicle tax) 
  
190) Insurance (accident, health insurance)   
191) Celebration 1 (name:____________)   
192) Celebration 2 (name:____________)   
193) Celebration 3 (name:____________)   
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2.3    Consumption of energy (fuel, light & household appliances) during the last 30 days 
Item Unit 
(name)  
Quantity consumed in 
last one month (units) 
Market price („000 Rp. 
/unit) if purchased 
194) Dung cake    
195) Coal, charcoal, briquettes, coke    
196) LPG [excl. conveyance]    
              a. 3 kg (subsidized)    
              b. 15 kg (non-subsidized)    
197) Battery     
198) Accu/ aki   (car battery)    
199) Generator    
a. Petrol (only for generator)    
b. Diesel (only for generator)    
c. Lubricants oil (only for 
generator) 
   
d. Oil for generator 
maintenance (minyak 
rem, kanvas, etc.) 
   
200) Other fuel    
201) Other consumption (Matches, 
candle, air freshener, Mosquito 
repellent etc.) 
   
 
 
2.4 Public transport expenditures during the last 30 days  
Item  Total expenditure in last month („000 Rp) 
202) Public bus/tram fare  
203) Public minibus (angkot) fare  
204) Air fare  
205) Public motorcycle (ojek)  
206) Taxi, auto-rickshaw fare  
207) Rental car  
208) Other public conveyance expense (such as 
porter charges, horse cart fare, etc.) 
 
 
2.5 Private transport expenditures during the last 30 days  
Item 
  
Fuel cost in last 
month („000 Rp) 
Other expenditures in last month 
 (lubricants, other fuel for vehicle, 
oil for maintenance, etc.) („000 
Rp) 
209) Private car    
210) Private minibus     
211) Private bus    
212) Private motorcycle     
213) Other private transport     
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2.6 Hadj 
Religion of the household members:                     Islam/Others (If others, go to 3) 
If Islam, have any of the household members gone to Hadj?           Yes/No 
If yes, details of past pilgrimages:   
Year of Hadj Number of household 
members went 
If gone for Hadj after 2012, 
expenditure incurred (million Rp) 
   
   
   
 
Are you planning to go for Hadj in the near future?    Yes/No 
If yes, are you saving for Hadj, currently?                    Yes/No 
 
If yes, average savings, kept for this purpose: …………… thousand Rp/year.  
 
 
3. Decision-making 
3.1. Who is primarily responsible for the following consumption expenditure items and tasks? 
(Ask only if the respondent in section 1-3 is different from section 4) 
Consumption and task 
items 
Examples Persons involved (Put √ mark or NA if not 
applicable) 
Male 
members 
Female 
members 
Both male and 
female 
members 
equally 
Purchase of food items Rice, vegetables, meat etc.     
Paying the bills Telephone, electricity, gas 
etc.  
   
Selecting clothing and 
footwear 
Clothes, tailoring, footwear 
etc.  
   
Paying for recreation 
and membership  
Movies etc.    
Spending on education 
of children (if applicable) 
School fees, books etc.     
Travel and transport  Taxi, public bus etc.     
Purchase and sale of 
durable goods 
Purchasing television etc.    
Purchasing and sale of 
land and houses 
Including involving in 
sharecropping 
   
Representing the 
household in the public 
Talking to govt. officials, 
participating in the 
discussions and group 
meetings etc.  
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